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ABSTRACT 
 
THE DEMAND FOR PREVENTIVE ACTIVITIES AMONG OLDER ADULTS AND ITS 
ASSOCIATION WITH MEDICARE EXPENDITURES  
Andrea Puig de la Parra 
Supervisor: Mark Pauly 
 
 In recent years, certain health policy makers have emphasized the need for an 
increase in preventive services interventions as means to improve health outcomes and 
cut health care costs. Oftentimes, the debate around the purported benefits of 
prevention centers on the need to cut the costs of highly costly systems such as 
Medicare. However, little is known about the factors that might actually influence the 
demand for preventive services among older adults, neither do we know much about 
how the dynamic for the demand for prevention plays out among older adults within 
the context of a household. Moreover, there is little evidence to support the belief that 
all preventive activities necessarily translate in cost savings. This dissertation examines 
the theoretical and empirical factors that influence the demand for prevention at the 
individual and household level. It also analyzes the associations between a diverse set of 
preventive services and Medicare expenditures in older adults. Using a panel data set 
from the Health and Retirement study linked to Medicare claims data, I find evidence 
that while lifestyle prevention such as physical activity, non-smoking and normal weight 
status maintenance are negatively associated with Medicare expenditures at ages 65-69, 
clinical preventive activities such as flu shot, cholesterol screening, mammography, Pap 
smears test and prostate cancer screening have at best no effect on expenditures, at 
worst they are positively associated; yet these findings may be biased due to 
uncontrolled unobservables. Also, I find that education, risk aversion, and long term 
planning are significantly associated with a higher demand for all preventive services. 
Finally, I find large bargaining effects between household members whereby spouses 
initiate and terminate preventive activities together. This result leaves room for policy 
makers to take advantage of spillover effects in the design of interventions designed 
with the purpose of increasing the demand for prevention. 
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INTRODUCTION: THE (HEALTH) ECONOMICS OF PREVENTION 
The idea that people invest in health in order to create human capital has long been 
entrenched in the health economics literature. At the same time, the belief in the old 
Benjamin Franklin adage of ―a penny saved is a penny earned” has become a powerful mantra 
among certain policy makers interested in cutting costs in the health care system. However, 
despite the enthusiasm about the promise of preventive behavior, the potential for 
prevention to generate cost savings has quite often been exaggerated. Fewer than 20% of 
studied preventive options are cost-saving (Russell, 2009, Cohen, Neumann & Weinstein, 
2008). The characteristics of those preventive services that save money and those that do not 
vary so much that it is puzzling to think that all types of prevention programs are all too 
often expected to have the same effect on a determined outcome.  
Few comprehensive studies have been carried out to study what are the factors that 
make preventive activities different from each other. Little is known about the characteristics 
that affect the demand for prevention, particularly among the population of older adults 
whose medical expenditures comprise a sizable portion of most countries‘ health care 
budgets. Neither has it been thoroughly studied what role these characteristics play in 
accounting for selection when the association between prevention and expenditures is 
explored. The purpose of this dissertation is to shed light in a comprehensive and thorough 
manner as to these questions. 
2 
 
1. The meaning of prevention 
There are several ways to define prevention and the behaviors associated with it. 
Kenkel (2000) distinguishes among primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention. Primary 
prevention is understood as actions that reduce the occurrence or incidence of disease. 
Vaccinations and healthy lifestyles decisions such as regular exercise and smoking cessation 
are grouped in this category. Secondary prevention involves actions that reduce or eliminate 
the health consequences of a disease given its occurrence. Examples in this category are 
preventive screenings for hypertension or cancer. Finally, tertiary prevention encompasses 
actions that reduce disability associated with a chronic illness (e.g. chronic treatment of 
diabetes to prevent amputation).  
To a large extent, the prevalent threats to health influence what is meant by 
prevention. In developed countries, the prevalence of serious communicable diseases is low 
and conditions such as heart disease and cancer are the major causes of death. As a result of 
this so-called epidemiologic transition, prevention increasingly involves lifestyle changes that 
reduce risk factors for these conditions. McGinnis and Foege (1993) review evidence on the 
relative contributions of various external factors linked to the leading causes of death in the 
U.S. They conclude that the three most prominent contributors to mortality in 1990 were 
tobacco, diet and activity patterns, and alcohol, which together accounted for almost 40 
percent of all deaths. With an increased aged population, health problems associated with 
chronic but not life-threatening conditions will become more important. 
The picture in developing countries is decidedly different where prevention aimed at 
communicable diseases remains the highest priority. Moreover, prevention is hardly ever 
3 
 
directed to older populations. Although prevention in a context of developing countries is 
interesting in itself, it will not be the focus of this dissertation; hence further discussion will 
be avoided. 
2. Prevention in economic models 
Theoretical models provide insights and frameworks for thinking about the 
economics of prevention. Consumer or household behavior has received most of the 
attention. Among this kind of studies, Michael Grossman‘s (1972) human capital model is 
perhaps the most prominent. In Grossman's seminal work, the individual's health capital 
stock determines a flow of utility directly and also determines the amount of time available 
for market and nonmarket production. Gross investment in health capital is produced by 
combining time, purchased medical care, and other purchased goods according to a 
household production process. The demand for health inputs, including medical care, is thus 
derived from the demand for health capital. 
A problem with Grossman's basic model in the context of the study of prevention is 
that it does not really allow for a useful, clear distinction to be made between preventive and 
curative care. In an extension, Grossman and Rand (1974) distinguish prevention and cure 
by assuming that groups with low depreciation rates primarily demand preventive care while 
groups with high depreciation rates primarily demand curative care. The distinction between 
prevention and cure is not very common in subsequent theoretical studies that build on the 
Grossman model. Whether or not prevention is distinguished from cure, the health capital 
framework provides useful insights into the roles schooling, time preference, initial health 
stock and age play in preventive health demand. 
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The basic model has, however, been argued to be unduly unrealistic as a description 
of the inherently uncertain area of health and utilization behavior in that its main part is 
based on the assumption of complete certainty (Dowie , 1975). Although Grossman (1972, 
pp. 19-21, especially footnote 18) does give a short discussion of the introduction of 
uncertainty into the basic framework and its implications, the explicit incorporation of 
uncertainty remained to be analyzed by others. Dardanoni and Wagstaff (1990) look into the 
case where the effectiveness of medical care and the incidence of illness are uncertain and 
derive different expressions of the demand for medical care for different types of 
uncertainty. In their static version of the Grossman consumption model, Dardanoni and 
Wagstaff find that, under plausible assumptions, greater uncertainty results in an increase in 
the demand for medical care. 
Cropper (1977) constructs a life-cycle model for the investment in health capital. Her 
model is, in my view, the most important theoretical development in terms of adapting the 
Grossman framework to the analysis of prevention while including the element of 
uncertainty. She considers illness and death to be random, and then studies the individual's 
investment in health and occupational choice. Comparing the models of Grossman (1972) 
and Cropper (1977), age may play distinctly different roles in the demand for curative and 
preventive care. In Grossman's model, because health capital is assumed to depreciate at a 
higher rate as people get older, if the price elasticity of the demand for health is smaller than 
one then the derived demand for curative medical care increases with age. Cropper shows 
that there is an effect working in the opposite direction to Grossman for preventive care. 
When the length of life is exogenous, because the pay-off period for any human capital 
investment is shorter for older individuals, use of preventive care tends to decline with age. 
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In contrast, when Cropper makes the length of life endogenous and assumes the 
depreciation rate rises with age, she obtains the same results as in Grossman's model. 
Another criticism of Grossman‘s model lies in the fact that his justification of the 
positive education-health correlation is somewhat unsatisfactory. Grossman (1972) 
hypothesizes that schooling increases the efficiency of the household production of health. 
Viewing prevention choices as inputs into the household production of health, Grossman's 
model yields ambiguous predictions about the relationship between schooling and 
prevention. Schooling reduces the shadow price of health capital which increases the 
demand for health capital, but the derived demand for health inputs such as prevention only 
increases if the price elasticity of the demand for health capital exceeds one. 
Muurinen (1972) attempts to formalize the role of schooling better.  In her model 
health stock is not the only durable capital good producing services. In simplified terms, the 
individual has three different stocks available for service creation in each period of life: firstly 
his or her stock of health, secondly his or her stock of skills and knowledge (education) - 
these first two together constituting the human capital of the individual in question, and 
thirdly his or her stock of wealth, the external financial capital available. In her model, the 
effect of education affects the demand for prevention via its impact on the use-related rate 
of depreciation on health. If education reduces the rate of depreciation, health is positively 
correlated with it. This result conforms to the predictions of Grossman‘s investment model, 
but its justification is different. 
The estimated relationships between schooling and the health behaviors might be 
due to unobservable differences across individuals, as Fuchs (1982) and Farrell and Fuchs 
(1982) suggest. In many conceptual analyses the individual rate of time preference plays an 
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important role in prevention decisions. Fuchs (1982) and Farrell and Fuchs (1982) suggest it 
as a candidate for the "hidden third variable" behind the link between schooling and health, 
if people with low rates of time preference are more likely to invest in both schooling and 
prevention. Becker and Mulligan (1997) challenged this view, arguing that time preference 
may be endogenous to health. In their model, Becker and Mulligan assume that each person 
is endowed with an initial level of subjective discount rate, but that rate can be modified by 
the individual investing time and resources to produce ―future-oriented capital‖ to make the 
future more salient, allowing one to appreciate the future more and to place more weight on 
future utility of consumption -- leading to a lower subjective discount rate. 
In summary, theoretical models provide insights and frameworks for thinking about 
the economics of prevention. Consumer or household behavior has received most of the 
attention. These lines of research have led to some empirical studies with tight links between 
the theoretical model and empirical specification. Below, I overview some of the empirical 
studies and their implications. It is important to note, however, that for many of such 
studies, theoretical models such as Grossman‘s only provide general guidance for the 
specification of empirical models of prevention decisions, for example, in terms of 
explanatory variables to be included in a demand model. This is a result due in part to the 
generalized and complicated nature of demand models such as Grossman‘s. In order to 
analyze specific problems in greater detail, it is necessary to concentrate on particular aspects 
of the model and to develop these submodels further, possibly at the expense of major 
simplifications in the rest of the framework. Nevertheless, the underlying conceptual model 
still remains in force, providing a very general economic explanation of health behavior, 
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which can be seen as a distinct advantage over the practice of utilizing several disconnected 
ad hoc models as the basis for an economic theory of health. 
 
3. Empirical factors associated with the demand for prevention 
As mentioned before, Grossman‘s theoretical model is a useful framework in which 
empirical work can be based on. Researchers have used a variety of data sources and 
empirical methods to determine the effect of some of the variables modeled by Grossman 
and other authors. Some of the more interesting and tractable results pertain to the study of 
the effects of age, education, time preferences, and insurance on the demand for preventive 
services. 
Kenkel (1994) finds that annual use of preventive medical services designed for the 
early detection of breast and cervical cancer decreases with increasing age. Although not the 
only plausible explanation, the results are consistent with women rationally reducing their 
use of preventive care as the payoff period to the investment shortens over the lifecycle. In 
general, the age patterns of the demand for prevention depend on the specific intervention 
because the risks of different illnesses show different lifecycle patterns. 
Schooling is also related to prevention for adult health and safety. For example, 
Leigh (1990) finds that people with more schooling are more likely to use seatbelts. Kenkel 
(1991a, 1991 b) finds that more schooling is associated with healthier lifestyle choices 
regarding smoking, drinking, and exercise. Kenkel (1994) finds that schooling is an 
important determinant of women's demand for preventive medical services designed for the 
early detection of breast and cervical cancer. Mullahy (1999) finds that more schooling is 
associated with a higher propensity to be immunized against the flu. The relationship is 
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estimated to be particularly strong for people over 65, where each year of schooling is 
associated with a 1.5 percentage point increase in the probability of being immunized. All of 
the empirical studies listed control for factors such as family income and age, but differ in 
their ability to control for other differences that might explain the schooling-prevention link. 
A crucial aspect, for this study is to investigate whether time preferences correlate 
with real-world expressions. Particularly, I am interested in investigating whether time 
preferences are related to the decision to invest in a special kind of future health 
investments, namely preventive behavior. In this regard, it is only fair to mention that the 
evidence has been mixed. Chapman and Elstein (1995) and Chapman, Nelson and Heir 
(1999) found only weak correlations between discount rates for money and health. Fuchs 
(1982) found no correlation between a prototypical measure of time preference (e.g.  
―Would you choose $1500 now or $4000 in five years?‖) and other behaviors that would 
plausibly be affected by time preference (e.g. smoking, credit-card debt, seatbelt use, and the 
frequency of exercise and dental checkups). Nor did he find much correlation among any of 
these reported behaviors. Yet, Chapman and Coups (1999) found that corporate employees 
who chose to receive an influenza vaccination did have significantly lower discount rates (as 
inferred from a matching task with monetary loses), but found no relation between 
vaccination behavior and hypothetical questions involving health outcomes. Munasinghe and 
Sicherman (2000) found that smokers tend to invest less in human capital (they have flatter 
wage profiles), and many others have found that for stylized intertemporal choices among 
monetary rewards, heroin addicts have higher discount rates (e.g. Alvos, Gregson & Ross, 
1993; Kirby, Petry, & Bickel, 1999).  Picone, Sloan and Taylor (2004) found that individuals 
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with a higher life expectancy and lower time preference are more likely to undergo cancer 
screening. 
Any study that aims to find a relationship between use of preventive services and 
future health expenditures has to consider the effect that insurance coverage may have in the 
use of preventive services. A fairly well established arm of the literature has looked into the 
effect of insurance coverage on the delivery of preventive services. A study looking at cross-
sectional data used age 65 as an IV to study the effect of insurance coverage on self-reported 
access to care, and utilization of medical services (Card, Dobkin & Maestas, 2008). This 
study found no large or statistically significant jumps in smoking or exercise participation 
when subjects turn 65. The authors posed that health behaviors evolve smoothly with age, 
and do not change suddenly at 65. McWilliams, Zaslavsky, Meara and Ayanian (2003) 
utilized longitudinal HRS data to compare the use of basic clinical services and medications 
in a nationally representative cohort of previously insured and uninsured near-elderly adults 
before and after they became eligible for Medicare at age 65 years. They discovered that 
substantial differences in cholesterol testing, mammography, and prostate examination 
between continuously uninsured and insured near elderly adults before age 65 years were 
reduced by half or more after these adults became eligible for Medicare coverage. 
4. The value of prevention 
Whether prevention does save money has been a running debate for decades. As 
long ago as 1986, in the book Is Prevention Better than Cure?, Rutgers economist Louise Russell 
argued that prevention rarely reduces costs. The issue resurfaced recently as policymakers 
embraced prevention as a means for controlling spending.  Russell (2007) reiterated her 
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message that prevention rarely saves money in a report for the National Coalition for Health 
Care. Russell‘s main point is that prevention does not always reduce medical care costs, 
because often the intervention is delivered to a large group, only a very small fraction of 
whom would get the disease without the intervention and thus incur treatment costs. Cohen, 
Neumann and Weinstein (2008) directed an article to the 2008 presidential candidates, 
arguing that prevention is inherently no more cost effective than conventional medical care. 
In April 2008, an article in the same journal described primary prevention as having the 
―lowest potential‖ among policy options for cost savings (Mongan, Ferris and Lee, 2008). 
4.1.  Lifestyle prevention and health expenditures 
Perhaps the area where more success has been had in finding the value of prevention 
is among those activities that modify lifestyle decisions or improve risk factors for chronic 
conditions. As the literature reveals, lifestyle prevention interventions have shown to be 
better able to improve health outcomes and/or modify future health expenditures than 
medical interventions. Nevertheless, the quality of many of the studies in this vein of the 
literature is very seldom as sound as it should be. 
One of the first efforts to assess the effects of multiple behavioral risk factors 
examined the impact of exercise, weight, smoking, hypertension, alcohol use, cholesterol 
level, and seatbelt use on health care utilization and costs dates back to the eighties (Brink 
1987). This non-peer-reviewed study relied on data collected on Control Data Corporation 
employees for the period 1981 through 1984. After following 10,000 employees for four 
years, the auditors concluded that medical care claims were lowest for employees who did 
not smoke cigarettes, exercised regularly, ate nutritious foods, fastened their seat belts, and 
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were not hypertensive. The analysis was descriptive in nature, and little effort was made to 
estimate the independent effects of each of the risk factors or other confounding variables. 
Using health insurance claims and health risk appraisal (HRA) data collected from 
4,782 employees of The Travelers Companies, Golaszewski, Lynch, Clearie and Vickery 
(1989) estimated the relationship between health expenditures and health index scores (a 
relatively crude measure of health status/health risk defined as the difference between actual 
and "appraised" ages). Using a cube-root transformation of medical claims, a significant 
inverse relationship for age and the health index was identified for men. No relationships 
were found for women. It was concluded that, for men when age is held constant, a negative 
relationship exist between retrospective medical claims and a health risk appraisal-generated 
health status indicator, the health index. In an analysis of the determinants of both medical 
claims and absenteeism costs, Yen, Eddington and Witting (1992) examined data on 1,284 
hourly employees from a manufacturing company. In this study, six of the health-related 
measures significantly predicted costs in multiple regression models (age, perception of 
health, personal health problems, self-reported 1984 absences, smoking and 
drug/medication use). However, the study relied upon a limited time frame (i.e., 2 years) and 
a relatively small sample size.  
One of the most impressive studies (Goetzel, Anderson, Whitmer, Ozminkowski, 
Dunn, Wasserman, 1998 ) to date on the link between medical care costs and risk factors 
was produced through a collaboration of six employers (Chevron, Health Trust, Hoffman-
LaRoche, Marriott, the State of Michigan, and the State of Tennessee), which was organized 
by the Health Enhancement Research Organization (HERO). StayWell, a health promotion 
vendor, and MEDSTAT, a medical care cost data management organization, had medical 
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care cost data on the six employers (46,026 employees). With the assistance of HERO and 
the permission of the employers, these two databases were merged to determine the 
relationship between 10 modifiable risk factors and medical care costs. The strengths of this 
study include the large sample size, measurement of a wide range of risk factors and the 
multivariate nature of the analysis. Seven of ten modifiable health risks are associated with 
significantly higher health care expenditures: those who reported themselves as depressed 
(70% higher expenditures), at high stress (46%), with high blood glucose levels (35%), at 
extremely high or low body weight (21%), former (20%) and current (14%) tobacco users, 
with high blood pressure (12%), and with sedentary lifestyle (10%). These same risk factors 
were found to be associated with a higher likelihood of having extremely high (outlier) 
expenditures. A common problem of all of the studies cited above is that the use of 
employer-based data on interventions can cause selection biases. Decisions to participate in 
the studies were voluntary. As a result, the study sample may or may not be representative of 
all of the employees of the organizations that participated in the study, much less the general 
working population. 
Although, there is some evidence of the effect of risk factors in the employer setting, 
few studies have examined the link between risk factors and expenditures in the public 
insurance realm. Among the few studies that have used publicly available data, one of them 
used data from four waves of the HRS to assess the impact of smoking on use of hospital 
and physicians‘ services and nursing home care (Picone & Sloan, 2001). The authors 
uncovered that smoking increased medical utilization and dollar outlays by 5 to 8 percent on 
average, with substantial variation in incidence by payer.  Public payers bore a 
disproportionate burden. Daviglus et al. (2004) used longitudinal data to find that BMI 
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assessed during young adulthood and middle age was significantly and positively associated 
with average annual cardiovascular disease-related and total Medicare health care charges in 
older age as well as with CVD-related and total cumulative charges from age 65 years to 
death or to age 83 years. 
Perhaps the closest study to the one I investigate in this dissertation was done by 
Daviglus et al. (2005). The study followed participants in the Chicago Heart Association 
Detection Project in Industry (CHA) study. The sample consisted on men and women aged 
32 to 64 years at baseline in 1967 through 1973, who died at ages 66 to 99 years and had 
Medicare coverage for at least one year in 1984 through 2002. In it, CVD expenditures were 
obtained for 39,522 adults from Medicare Claims data. Participants were classified as having 
favorable levels of all major cardiovascular risk factors (low risk), that is, serum cholesterol 
level lower than 200 mg/dL (>.2 mmol/L), blood pressure 120/80 mm Hg or lower and no 
antihypertensive medication, body mass index (calculated as weight in kilograms divided by 
the square of height in meters) lower than 25, no current smoking, no diabetes, and no 
electrocardiographic abnormalities. The study shows categorically that in the last year of life, 
average Medicare charges were lowest for low-risk persons.   
4.2.  Cost-effectiveness analysis and prevention 
For clinical preventive interventions, a more useful perspective emerges when the 
calculation considers the return on investment, such as cost-effectiveness (CE) research. 
Here, too, studies can reach different conclusions. For example, in three studies, estimates of 
the CE of various mammography screening protocols ranged from $4,200 per QALY to 
$140,000 per QALY (Stone, Teutsch, Chapman, Bell, Goldie & Neumann, 2000). Overall 
assessments of the CE of preventive services also are inconsistent. As noted earlier, Russell, 
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Weinstein, and other economists have questioned whether the average CE of preventive 
services is any better than for medical treatments. Conversely, groups such as Partnership for 
Prevention and the Partnership to Fight Chronic Disease (2010) paint a more positive 
picture and speak of low CE ratios and cost savings for some forms of prevention. 
Such disparate findings stem in part from technical variations in how economic 
evaluations are conducted (Gold 1996). The frame of reference affects inferences about the 
CE of prevention. For example, it matters whether the analysts have taken a societal 
perspective or are considering the costs and benefits experienced by a sector (e.g., payers, 
employers), and the time horizon they are considering (Leatherman, Berwick, Iles, Lewin, 
Davidoff, Nolan & Bisognano, 2003). Those who benefit from and bear the costs of 
preventive services are not always the same. It matters whether the study evaluates the CE of 
the intervention compared to doing nothing, or the marginal (i.e., incremental), CE of option 
A versus option B. 
Nevertheless, in the largest and most comprehensive review of the cost-effectiveness 
literature on prevention, Cohen, Neumann and Weinstein (2008) analyzed the contents of 
the Tufts–New England Medical Center Cost-Effectiveness Analysis Registry (www.tufts-
nemc.org/cearegistry), which consists of detailed abstracted information on published cost-
effectiveness studies through 2005. This study found that cost-effectiveness ratios for 
preventive measures and treatments are very similar — in other words, opportunities for 
efficient investment in health care programs are roughly equal for prevention and treatment, 
at least as reflected in the literature reviewed. Moreover, both distributions of preventive and 
curative services span the full range of cost-effectiveness. Therefore, just as with curative 
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interventions, it is not reasonable to assume that all preventive interventions are cost-
effective just because they may improve health outcomes.  
In sum, the literature on the value of prevention is by no means definitive. The 
review presented above, indicates that those preventive activities that reduce risk factors for 
chronic diseases such as lower body mass index and non smoking habits might in fact render 
good value. However, the studies in this class fail to completely surmount selection biases 
and are not specific in explaining whether the changes in lifestyle are scalable to the general 
population. Clinical preventive activities, on the other hand, tend to struggle to prove to be 
cost-effective just as much as other curative interventions. Contrary to popular perception, 
hardly any clinical prevention has ever shown to be cost saving. 
5. Preface 
Prevention is a thorny topic to study in the health economics literature. Furthermore, 
research assessing the relationship between preventive behavior and medical expenditures is 
accompanied by numerous challenges. People who engage in preventive activities and people 
who do not differ in many measurable and immeasurable ways, any of which could account 
for differences in both health outcomes and expenditures that one might otherwise attribute 
to preventive behavior. Similarly, individuals engaging in preventive activities differ not only 
in demographic attributes but also in health behaviors, preferences and attitudes toward 
health and health care, multiple dimensions of health status, and health trajectories. Given 
the absence of a natural experiment, causal associations relating prevention and expenditures 
are difficult to establish.  
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This dissertation attempts to be a comprehensive study of prevention among older 
adults in four parts. The first chapter focuses on the theoretical models for the demand for 
prevention. In it, I propose a theoretical model suitable to understand the factors influencing 
the demand for prevention among older adults for which other theoretical models are not 
valid. Chapter two uses data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) to test empirically 
the predictions of the theoretical model regarding the factors that affect the demand for 
prevention. In chapter three, I take a look at the demand for prevention at the household 
level. In particular, I examine theoretically and empirically using HRS data, the reasons why 
the demand for prevention among spouses might be correlated. Finally, in the last chapter I 
describe and analyze how the demand for prevention services among HRS respondents is 
associated with Medicare expenditures. Different empirical approaches are used to 
ameliorate and characterize potential biases.  
The reader is, of course, advised to read the complete dissertation as a broad and 
comprehensive study of the topic. However, although there are some natural connections 
and references between the four chapters, each of them was written to capture a self-
contained narrative. 
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CHAPTER 1: A THEORETICAL STUDY ON THE DEMAND FOR 
PREVENTIVE ACTIVITIES AMONG OLDER ADULTS 
1. Introduction 
Grossman‘s model of health capital (1972a, 1972b, 2000) is considered a cornerstone 
in the economics of the derived demand for medical care. In Grossman‘s human capital 
framework individuals demand medical care (e.g., invest time and consume medical goods 
and services) for the consumption benefits (health provides utility) as well as production 
benefits (healthy individuals have greater earnings) that good health provides. In this first 
chapter of the dissertation, I modify Michael Grossman model (1972a, 1972b) in order to 
generate testable predictions that identify the factors that drive the demand of older adults 
for prevention. These predictions are later explored empirically in chapter 2. 
Several papers on demand-for-health related topics have appeared since Grossman‘s 
seminal work exploring a variety of phenomena related to health, medical care, inequality in 
health, the relationship between health and socioeconomic status, and occupational choice  
(Galama and Kapteyn, 2009). Cropper (1977) constructs a life-cycle model for the 
investment in health capital, where she considers illness and death to be random, and then 
studies the individual's investment in health and occupational choice. Muurinen (1982) 
elaborates on Grossman's demand-for-health model and looks at the comparative static 
results of age, education and wealth effects. Dardanoni and Wagstaff (1990) look into the 
case where the effectiveness of medical care and the incidence of illness are uncertain and 
derive different expressions of the demand for medical care for different types of 
uncertainty. Liljas (1998) develops Michael Grossman‘s demand-for-health model by letting 
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the depreciation rate depend upon the level of health, by letting the incidence and size of 
illness be uncertain, and by investigating how the individual‘s demand for health would be 
affected by the introduction of insurance. 
In this model, although following the basic Grossman framework, I step away from 
him in several ways. Firstly, I do not include time inputs into the production of consumption 
nor in the production of medical care. The reason for that is that Grossman‘s model uses the 
wage rate as the best way to establish a price for time. However, my study will focus on 
studying the demand for preventive services on near-elderly and elderly people, a majority of 
whom earn no wages since they are already retired. Therefore, my formulation allows for a 
more general treatment of the costs of health investments. Secondly, I use a more complex 
depreciation function for health that depends on more factors than Grossman‘s which 
depends solely on time. Thirdly, I incorporate the effect of curative care by modeling it as a 
function that negatively depends on the stock of health. Finally, I consider an extension to 
Grossman‘s model by which unhealthy habits enter the utility function. This last 
consideration helps to dichotomize the different kinds of preventive investments into: those 
investments that directly affect the stock of health care and those that intervene through the 
deterioration of the health stock.  
2. The theoretical model  
 
2.1. Assumptions 
The following assumptions will be made about the individual, her production of 
health and the environment: (a) all functions are continuous and differentiable and (b) other 
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variables and parameters in the model are unaffected by the defined changes that is, no 
indirect effects. 
2.2. General form 
The individual seeks to maximize her lifetime utility. Utility is a function of a 
composite consumption goods, Z(t), at each time t, and of the services of the stock of 
health. The services of health are defined as reduced illness in the form of healthy time, h(t): 
(1)                       
 
 
  
where θ is the individual‘s subjective rate of time preferences. Healthy time h(t) is produced 
from the stock of health, H(t), according to: 
 
(2)              , ϕ‘>0, ϕ‘‘<0  
The time of death, T, is defined by the stock of health. 
(3)                     
Following Liljas (1998), health stock changes over time. Further, in this model, as 
compared to Grossman‘s original model, the depreciation of health capital is also a function 
of other environmental exogenous variables, Qt: 
 
(4) 
  
  
                          , 
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where I stands for investment in preventive measures. Health can be improved through 
investments I, and deteriorates at the ―natural‖ health deterioration rate δ. f(t) is the input 
coefficient of preventive activities and satisfies the following condition: 
(5) f(t)>0 for all t, 
Z, represents investment in other consumption goods. 
 Curative care can be purchased at price pM. The amount of curative care is assumed 
to depend on the state of health which is represented by the stock of health capital H. Thus 
M=M(H) with: 
(6)                  
Since the decision on the amount of curative care is usually taken by the physician, it 
is not modeled here; it is simply included in the budget constraint. 
Following Muurinen (1982), the second dynamic constraint in the model is similar to 
equation (4) and expresses the change in the stock of wealth,    , which is a function of 
W(t), income Y(t), and the costs of investments: 
 
(7) 
  
  
                          
                           
        , 
where pZ(t) and pI(t) are the exogenous prices of Z(t) and I(t), respectively, r is a constant 
rate of interest and Y is earned income and Y(h(t), R(t)) meaning that income is a function 
of health time and other relevant variables, R(t).  
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(8) 
  
  
      
 
In other words, the healthier a person is, the more favorable the conditions are for 
the earning of income. 
Let‘s assume that preventive activities are positive throughout {0,T}. In this case, the 
optimization requires the following conditions. 
(9)          
(10)           
which are both assumed to be a constant. 
(11)           
(12)                  
(13)        
And 
(14) H(t), Z(t), I(t), pM(t), pI(t), pZ(t) are non-negative for all t. 
Where t is a continuous variable. 
Maximization of expression (1), taking into account (2), gives the following 
Hamiltonian: 
(15)                                                      
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where λ1 is the adjoint variable associated with the differential equation (4) for health H(t), 
λ2 is the adjoint variable associated with the differential equation (7) for wealth W(t). 
The necessary conditions for a maximum require, in addition to (4) and (7) and the 
boundary conditions, that the following conditions are satisfied: 
(16) 
  
     
             
    
(17)        
(18) 
  
     
             
    
(19)                      
(20) 
  
  
       
                                    
  
   
(21) 
  
  
           
The individual‘s time of death, T, depends on the individual‘s investment in health 
capital in earlier periods and will occur when the level of health is equal to Hmin. The value of 
the maximized Hamiltonian at the unspecified final time T, equals zero: 
(22)                
(23)           
Meaning that at the time close to the individual‘s death, T, her gross investments in 
health capital are smaller than the depreciation of health capital, thus investing in health is of 
no value for the individual at the moment of death. 
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The case that the individual never invests in health in t ≤ T may appear, but will not 
be considered here. Thus since I(t)>0, equation (18) can be set equal to zero by assumption: 
(24)      
  
    
         
Differentiating (24) renders: 
(25)                       
Where,  
(26)      
  
    
 
From (21), and considering that K is a constant, one gets: 
(27)       
         
    
  
  
Substituting into (20): 
(28)       
                                 
     
                  , which reduces to: 
(29)  
         
 
                  
     
    
  
    
    
  
In (28), Uh represent the consumption benefits of health, and Yh is the effect of 
healthy time on earned income.  
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This optimality condition is similar to Grossman‘s model. In Grossman‘s investment 
model, the consumption benefits of health equal zero. In that case, the YH in my model 
would be analogous to the wage rate in Grossman‘s. The remaining differences between (29) 
and Grossman‘s formulation lie the specification of the marginal costs of new health 
investment, C(t). While in Grossman the costs for investment in health are defined in terms 
the price away from productive activities such as work, in my model the cost of preventive 
investments in health is a function of the price of such investments and the productivity of 
those investments.  I have chosen to move away from Grossman‘s framework mainly 
because the empirical aspect of the study deals with data extracted from older individuals 
who are mostly retired. Thus, in this context, the wage rate cannot be seen as the 
theoretically correct measure of the price of time.  
2.3. Comparative statics 
2.3.1.  Effect of age, t 
Following Muurinen (1982), the best way to obtain comparative statics in this is to 
convert (29) to logarithms. I assume that the proportionate change of health investment over 
time,            dos not depend on age and equals    .  
(30) ln 
       
 
                                  
    
    
  
Differentiation with respect to time yields: 
(31) 
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Using (25), the last term in the last derivative in parenthesis can be written as: 
(32)   
    
    
 
         
  
 
Let‘s assume, for simplicity, that MH is constant through time. In other words, the 
marginal amount medical care given a certain level of health stays the same through time. 
Then: 
(33) 
  
  
    
    
  
 
  
  
 
Since by assumption MH is negative (see equation (6)) and the effectiveness of 
preventive activities is assumed to decrease with time so f‘(t)<0, then πt is positive. I further 
assume that all rates are the same, i.e. the rate of depreciation of utility θ, the rate of interest 
on wealth r, and the rate of depreciation of health investment    . For simplicity I well 
denote (δ+π) as φ. Then (31) simplifies into: 
(34) 
        
  
 
          
  
 
          
  
 
      
  
 
Following Grossman,             is denoted by -1/ε, negative of the inverse of 
the marginal efficiency of health capital. I will use a tilde above a variable to denote its 
percentage change over time (i.e.
       
  
). 
(35)    ε              
 And  
(36)                  
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From (26), I can easily solve for     
(37) 
          
  
      
      
    
       
From the assumption in equation (5), f (t)>0 and assuming that the productivity of 
investment in health decrease with age:        . Thus,     is positive. To derive the effect 
of age on investments, equation (4) can be solved for I and written in logarithm form: 
(38)                                         
   
 
     
          
Differentiating with respect to time, one arrives to: 
(39) 
 
 
 
  
  
         
         
  
 -    =               
             
            
 -      
So, assuming that     is independent of age. 
(40)      
          
           
           
            
 
The denominator of the first term in equation (40) equals      , which multiplied 
by H(t) renders         Since this is positive, the denominator in (40) is positive too. 
Hence, the whole expression is positive if ε is less than or equal to one, and negative if ε is 
greater than one. In other words, the demand for investment in preventive activities depends 
on the marginal efficiency of health capital in producing healthy days. Therefore, the effect 
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of age on investment for preventive activities is ambiguous. As such, this effect should be 
tested empirically. 
Another observation from equation (40) is that the rate of investment in preventive 
activities through time augments in magnitude if the rate of depreciation increases. In other 
words, a higher rate of depreciation would increase the rate at which the demand for 
preventive investments in health accelerate or decelerate with time.   
2.3.2. Effect of education, E 
Education effects can be derived by differentiating (38) with respect to education. C, 
cost of medical care, is not dependent on education in the model.  
(41)                                            
   
 
     
          
(42) 
  
  
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
    
  
    
  
  
  
  
      
The effect of education in health is given by: 
(43)     
 
 
 
  
  
        
This expression means that if education slows down the rate of depreciation in 
health (i.e.      ), then health is positively correlated with education. This result is the 
same as in the Grossman model.  
Assuming that     is independent of education, and considering (39) and (40), 
education affects investment in healthy activities in the following way:  
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(44) 
  
  
   
          
           
           
    
Since, the denominator of the term in brackets is positive (see discussion for 
equation (40)), and since I assume I>0, the sign of the expression depends on the 
numerator. Thus, a sufficient condition for 
  
  
 to be positive is if ε, is less than or equal to 
one. In this way, the signs of equations (40) and (44) are linked to each other, if demand for 
preventive activities increases with age, investment in these activities decreases with 
education, and vice versa. These two conditions can and should be tested empirically. 
In sum, education in this model works by reducing the rate of health deterioration, 
which lowers the user cost of health investments. This is conceptually different from the 
results in Grossman‘s model whereby education is positively associated with health, because 
it increases the general non-market productivity of the individual thus reducing the marginal 
cost of new investment in health. In this model, an implicit assumption has been that 
education does not affect the production benefits of health or the income loss caused by 
using medical care (i.e. Y is not a function of education).  
2.3.3. Effect of time preferences 
A simplifying assumption in the derivation of (37) was made by assuming that the 
time preference and interest rate differ (see discussion under equation (31)). Let‘s assume 
now that the production benefits of health, YH, are zero. The interest rate and the rate of 
depreciation of health are the same. Therefore, equation (29) reduces to: 
(45)  
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Again, denoting φ as the sum of δ and 
         
  
 , I can write (45) in logarithmic form: 
(46)    θ                            
Differentiating equation (43) with respect to time, one arrives to: 
(47)    θ  
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In this case, the equivalent expression for equation (36) becomes: 
(48)                         
Equations (33) and (48) equal each other if θ equals r. If the rate of time preference 
is higher than the rate of interest, the health stock deteriorates more rapidly. So according to 
this interpretation, an increase in the discount rate of time leads to a lower valuation of 
future consumption and, thus, decreases the return on prevention. Therefore, the reduction 
in prevention in order to increase present consumption is a natural reaction. As presented 
below, this will be another one of the hypothesis that will be tested empirically. 
2.3.4. Effect of changes in health deterioration rate 
A higher rate of depreciation has two effects. On the one hand, prevention becomes 
less effective; on the other hand, more prevention is needed in order to retain the current 
state of health. Nevertheless, equations (40) and (44) show that a higher health depreciation 
rate should, more directly, decreases the rate of investment in preventive activities. 
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2.3.5. Effect of prices 
If preventive care becomes more expensive, then demand for prevention will decline. 
In this model, a rise in the price of curative care unambiguously increases the demand for 
preventive care, which is, of course, plausible. However, in alternative models from the 
literature the cross-price elasticity of demand for prevention cannot be uniquely derived 
(Kenkel, 1994; Meier, 1996). The intuitive explanation for the unique results in the current 
model is that the substitution effect of a changing price always dominates due to absence of 
an income effect. 
2.3.6. Effect of insurance coverage 
 If insurance covers both preventive and curative care, then changes in insurance 
coverage would have an ambiguous effect. On the one hand, when an insurance policy 
covers preventive services, I should expect an increase of the demand for those behaviors. 
However, insurance could also diminish the demand for prevention by reducing the cost of 
curative treatment. Therefore, the effect of insurance is ambiguous and should be tested 
empirically. One way to distinguish the two effects is by noting the difference in the effect of 
insurance on the demand for preventive activities on activities for which the cost of 
preventative and curative measurements are covered by insurance, such as cancer screening, 
versus those activities for which the cost of prevention is not affected by insurance coverage 
but the cost of treatment is, such as physical activity. 
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2.4. Model variations 
2.4.1. Different kinds of preventive services 
One of the advantages of the model as presented above is its capacity to absorb 
different kinds of preventive investments. One such variation can be done by considering 
the marginal productivity of health investments, f(t), in equation (4). For instance, the 
specification of a relationship between use of medical care and new investment in health 
adopted in the context of this theoretical model may be replaced by a more detailed one. For 
example, f(t) could be defined as a function of both age and the quantity of medical care 
consumed, f(t, M), which would allow for the possibility of decreasing marginal productivity 
of the investment in response to medical care to be taken into account in the model. Also, 
the heterogeneity of preventive investments could be incorporated into the framework by 
replacing the simple production relationship f(t)•I(t) by φ(t)[I1(t), I2(t), . . . , In(t)] or even 
more complex φ(t)[I1(t, M), I2(t, M), . . . , In(t, M)] , where Ii is the ith type of preventive care.  
Different kinds of preventive activities like lifestyle preventive activities or clinical preventive 
activities can be incorporated and distinguished in this framework. For instance, the marginal 
productivity of health investments might differ widely when they are associated with the use 
of other medical care, e.g. when prescribed by a doctor than when carried out on one‘s own 
initiative.  
2.4.2. Useful variation of the model: Level effects on health 
Some basic modifications, inspired in Case and Deaxton (2001) can be made to the 
initial setting to acquire additional insights into the effect of other factors in the demand for 
health.  
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Recall equation (4), a modified version of this equation in which health stock is 
modeled over the life cycle renders: 
(49)                           
Before, the investment function was modeled in dynamic terms throughout lifetime. 
Let‘s assume that one could directly buy these investments in such a way that, instead of a 
dynamic, one gets a lifetime budget constraint takes the form budget constraint, equation (7) 
can now be written. 
(50)  
    
  
 
   
    
  
 
   
   
  
 
      
     
  
 
  
Where pI is the price of the investment in health, pM is the price of curative health 
and again T is the time of death. By setting the model this way, I can substitute (49) into (50) 
and arrive to a single integrated constraint: 
(51)  
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Just as before, consumers maximize subject to (50): 
(53)                              
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First order conditions are: 
(54)      
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The Lagrange multiplier λ is the shadow price of lifetime wealth. Following Wagstaff 
(1986), equations (54) and (55) can be used to examine the life-cycle evolution of 
consumption and health given that they hold whether or not health is optimally adapted to 
its user cost. Given the assumptions that there is a diminishing marginal utility of health and 
consumption as well as diminishing marginal productivity of health on income yH, I can 
derive some comparative results about the level of health. The level health stock throughout 
life will be higher: 
a) The lower is the price of health investment, pI. 
b) The higher is the efficiency of health investment in repairing health, f(t). 
c) The lower the rate of health deterioration, δt.  
d) The higher are initial assets, initial health, or lifetime earnings, and the lower are 
prices over the lifetime, all of which lower λ through lifetime income effects. 
2.4.3. Useful variation of the model: The case for investment in healthy lifestyles 
In this section, I further modify the model above to accommodate another kind of 
investment, healthy lifestyle. Oftentimes, preventive activities encompass two different kinds 
of preventive behavior: preventive screening and healthy lifestyle. On the one hand, 
preventive screenings might have a direct effect on the health stock by decreasing the 
amount the stock decreases in the event of an illness. On the other hand, healthy lifestyles 
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do not only help to increase or at least prevent the deterioration of the health stock, but 
arguably, healthy lifestyle choices also have a direct effect in the utility function of an 
individual. In this variation of the model, I assume that an individual could increase her 
utility by consuming more unhealthy items (e.g. cigarettes, excessive number of alcoholic 
beverages, sedentary habits).  
Suppose that the utility function contains a second consumption good whose price is 
paid, not in money, but in the rate of health deterioration. This component includes 
activities that relate to an unhealthy lifestyle which include but are not limited to smoking, 
the consumption of junk food, unsafe sex, and sedentary lifestyle. All of these activities are 
either low-cost or free and pleasurable or easy to engage in, but these are activities are paid 
out of a higher rate of health deterioration. Calling the added consumption item is G, i.e. 
U(Z(t), h(t), G), and assuming that G enter the rate of deterioration function such that δ(G) 
and δ‘>0, then the additional first-order condition to (52) and (53) is: 
(56)    
     
    
  
  
    
 
   
  
     
Holding the right-side of the equation constant, elements that changes taste away from 
or reduces the marginal utility of G-goods will reduce their consumption and lower the rate 
of health deterioration. Once again, education seems to come in mind as a factor that drives 
a person away from unhealthy activities. Another such element that could shift preference 
could be a health shock to a relative or a spouse that comes as a consequence of theses 
unhealthy activities.  
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2.4.4. Useful variation of the model: The demand for preventive services in households 
 This theoretical setting will be modified in some ways in chapter 3 in order to 
provide some insight into the factors that might lead to explain why the demand for 
preventive services among spouses may be correlated. In the literature, there are 3 types of 
which may explain the correlation between partners‘ demand for health: assortative matching 
in the marriage market; social learning about health risks from the observation of one‘s 
partner; interactions due to bargaining within marriage. These characteristics link directly to 
some of the factors that are involved in the demand for preventive activities in this model.  
Assortative mating assumes that partners in the marriage market match taking into 
consideration a number of observable characteristics like education, initial assets, education 
of parents, as well as the history of health-related behaviors. All these factors influence the λ 
in the model above. So, it follows that a shared λ would also link their health trajectories. 
The social learning about health risks from the observation of one‘s partner can 
enter the model in a variety of ways. Learning from partner‘s experience can be a significant 
force in altering preferences for unhealthy behaviors and thus diminishing the demand for G 
in the model. For instance, an individual may switch a lifestyle after a spouse‘s stroke or 
heart attack. 
Finally, interactions and bargaining between spouses represent another mechanism 
by which I should expect their demand for preventive investments to be correlated. I should 
expect spouses to have a similar health trajectory as they share many of the elements Q that 
affect the deterioration rates of health in the model due to sharing the same environment, 
financial situation or access to care. 
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2.5.  A comment on uncertainty 
The model presented in here does not deal with uncertainty as it was determined that 
its inclusion would unnecessarily complicate the concepts treated before. However, it is 
worth pointing out that some other models in the literature have incorporated elements of 
uncertainty as it has been recognized to be an important element of consideration in the 
health sector for a long time. Arrow (1963) claims that the uncertainty surrounding medical 
care is possibly more intense than the uncertainty in most other commodities. Yet, 
Grossman‘s model does not directly incorporate uncertainty, an omission that has 
encouraged revisions and extensions by other authors.  
Cropper (1977) used a dynamic model with uncertainty but only regarded two health 
states: ‗ill‘ or ‗not ill‘, compared to this case where it was assumed that there were an infinite 
number of health states. In her model, the individuals wanted to increase their stock of 
health capital in order to decrease the probability of illness since in that case they did not 
receive any utility from consumption. Dardanoni and Wagstaff (1990) showed that under 
plausible assumptions the demand for medical care would increase in response to increased 
uncertainty over the ex ante level of health and/or in response to increased uncertainty over 
the effectiveness of medical care. Picone et al. (1998) extend Dardanoni and Wagstaffs‘ 
insights and determine that greater risk aversion causes extra precautionary behavior in an 
uncertain environment even when a health shock does not occur. It is precisely this last 
prediction that may be tested in the empirical framework of chapter 2. As it will be 
discussed, the available data contains some variables that indicate risk aversion and whose 
effect on preventive behavior can be examined. 
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2.6. Comparison to the Grossman model 
In the final paragraph of his seminal paper, Michael Grossman provides some advice 
for future modeling efforts: ―any model must recognize that health is a durable capital stock, 
that health capital differs in important respects from other forms of human capital, and that 
the demand for medical care must be derived from the more fundamental demand for ‗good 
health‘ ‖ (1972, p. 242). Under that optic, the variation of Grossman depicted here fulfills all 
three prescriptions. However, my model differs with Grossman in at least three significant 
ways. Firstly, although Grossman distinguishes between those health investments that can be 
bought with time and those that can be bought with wages. In Grossman‘s mind, this 
distinction is akin to telling apart lifestyle vs. medical treatment. However, there is no clear 
distinction between preventive and curative health investments in the sense that a, for 
instance, a mammography can be discriminated from a treatment for breast cancer. Two 
years later, Grossman together with Rand (2000) modify the original framework to 
distinguish prevention and cure by assuming that groups with low depreciation rates 
primarily demand preventive care while groups with high depreciation rates primarily 
demand curative care. In the opinion of the author, the model above is much more 
straightforward in the distinction by assuming that while prevention represents an ex ante 
investment undertaken by the utility maximize, curative treatment is an ex post reaction to 
the presence of disease.  
Secondly, the model of health investment presented in this paper is a generalized 
version of Grossman‘s original model in the sense that it does not rely on the acceptance of 
household production theory and time prices. Grossman‘s model uses the wage rate as the 
best way to establish a price for time. However, since I focus on the demand for preventive 
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services on near-elderly and elderly people, a majority of whom earn no wages since they are 
already retired, wage rate does not seem to be a sensible way to price prevention. By 
considering a more general treatment of the costs of health investments, I create a model 
that more closely adapts to the characteristics of my population of interest in this study. 
 Thirdly, my health depreciation function depends on more factors compared to 
Grossman‘s which is only a function of time. This renders the possibility for a more direct 
relationship to other variables such as education. As explained below, the slight modification 
in the depreciation function allows for a clearer interpretation of some of the comparative 
statics. 
 In terms of the comparative statics derived from both mine and Grossman models, 
one can contrast the predictions for education, age, wealth and insurance. Firstly, in my 
model if education reduces the rate of depreciation, the demand for preventive investments 
is positively correlated with it. This result conforms with the predictions of Grossman‘s 
investment model, but its justification is different. In his model, education is positively 
associated with health, because it increases the general non-market productivity of the 
individual in question, thus reducing the marginal cost of new investment in health, whereas 
in my model education is seen as operating on a more aggregate level in redirecting the 
choice of different production processes in a way which leads to a lifestyle that is less use-
intensive in terms of health. Therefore, the comparative static results with respect to 
education derived here are qualitatively very similar to Grossman‘s predictions. However, the 
present model does not require the assumptions of input or commodity neutrality utilized in 
Grossman‘s analysis. It is also not dependent on the acceptance of the hypothesis that 
education affects household productivity in general. 
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 In Grossman's model, because health capital is assumed to depreciate at a higher rate 
as people get older, if the price elasticity of the demand for health is smaller than one then 
the derived demand for curative medical care increases with age. In my model, since the 
depreciation rate is a function of time and education, the relationship is more complicated. 
In fact, the comparative static for the effect of aging is diametrically opposed to the effect of 
education through the mechanisms of the depreciation function. Thus, when education is 
positively associated with the demand for prevention, then age is negatively associated, and 
vice versa.  
In traditional consumer analysis, increases in wealth lead to increased demand for 
normal goods. Thus, in Grossman‘s pure consumption model the wealth effect on health 
was expected to be positive. My model reaches the same conclusion for essentially the same 
reasons.  
Grossman‘s model does not consider the effect of insurance. In fact, Grossman 
anticipate that the inclusion in further models of uncertainty regarding the age of death of a 
consumer ―would give persons an incentive to protect themselves against the ‗losses‘ 
associated with higher than average depreciation rates by purchasing various types of 
insurance and perhaps by holding an ‗excess‘ stock of health‖ (1972, p. 248). In my model, I 
do not consider the effect of insurance directly, however, I predict the effect of insurance 
indirectly by observing the shielding of the price of both preventive and curative investments 
that might come with the existence of insurance. 
As I final note, it is important to remark that the assessment of my comparative statics in 
relation with Grossman‘s is limited at best. The reason is that while my comparative statics 
apply only to preventive investments, Grossman‘s apply to the demand for all medical 
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investments in general, including both curative and preventive investments. I purport that 
the failure to distinguish between prevention and treatment explicitly in Grossman‘s model 
has caused some confusion in the empirical evaluations of the model‘s predictions that have 
followed after the publication of the famous Grossman paper. It is my thought that a more 
convincing separation of preventive vs. curative treatment would conform to better 
agreements with the empirical evidence. 
3. Background on empirical evidence 
In this section I present a summary of the most relevant empirical studies examining 
some of the predictions that I have outline above. 
Healthy people consume less medical care: Wagstaff (1986) observes that 48% 
of the 1976 DanishWelfare Survey (DWA) sample he employed recorded zero general 
practitioner visits and 46.5% recorded zero weeks in hospital. 
Wealthier people have higher stocks of health: Smith (2004, 2007) uses self-
reported health (SRH) status from the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) and PSID 
to show how disparity in health between low and high-income individuals (the so-called 
socio-economic status [SES]-health gradient) increases with age. 
Health and education: Van Doorslaer assumes that investment is a function of 
personal background variables (schooling, age, income, and gender). Thus, he regresses 
health in 1984 on these variables and on health in 1979. To test the hypothesis that 
schooling lowers the rate of depreciation, he allows for an interaction between this variable 
and health in 1979 in some of the estimated models. Van Doorslaer's main finding is that 
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schooling has a positive and significant coefficient in the regression explaining health in 
1984, with health in 1979 held constant.  
Effect of time preferences:  Farrell and Fuchs find that the negative relationship 
between schooling and smoking, which rises in absolute value for cohorts born after 1953, 
does not increase between the ages of 17 and 24. Since the individuals were all in the same 
school grade at age 17, the additional schooling obtained between that age and age 24 cannot 
be the cause of differential smoking behavior at age 24, according to the authors. Based on 
these results, Farrell and Fuchs reject the hypothesis that schooling is a causal factor in 
smoking behavior in favor of the view that a third variable causes both. Since the strong 
negative relationship between schooling and smoking developed only after the spread of 
information concerning the harmful effects of smoking, they argue that the same mechanism 
may generate the schooling-health relationship.  
On separating schooling, health and time preferences:  Berger and Leigh (1989) 
have developed an extremely useful methodology for disentangling the schooling effect from 
the time preference effect. Their methodology amounts to treating schooling as an 
endogenous variable in the health equation and estimating the equation by a variant of two-
stage least squares. If the instrumental variables used to predict schooling in the first stage 
are uncorrelated with time preference, this technique yields an unbiased estimate of the 
schooling coefficient. Since the framework generates a recursive model with correlated 
errors, exogenous variables that are unique to the health equation are not used to predict 
schooling. Except for the last finding, these results are inconsistent with the time preference 
hypothesis and consistent with the hypothesis that schooling causes health. 
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On the correlation between spouses’ demand for preventive activity: It has 
been found that among married couples, there is evidence of initial matching and 
compatibility in many areas due to endogamy and homogamy in race, religion, 
socioeconomic status (Mare 1991; Kalmijn 1998) substance use (Vanyukov et al. 1996), 
occupation (Hout 1982; Smits, Ultee, and Lammers 1999), and leisure preferences (Houts, 
Robins, and Huston 1996). Further inquiry has evaluated the transitions that occur in health 
behaviors after the initial matching, and spouse behavior is considered as an important risk 
factor for adopting, continuing, or relapsing to poor health behaviors. For instance, studies 
have estimated the effect of a husband‘s drinking on the wife‘s drinking during the transition 
to marriage and in the newlywed phase (Leonard and Das Eiden 1999; Leonard and Mudar 
2004). In the case of smoking, both spousal support and spousal smoking status have been 
studied (Coppotelli and Orleans 1985; Mermelstein et al. 1986; Roski, Schmid, and Lando 
1996; Monden, De Graaf, and Kraaykamp 2003; Homish and Leonard 2005). Studies 
typically evaluate one spouse‘s behavior simply as a risk factor for the other‘s without taking 
into account the joint process of change, although there are exceptions (Shattuck, White, and 
Kristal 1992; Franks, Pienta, and Wray 2002). 
These spousal interactions have been theorized within a Grossman style framework 
(Jacobson 2000). Falba and Sindelar (2008) use HRS data to show empirically that when one 
spouse improves his or her behavior, the other spouse is likely to do so as well. They 
conclude that spouses influence the dynamics of each other‘s health habits. 
On the effect of risk aversion and demand for insurance and prevention: Using 
the Health and Retirement Study, Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) show that two types of 
people purchase insurance: individuals with private information that they are high risk and 
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individuals with private information that they have strong taste for insurance. Ex post, the 
former are higher risk than insurance companies expect, while the latter are lower risk. 
Specifically, they show that wealthier individuals and individuals who exhibit more cautious 
behavior—as measured either by their investment in preventive health care or by seat belt 
use—are both more likely to have long-term care insurance coverage and less likely to use 
long-term care. 
4. Summary of predictions and preview of next chapters 
In the next chapter of this dissertation I test empirically the validity of the following 
model predictions.  With respect to the demand for preventive services, the model predicts: 
a) The marginal demand for investments in preventive activities decreases with age if it 
increases with education and vice versa. 
b) A higher time discount rate, i.e. a preference for short term consumption rather than 
long term planning, causes the health stock to deteriorate more rapidly. 
c) An increase in the discount rate of time leads to a lower valuation of future 
consumption and, thus, decreases the return on prevention. 
d) An increase on the deterioration rate of health will decrease the demand for 
preventive services. 
e) Insurance coverage that covers both preventive and curative care should increase the 
demand for preventive activities. 
f) Insurance coverage that covers only the cost of curative care but not the cost of the 
investment in preventive activity should have a mild negative effect on the demand 
for such activity. 
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Although not in my model per se, risk aversion has been modeled by others to 
positively correlate with demand for preventive investments. Such prediction will be tested 
empirically as well. 
g) Individuals who are more risk averse will be more likely to engage in preventive 
behavior. 
In chapter 3 of this dissertation, I explore the joint demand for preventive services 
within households.  In that regard, I test not only whether the demand for those activities is 
correlated between spouses but also, and perhaps more interesting, I analyze the 
mechanisms that are in play when jointly demanding for prevention. In this sense, I test the 
following predictions: 
e) If there is positive assortative matching over the demand of prevention, partners‘ 
estimated individual fixed effects in hierarchical linear model will be positively 
correlated. 
f) Household decision-making suggests that respondent‘s decision to engage in 
preventive activities should be positively correlated with partner‘s lagged preventive 
activities once individual fixed effects are controlled for. 
g) Partner‘s health developments may affect respondent‘s preventive activities. In the 
case of social learning, the partner will increase her investment in a preventive 
activity after a respondent suffers a health shock that is associated with the 
preventive behavior in question.  
Finally, in chapter 4 of the dissertation, I use the insights of the previous two 
chapters in order to parse out the effect that preventive activities and the factors associated 
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with them have on health expenditures. I use the predictions and significance of the 
variables included in Chapter 1‘s predictions to ameliorate the endogeneity present when 
trying to analyze the effect of preventive behavior on health expenditures. In chapter 4, a 
variety of methods underlying key findings from the theoretical model for the demand for 
prevention are used such as: 
1) An examination of alternative hypotheses that might indicate self-selection. 
2) Use of propensity scores to predict the probability of engaging in preventive 
activities or not by balancing observed characteristics very closely between groups.  
3) Use of instrumental variables. 
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CHAPTER 2: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY ON THE FACTORS THAT 
AFFECT THE DEMAND FOR PREVENTION AMONG OLDER 
ADULTS 
1. Introduction 
The theoretical model presented in chapter 1 renders a series of predictions that are 
tested empirically in this chapter. Table 2.1 summarizes the predictions described in last 
chapter. 
Table 2.1. Chapter 1model prediction on the demand for investment activities. 
Variable Predicted Association with Investment 
in Preventive Activities 
Age, t Opposite direction to the effect of 
education 
Education, E Opposite direction to the effect of age 
Price of medical care, pM + 
High discount rate for time, θ  - 
Price of investment in health activities, pI - 
Rate of deterioration of health stock, δ - 
Insurance coverage + for activities such as cancer screening.  
– for healthy lifestyle activities. 
Risk aversion* + 
Wealth + 
*Risk aversion is not explicitly in my model, yet I choose to test its relation with the 
demand for prevention empirically as other theoretical models predictions have predicted 
such relationship. 
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2.  Data 
2.1. The Health and Retirement Study linked to Medicare claims data 
 For this chapter, I use publicly available data from the Health and Retirement Study 
(HRS), a nationally representative, longitudinal study sponsored by the National Institute on 
Aging and conducted by the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan, Ann 
Arbor. Designed to assess health status, retirement decisions, and economic security during 
retirement, this study enrolled non-institutionalized adults in the 48 contiguous US states 
who were born during the years 1931 through 1941, with oversampling of blacks, Hispanics, 
and Florida residents. I use waves 3, 5, and 7 collected in 1996, 2000, and 2004, respectively 
as only these waves contained all the necessary variables regarding preventive behavior. 
Further details of this survey are available at the following address: 
http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/ 
2.2. Prevention in the Health and Retirement Study. 
HRS asked respondents questions regarding lifestyle preventive choices such as 
exercising, smoking and body weight in each of the 8 rounds. However, respondents were 
surveyed about clinical preventive activities, namely flu shot, cholesterol screening, pap 
smear test, mammography, and prostate screening only every other wave starting in wave 3. 
As such and in order to preserve consistency, only waves 3, 5, and 7 are considered for all 
preventive variables and covariates. The wave of origin was chosen to be that for which the 
interview age was closer to when the respondents turned 65. This is the same preventive 
behavior and timing that is studied in chapter 4 in connection with Medicare expenditures. 
The only exception is for the age for which a separate analysis was performed. 
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3. Econometric approach 
The first step in this analysis is to estimate probit models with all independent 
variables (in table 2.3) included at the same time.  This is termed the fully specified model. 
The second step is the examination the relationship between an individual‘s undertaking of a 
given preventive activity and the relevant key independent variable whose effect is predicted 
by the theoretical model. For this second step, I estimated the following two probits: 
(1)                     
(2)                         
PREV is a binary variable for whether the individual practices one of the preventive 
activities that are available in the survey in the wave closer to age 65. Table 2.2 presents a 
summary of such variables and a description of such variables in the sample.i The coefficient 
of interest is β2, the individual‘s key independent variables that are predicted in the model 
(plus the some variables regarding risk aversion), see table 2.3.  In the first probit, no 
controls were used. In the second probit, a vector of covariates X was included.  These 
covariates are the same used in McWilliams et al. (2003). Table 2.4 summarizes the 
covariates. Each of the independent variables was explored in separate probit models for 
each of the preventive activities/dependent variables.  
For robustness, I also tried logistic regression models instead of probit models. The 
results of the logit models, although not shown, were extremely similar in significance to the 
probit models. 
                                                          
i For the healthy lifestyle and clinical prevention index, I used ordinal probit models in the empirical 
specification. 
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Table 2.2. Summary statistics for dependent variables. 
Type of 
preventive 
activity 
Preventive 
activity 
Description Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Healthy Lifestyle 
Preventive activities 
Vigorous 
physical 
exercise 
Performs vigorous 
exercise 3+ times per 
week 
38.5% (48.7%) 
Non-smoking 
Respondent currently 
does not smoke 
84.3% (36.4%) 
Normal weight 
Survey asked for weight 
and height. 
29.1% (45.4%) 
Clinical Preventive 
activities 
Flu shot 
Whether the respondent 
has received the shot this 
wave 
58.8% (49.2%) 
Cholesterol 
Screening 
Whether the respondent 
has performed the test 
this wave 
80.9% (39.3%) 
Breast Cancer 
Screening 
Whether the respondent 
has performed a 
mammography this wave 
76.2% (42.6%) 
Cervical 
Cancer 
Screening 
Whether the respondent 
has performed a pap 
smears this wave 
65.7% (47.5%) 
Prostate 
Cancer 
Screening 
Whether the respondent 
has performed any kind 
of prostate cancer test 
this wave 
76.2% (42.6%) 
Composite 
measures 
Any 
preventive 
activity 
Any of the preventive 
activities listed above 
99.1% (9.5%) 
All preventive 
activity 
All of the preventive 
activities listed above 
4.8% (21.4%) 
Lifestyle index 
An index of 0-3 
consisting of the sum of 
positive answers for 
frequent vigorous 
physical exercise, normal 
body weight, non-
2.5 (1.2) 
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smoking. 
Clinical 
prevention 
index 
An index of 0-4 (0-3 for 
men) consisting of the 
sum of positive answers 
for flu shot, cholesterol 
screenings, and cancer 
screenings (pap smear 
test and mammograms 
for women; prostate 
screenings for men) 
1.5 (0.8) 
Sample size 5,360 
Sample size (female) 3,106 
Sample size (male) 2,254 
 
Table 2.3. Summary statistics for key independent variables. 
Variable Comments Description Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Insurance status 
pre-65 
1 if respondent 
had private 
and/or public 
insurance 
coverage in the 
wave before 
turning 65; 0 if 
no insurance 
was reported. 
 - 77.6% (41.7%) 
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Wealth: Income 
(in 100,000) 
Continuous. 
Is the sum of respondent's 
and spouse‘s wage/salary 
income/ 
bonuses/overtime 
pay/commissions/tips, 
capital income, income 
from Social Security 
disability benefit, pension 
and annuity, income from 
social security retirement, 
income from 
unemployment and/or 
workers‘ compensation, 
other government 
transfers, and any other 
household income. 
4.0 (10.3) 
Wealth: Assets 
(in 100,000) 
Continuous 
Sum of value of primary 
residence,  value of other 
real estate, net value of 
businesses, vehicles, 
IRA/Keogh, stock, 
checking/savings 
accounts, CDs, Saving 
bonds, T-bills, bond 
funds, and other savings 
minus debts, mortgage, 
and home loans. 
0.6 (0.8) 
Education: 
Number of years 
Continuous 
 
12.3 (3.2) 
Health 
deterioration 
Mean recent 
change in health 
(1 = much 
better, 5 = much 
worse) 
This question asks the 
respondent to assess 
retrospectively how 
his/her health has 
changed since the last 
interview 
3.1 (0.7) 
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Risk aversion to 
changing jobs 
1 if the 
respondent is 
found to be 
among the most 
risk- adverse 
category. 
In the first wave of HRS, 
the individual is asked to 
choose between pairs of 
jobs where one guarantees 
current family income and 
the other offers a chance 
to increase income but 
also carries the risk of loss 
of income. If R says 
he/she would take the 
risk, the same scenario but 
with riskier odds is 
presented. If R says 
he/she would not take the 
risk, the same scenario 
with less risky odds is 
asked. 
60.3% (48.9%) 
Risk aversion: 
very frequent 
use of seatbelt 
1 if the 
respondent 
claims to use 
seatbelt very 
frequently. 0 if 
not. 
 
71.8% (45.0%) 
Risk aversion: 
life insurance 
1 if the 
respondent has a 
life insurance 
policy. 0 if not. 
 
69.5% (46.0%) 
Risk aversion: 
long-term care 
insurance 
1 if the 
respondent has a 
long term care 
insurance policy. 
 
11.6% (32.1%) 
Time preference 
1: Short term 
financial 
planning (next 
few months, 
next year), long 
term financial 
planning (next 
few years, next 
5-10 years). 
In the first wave, HRS 
asks: ―In deciding how 
much of their (family) 
income to spend or save, 
people are likely to think 
about different financial 
planning periods. In 
planning your (family‘s) 
saving and spending, 
which of the time periods 
listed in the booklet is 
most important to you 
[and your 
(husband/wife/partner)]?‖ 
31.1% (46.3%) 
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Table 2.4. Summary statistics of control variables. 
Variable Mean  Standard Dev. 
Female 56.6% (49.6%) 
Race  
Non- Hispanic white 75.0% (43.3%) 
Non- Hispanic black 14.7% (35.5%) 
Hispanic 8.5% (27.9%) 
Other 1.8% (13.3%) 
Veteran status 25.3% (43.5%) 
Employment (full-time, part-time, unemployed, semiretired, retired, disabled, not 
in labor force) 
Full time 19.0% (39.2%) 
Part time 4.5% (20.7%) 
Unemployed 0.3% (5.6%) 
Semi-retired 14.2% (34.9%) 
Retired 51.1% (50.0%) 
Disabled 2.5% (15.6%) 
Not in labor force 8.4% (27.8%) 
Number of household members 2.2 (1.1) 
Self-reported health status (poor, fair, good, very 
good or excellent) 
  Excellent 13.4% (34.0%) 
Very good 30.2% (45.9%) 
Good 32.2% (46.7%) 
Fair 17.8% (38.3%) 
Poor 6.3% (24.4%) 
Number of functional limitations with activities of 
daily life (ADLA) 0.2 (0.7) 
Diagnosis of chronic conditions (high blood pressure, diabetes, cancer, lung 
disease, heart disease, stroke, arthritis) 
High blood pressure 50.4% (50.0%) 
Diabetes 16.9% (37.5%) 
Cancer 11.0% (31.3%) 
Lung disease 8.9% (28.4%) 
Heart disease 19.0% (39.3%) 
Stroke 5.1% (21.9%) 
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Arthritis 58.0% (49.4%) 
Social Security benefit recipient status 7.9% (27.0%) 
Mental health (CESD score)  1.3 (1.9) 
Census divisions 
New England 3.8% (19.1%) 
Mid Atlantic 12.0% (32.5%) 
Eastern North Central 15.8% (36.5%) 
Western North Central 9.2% (28.8%) 
South Atlantic 24.8% (43.2%) 
Eastern South Central 6.8% (25.2%) 
Western South Central 10.0% (29.9%) 
Mountain 5.3% (22.3%) 
Pacific 12.3% (32.8%) 
Sample size 
                                  
5,360  
Sample size (female) 
                                  
3,106  
Sample size (male) 
                                  
2,254  
 
Finally, I exploit the longitudinal aspect of the data and estimate fixed effects 
multivariate logistical models that allows controlling for unobserved heterogeneity at the 
individual level. Not all of the variables are suited for this analysis. Some of the dependent 
and independent variables and controls are only measured at one point in time of are fixed 
characteristics of the respondent (e.g. education).  
The fixed effects logit estimator     gives the effect of each element of B and X on 
the log-odds ratio: 
(3)    
              
                
             
where c represents some unobserved heterogeneity (Wooldridge 2002). 
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In order to study the association with age, a slightly different empirical strategy has 
to be utilized. One cannot observe the effect of age on the demand for prevention if the 
criterion for selecting the timing of the variables is precisely being sufficiently close to age 
65. Therefore, for this part of the analysis, I switch the sample to include all those 
respondents in wave 7 (the wave for which the majority of the respondents‘ information at 
age 65 come from) who do not have missing responses. Probabilistic and ordinal 
probabilistic regression models similar to the ones described above were estimated. 
4. Results 
4.1. Key independent and preventive activities in at age 65 
4.1.1. Fully specified models  
The first set of results corresponds to the probit models in a fully specified form that 
includes the associations of all controls and all other key variables in table 2.3 operating at 
the same time for each of the different preventive behaviors. In table 2.5, the results for the 
marginal effects of the key variables on eleven different probabilistic or ordinal probabilistic 
models are shown. The marginal effects for control variables are not shown. All variables, 
except for seatbelt use and risk aversion to changing jobsii, are considered at age 65. 
The results of this specification show that insurance pre-65 was significantly and 
positively associated with all different clinical preventive behaviors and non-smoking 
behavior. Yet, insurance pre-65 was significantly (at 10% level) and negatively associated 
with physical activity. The association of a time preference for short term financial planning 
                                                          
ii These variables were only asked in wave 1 and asked in subsequent waves only for those respondents who 
haven‘t answered them before. 
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remained negative and significant for physical activity and all other clinical preventive 
activities, except for Pap smears test, and negative but not significant for healthy lifestyle 
preventive behaviors such as non-smoking and normal weight status. In this specification, 
health deterioration was negatively and significantly associated with physical activity and 
non-smoking but not significantly associated with any other activity. Finally, among the risk 
aversion measures, aversion to changing jobs was a positive significant predictor for any 
behavior but Pap smear test. Seatbelt use was never significantly associated with preventive 
behavior. Except for cholesterol screening and Pap smear tests, having life insurance was a 
predictor of increased preventive behavior. Long term care insurance positively and in 
almost all cases significantly predicts all preventive behaviors except for physical activity and 
normal weight status. 
The collinearity in this model is high as evidenced by condition indexes of above 30. 
Hence, the analysis of the association of each of the independent variables separately (see 
section 4.1.2. below) is warranted.
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Table 2.5. Coefficients for fully specified model. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Type of 
model 
DPRO
BIT 
DPROB
IT 
DPRO
BIT 
DPRO
BIT 
DPRO
BIT 
DPRO
BIT 
DPRO
BIT 
DPRO
BIT 
DPRO
BIT 
DPRO
BIT 
OPRO
BIT 
OPRO
BIT 
VARIABLES 
Vigoro
us 
activity 
Non-
smoker 
Normal 
weight 
Flu 
shot 
Cholest
erol 
screeni
ng 
Pap 
smear 
test 
Mamm
ogram 
Prostat
e 
screeni
ng 
ANY 
preven
tion 
ALL 
preven
tion 
Healthy 
lifestyle 
index* 
Clinical 
index* 
-0.030* 0.020* -0.01 0.122*** 0.080*** 0.104*** 0.108*** 0.077*** 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.368*** 
Insurance pre-
65 
(0.017) (0.012) (0.016) (0.018) (0.014) (0.022) (0.019) (0.025) (0.002) (0.005) (0.040) (0.039) 
Wealth: 
Household 
assets 
(100,000's) 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004* 0.011*** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.007*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) 0.000  0.000  (0.001) (0.002) 
0.00 0.026* 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.047** 0.02 0.036* 0.00 0.004** 0.02 0.069*** 
Wealth: 
Household 
income 
(100,000's) 
(0.008) (0.013) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.023) (0.021) (0.019) (0.002) (0.002) (0.020) (0.024) 
0.00 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.008*** 0.00 0.00 0.014*** 0.00 
0.004**
* 
0.031*** 0.026*** 
Education 
years 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 0.000  (0.001) (0.006) (0.006) 
0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 
Risk aversion: 
Very frequent 
seatbelt use 
(0.014) (0.010) (0.013) (0.014) (0.010) (0.018) (0.015) (0.018) (0.001) (0.004) (0.032) (0.031) 
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0.108*** 0.062*** 0.047*** 0.057*** 0.02 0.00 0.039** 0.043** 0.01*** 0.01 0.317*** 0.099*** 
Risk aversion: 
Life insurance 
(0.014) (0.011) (0.014) (0.015) (0.011) (0.019) (0.017) (0.020) (0.002) (0.005) (0.035) (0.033) 
-0.01 0.025** -0.08*** 0.052*** 0.031*** 0.063*** 0.060*** 0.072*** 0.004* 0.00 -0.087** 0.181*** 
Risk aversion: 
Long term 
care insurance 
(0.015) (0.011) (0.015) (0.016) (0.012) (0.019) (0.017) (0.023) (0.002) (0.005) (0.035) (0.035) 
0.036* 0.061*** 0.046** 0.050** 0.028* -0.01 0.066*** 0.073*** 0.010* 0.012* 0.200*** 0.165*** 
Risk aversion: 
Very risk 
averse to job 
loss 
(0.022) (0.014) (0.021) (0.022) (0.016) (0.028) (0.022) (0.027) (0.006) (0.007) (0.049) (0.048) 
-0.030** -0.013* 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.00 
Health 
deterioration 
(1=much 
better… 
5=much 
worse) 
(0.012) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.009) (0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.001) (0.004) (0.026) (0.024) 
-0.036** -0.02 0.00 -0.05*** -0.03*** -0.05** -0.05*** -0.048** 0.00 -0.008* -0.084** -0.16*** 
Short term 
financial 
planning 
(0.015) (0.011) (0.014) (0.015) (0.011) (0.019) (0.017) (0.021) (0.001) (0.005) (0.034) (0.033) 
All of the variables in the first column were included in the same probit model controlled for  gender, race, veteran status, working status (full time, part 
time, unemployed, partly retired, retired, disabled, other), number of household residents, self-reported health status, respondent's diagnosis of chronic 
conditions (high blood pressure, diabetes, cancer, lung disease, heart disease, stroke, arthritis), beneficiary of Social Security, mental health (CESD score), 
residence in one of 10 census divisions. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 
the 1-percent, 5-percent, and 10-percent level, respectively. 
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4.1.2. Analysis of independent variables one at a time 
Table 2.6 reports the marginal effects from probit estimation of equation (1) in the 
odd-number columns, i.e. with no controls, and of equation (2) in the even-number 
columns. i.e. with controls, for those preventive activities that are related to a healthy 
lifestyle. Table 2.7 reports the marginal effect for those preventive activities that are related 
to medical services. Table 2.8 presents the results for the constructed variables for 
undergoing any and all of the preventive activities presented in the previous two tables, 
except for the indexes. The marginal effects on each of the rows in all tables were computed 
separately.  
In general, the results of these specifications ratify the findings of table 2.5, albeit the 
magnitude of the associations are exacerbated by the fact that each key independent variable 
is analyzed separately. 
The two variables that have to do with the current amount of affluence in a house 
are: household income and household wealth. The result shows that wealth is invariably 
positively and almost always significantly associated with all preventive behaviors. By the 
same token, education years are, in all instances, a positive and significant predictor of all 
preventive behaviors. 
Health insurance in the wave prior to turning 65 has an uneven association on 
prevention behavior. While insurance has a positive and significant association on all clinical 
preventive services, this variable had a positive and significant association only with one of 
the healthy lifestyle preventive behaviors: being a non-smoker. Yet, insurance had a negative 
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but insignificant association on vigorous physical activity and normal weight status. 
Respondents with insurance pre-65 were significantly more likely to engage in any preventive 
activity and in all preventive activities. 
While the association of the time preference variables was clearly unidirectional, 
health deterioration had a more variable association on prevention. Respondents who had a 
short term financial planning (next few months, next year) were significantly less likely to 
engage in each, any and all of the preventive activities examined in the survey. Respondents 
whose health had deteriorated during the last 2 years, i.e. between waves, were significantly 
less likely to engage in all healthy lifestyle preventive behaviors and Pap smear test. A higher 
rate of health deterioration was positively and significantly correlated with having a flu shot 
and cholesterol screening, but insignificantly correlated with having a mammogram or 
prostate cancer screening. 
 Finally, the variables that were included in this analysis because they signal risk 
aversion reported mixed results. Firstly, HRS measure of the risk aversion to change jobs 
was not significant in predicting any preventive behavior. Seatbelt use was negatively and 
significantly associated with vigorous activity, non-smoking, normal weight status, flu shot, 
mammogram and prostate screening. Perhaps more robust and interesting are the measures 
of risk aversion regarding life insurance and long term care insurance. Respondents with a 
life insurance policy were significantly more likely to engage in all clinical preventive 
activities and in physical activity and non-smoking, yet less likely to report normal weight. 
Respondents with a long term care policy were significantly more likely to engage in each all 
of the preventive activities examined in HRS except for Pap smear test. 
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Table 2.6. Relationship between key variables and healthy lifestyle preventive activities at age 65. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  DPROBIT DPROBIT DPROBIT DPROBIT DPROBIT DPROBIT OPROBIT# OPROBIT# 
Independent 
variable 
Association of 
variable on 
vigorous 
activity at age 
65, no controls 
Association 
of variable 
on vigorous 
activity at 
age 65, with 
controls 
Association 
of variable 
on non-
smoker at 
age 65, no 
controls 
Association 
of variable 
on non-
smoker at 
age 65, with 
controls 
Association 
of variable 
on normal 
weight at age 
65, no 
controls 
Associatio
n of 
variable on 
normal 
weight at 
age 65, 
with 
controls 
Association 
of variable 
on healthy 
lifestyle 
index at age 
65, No 
Controls 
Association 
of variable 
on healthy 
lifestyle 
index at age 
65, with 
controls 
Insurance pre-65 
-0.02 -0.02 0.036*** 0.044*** -0.026* -0.01 0.00 0.03 
(0.016) (0.017) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.037) (0.039) 
Wealth: Household 
assets (100,000's) 
0.002*** 0.00 0.005*** 0.003** 0.002*** 0.001** 0.010*** 0.004*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Wealth: Household 
income (100,000's) 
0.032*** 0.00 0.065*** 0.045*** 0.016** 0.01 0.116*** 0.040* 
(0.011) (0.007) (0.013) (0.012) (0.008) (0.007) (0.034) (0.021) 
Education years 
0.017*** 0.00 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.007*** 0.057*** 0.024*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) 
Risk aversion: Very 
frequent seatbelt 
use 
0.128*** 0.117*** 0.068*** 0.062*** 0.053*** 0.043*** 0.348*** 0.319*** 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.032) (0.033) 
Risk aversion: Life 
insurance 
0.031** -0.01 0.029*** 0.028*** -0.064*** -0.068*** 0.00 -0.069** 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.014 (0.031) (0.033) 
Risk aversion: 
Long term care 
insurance 
0.097*** 0.045** 0.079*** 0.061*** 0.064*** 0.038** 0.325*** 0.200*** 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.012) (0.012) (0.019) (0.019) (0.043) (0.044) 
Risk aversion: Very 
risk averse to job 
loss 
0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 
(0.012) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.028) (0.029) 
Health -0.107*** -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.012* -0.025*** 0.01 -0.234*** -0.052** 
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deterioration 
(1=much better… 
5=much worse) 
(0.009) (0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.021) (0.024) 
Short term 
financial planning 
-0.072*** -0.033** -0.035*** -0.021** -0.028** -0.01 -0.184*** -0.087*** 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.030) (0.031) 
All columns show the marginal effect of the variable in question in separate models. Each of the even number columns present the relevant 
variable of separate probabilistic or ordinal probabilistic regressions controlled for  gender, race, veteran status, working status (full time, part 
time, unemployed, partly retired, retired, disabled, other), number of household residents, self-reported health status, respondent's diagnosis 
of chronic conditions (high blood pressure, diabetes, cancer, lung disease, heart disease, stroke, arthritis), beneficiary of Social Security, mental 
health (CESD score), residence in one of 10 census divisions. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * 
denote statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent, and 10-percent level, respectively. # Ordinal probabilistic regression was used. 
  
Table 2.7. Relationship between key variables and clinical preventive activities at age 65. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Type of 
model 
DPRO
BIT 
DPRO
BIT 
DPRO
BIT 
DPROB
IT 
DPRO
BIT 
DPROB
IT 
DPRO
BIT 
DPRO
BIT 
DPRO
BIT 
DPRO
BIT 
OPRO
BIT 
OPRO
BIT 
Independe
nt 
variables  
Associa
tion of 
variable 
on flu 
shot at 
age 65, 
no 
controls 
Associa
tion of 
variable 
on flu 
shot at 
age 65, 
with 
controls 
Associa
tion of 
variable 
on 
cholest
erol 
screeni
ng at 
age 65, 
no 
controls 
Associati
on of 
variable 
on 
cholester
ol 
screenin
g at age 
65, with 
controls 
Associa
tion of 
variable 
on pap 
smear 
test at 
age 65, 
no 
controls 
Associati
on of 
variable 
on pap 
smear 
test at 
age 65, 
with 
controls 
Associa
tion of 
variable 
on 
mamm
ograms 
at age 
65, no 
controls 
Associa
tion of 
variable 
on 
mamm
ograms 
at age 
65, with 
controls 
Associa
tion of 
variable 
on 
prostate 
screeni
ng at 
age 65, 
no 
controls 
Associa
tion of 
variable 
on 
prostate 
screeni
ng at 
age 65, 
with 
controls 
Associa
tion of 
variable 
on 
clinical 
index at 
age 65, 
No 
Control
s 
Associa
tion of 
variable 
on 
clinical 
index at 
age 65, 
With 
Control
s 
Insurance 
pre-65 
0.150*** 0.143*** 0.121*** 0.101*** 0.111*** 0.121*** 0.138*** 0.130*** 0.144*** 0.120*** 0.360*** 0.432*** 
(0.016) (0.017) (0.014) (0.014) (0.020) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.025) (0.025) (0.036) (0.038) 
Wealth: 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.002*** 0.00 0.009*** 0.011*** 
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Household 
assets 
(100,000's) 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Wealth: 
Household 
income 
(100,000's) 
0.037*** 0.043*** 0.054*** 0.062*** 0.105*** 0.087*** 0.103*** 0.095*** 0.032*** 0.00 0.092*** 0.162*** 
(0.012) (0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.011) (0.007) (0.021) (0.031) 
Education 
years 
0.016*** 0.017*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.010*** 0.005* 0.013*** 0.009*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.038*** 0.047*** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
Risk 
aversion: 
Very 
frequent 
seatbelt use 
0.052*** 0.056*** 0.02 0.021* 0.01 0.00 0.052*** 0.047*** 0.059*** 0.052*** 0.131*** 0.109*** 
(0.014) (0.015) (0.011) (0.011) (0.018) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.030) (0.031) 
Risk 
aversion: 
Life 
insurance 
0.044*** 0.055*** 0.045*** 0.041*** 0.071*** 0.065*** 0.070*** 0.066*** 0.130*** 0.111*** 0.108*** 0.208*** 
(0.014) (0.015) (0.011) (0.011) (0.017) (0.018) (0.015) (0.016) (0.020) (0.021) (0.030) (0.032) 
Risk 
aversion: 
Long term 
care 
insurance 
0.101*** 0.084*** 0.060*** 0.052*** 0.04 0.01 0.102*** 0.081*** 0.117*** 0.103*** 0.282*** 0.238*** 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.014) (0.014) (0.024) (0.025) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.023) (0.041) (0.043) 
Risk 
aversion: 
Very risk 
averse to 
job loss 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.01 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010 (0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.027) (0.028) 
Health 
deterioratio
n (1=much 
better… 
5=much 
worse) 
0.025*** 0.00 0.020*** 0.00 
-
0.032*** 
0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.01 
(0.009) (0.011) (0.007) (0.008) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.019) (0.022) 
Short term 
financial 
planning 
-0.06*** 
-
0.050*** 
-0.04*** -0.036*** 
-
0.061*** 
-0.053*** -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.06*** 
-
0.050*** 
-0.15*** -0.17*** 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.029) (0.030) 
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All columns show the marginal effect of the variable in question in separate models. Each of the even number columns present the relevant 
variable of separate probabilistic or ordinal probabilistic regressions controlled for  gender, race, veteran status, working status (full time, 
part time, unemployed, partly retired, retired, disabled, other), number of household residents, self-reported health status, respondent's 
diagnosis of chronic conditions (high blood pressure, diabetes, cancer, lung disease, heart disease, stroke, arthritis), beneficiary of Social 
Security, mental health (CESD score), residence in one of 10 census divisions. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent, and 10-percent level, respectively. 
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Table 2.8. Relationship between key variables and any or all preventive activities at age 65. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES DPROBIT DPROBIT DPROBIT DPROBIT 
  
Association 
of variable 
on any 
prevention 
activity at 
age 65, no 
controls 
Association 
of variable 
on any 
prevention 
activity at 
age 65, with 
controls 
Association 
of variable 
on all 
prevention 
activities at 
age 65 no 
controls 
Association 
of variable 
on all 
prevention 
activities at 
age 65 with 
controls 
Insurance pre-65 
0.007** 0.004* 0.012* 0.010** 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.005) 
Wealth: Household assets 
(100,000's) 
0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000* 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Wealth: Household income 
(100,000's) 
0.008** 0.005** 0.011*** 0.005*** 
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Education years 
0.001*** 0.000** 0.008*** 0.004*** 
0.000  0.000  (0.001) (0.001) 
Risk aversion: Very frequent 
seatbelt use 
0.008** 0.005** 0.013** 0.01 
(0.003) (0.002 (0.006) (0.005) 
Risk aversion: Life insurance 
0.006** 0.005** 0.00 0.00 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.005) 
Risk aversion: Long term care 
insurance 
0.007*** 0.003** 0.041*** 0.019** 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.011) (0.008) 
Risk aversion: Very risk averse to 
job loss 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.006) (0.004) 
Health deterioration (1=much 
better… 5=much worse) 
0.00 0.00 -0.014*** 0.00 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) 
Short term financial planning 
0.00 0.00 -0.021*** -0.009** 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) 
All columns show the marginal effect of the variable in question in separate models. Each of the 
even number columns present the relevant variable of separate probabilistic or ordinal 
probabilistic regressions controlled for  gender, race, veteran status, working status (full time, part 
time, unemployed, partly retired, retired, disabled, other), number of household residents, self-
reported health status, respondent's diagnosis of chronic conditions (high blood pressure, 
diabetes, cancer, lung disease, heart disease, stroke, arthritis), beneficiary of Social Security, mental 
health (CESD score), residence in one of 10 census divisions. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5-
percent, and 10-percent level, respectively. 
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4.2. The association of age 
Table 2.9 shows exclusively the association of age with the different preventive 
activities/dependent variables. The results show that the association of age varies for 
different preventive activities. While older people are significantly less likely to exercise, get 
Pap smear tests or mammograms. Age is positively and significantly associated with being in 
a normal weight range, not smoking, and receiving the flu shot. The results for cholesterol 
screening and the constructed lifestyle and clinical indexes are mixed and barely significant.  
Table 2.9. Relationship between AGE and preventive activities in wave 7. 
Dependent 
variable 
Specification 
Marginal 
effect 
Robust 
standard 
error 
Physical activity 
in wave 7 
No controls -0.006*** (0.000) 
With controls -0.005*** (0.001) 
Non-smoker 
status in wave 7 
No controls 0.007*** (0.000) 
With controls 0.007*** (0.000) 
Normal weight in 
wave 7 
No controls 0.006*** (0.000) 
With controls 0.008*** (0.001) 
Healthy lifestyle 
index# 
No controls -0.002 (0.001) 
With controls 0 (0.001) 
Flu shot in wave 
7 
No controls 0.012*** (0.001) 
With controls 0.008*** (0.001) 
Cholesterol 
screening in wave 
7 
No controls 0.002*** 0.000  
With controls -0.001* 0.000  
Pap smears test in 
wave 7 
No controls -0.014*** (0.001) 
With controls -0.014*** (0.001) 
Mammogram in 
wave 7 
No controls -0.005*** (0.001) 
With controls -0.007*** (0.001) 
Prostate screening 
in wave 7 
No controls 0.002** (0.001) 
With controls 0 (0.001) 
Clinical index# 
No controls 0.001 (0.001) 
With controls -0.008*** (0.001) 
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Sample size 
                                
13,443  
Sample size (female) 
                                  
8,420  
Sample size (male) 
                                  
5,023  
All ROWS show the marginal effect of the variable in question in 
separate probabilistic (or ordinal probabilistic regression models for 
indexes). Controls included regression were used and controlled for 
working status (full time, part time, unemployed, partly retired, retired, 
disabled, other), number of household residents, self-reported health 
status, respondent's diagnosis of chronic conditions (high blood 
pressure, diabetes, cancer, lung disease, heart disease, stroke, arthritis), 
beneficiary of Social Security, mental health (CESD score), residence in 
one of 10 census divisions. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, 
* denote statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent, and 10-
percent level, respectively. #Ordinal probabilistic models were 
estimated. 
4.3. The association of insurance 
In order to analyze the association of insurance, I study whether changes in insurance 
coverage affect the decision to initiate a preventive activity. Initiation of preventive behavior 
takes place strictly when the person had not engaged in such behavior at the previous wave 
(in the case of clinical preventive services, I take the wave before the previous wave since 
clinical preventive questions were asked only every other wave). Table 2.10 presents the 
results on initiation of each of the different preventive services conditional on positive 
changes in insurance coverage. 
Remarkably, yet not unexpectedly, insurance coverage has a significant effect on clinical 
preventive services but does not affect initiation of lifestyle preventive behaviors. The reason 
for this phenomenon probably obeys to the fact that insurance policies typically cover 
clinical services such as cholesterol screening, flu shot or mammograms. Hence, as predicted 
in the model, a change in the price faced by respondents in clinical preventive services 
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increases the demand for such services. Lifestyle preventive activities, on the other hand, 
tend to be only very marginally and seldom shielded by insurance policies. Thus, it is to be 
expected that changes in insurance coverage have an insignificant effect in initiation of 
lifestyle preventive activities.  
Table 2.10. Effect of positive changes in insurance coverage in initiation of preventive activities. 
Dependent variable Statistic Type Statistic 
Physical activity  
Marginal effect 0.02 
Standard error (0.040) 
Non-smoker status  
Marginal effect 0.12 
Standard error (0.100) 
Normal weight 
Marginal effect -0.09 
Standard error (0.070) 
Flu shot 
Marginal effect 0.40*** 
Standard error (0.080) 
Cholesterol screening 
Marginal effect 0.47*** 
Standard error (0.070) 
Pap smears test 
Marginal effect 0.44*** 
Standard error (0.090) 
Mammogram 
Marginal effect 0.56*** 
Standard error (0.090) 
Prostate screening 
Marginal effect 0.54*** 
Standard error (0.120) 
Sample size                    18,511  
Sample size (female)                    10,811  
Sample size (male)                      7,700  
All columns show the marginal effect of the variable in question in separate models. Fixed effects 
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logistic regression were used and controlled for working status (full time, part time, unemployed, partly 
retired, retired, disabled, other), number of household residents, self-reported health status, 
respondent's diagnosis of chronic conditions (high blood pressure, diabetes, cancer, lung disease, heart 
disease, stroke, arthritis), beneficiary of Social Security, mental health (CESD score), residence in one 
of 10 census divisions. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 
1-percent, 5-percent, and 10-percent level, respectively. 
4.4. Fixed effect regressions 
Table 2.11 shows the results for fixed effects regressions with and without controls. 
Given that HRS asked the questions regarding clinical preventive services every other year, 
and only during waves 3, 5, and 7, the fixed effect models would not converge for those 
dependent variables. An explanation for this lack of convergence may be attributed to a 
short panel (t=3). Alternatively, it could also be due to the fact that there is little variation 
between the dependent dummy variables for prevention throughout the waves and thus the 
sample is reduced to the point where convergence was not achieved. The key variables 
regarding education years, time preference, seatbelt use, and risk aversion to job change are 
constant throughout the panel and therefore are excluded from the fixed effects analysis. 
Appendix A shows a version of these fixed effects models but with all independent variables 
included simultaneously (fully specified models). 
The results show that the key independent variables analyzed are less often 
significant in predicting changes in vigorous physical activity, non-smoker status, and normal 
weight than in the cross-section analyses. Age is significantly associated with less vigorous 
activity, a higher likelihood of being a non smoker and outside the normal weight parameter. 
Interestingly, changes in both health and life insurance status significantly predicted less 
vigorous activity and a lower likelihood of being in the normal weight category, but 
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insurance was significantly associated with a higher likelihood of being a nonsmoker. 
Changes in wealth and income had an insignificant role in predicting any preventive 
variables. Long term care insurance had a positive and significant effect on vigorous physical 
activity but insignificant in predicting smoking and normal weight status.  
Table 2.11. Fixed effects logistic regressions on the effect of key independent variables and preventive services. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Type of model xtlogit xtlogit Xtlogit xtlogit xtlogit xtlogit 
 Variables 
Fixed effects 
of variable on 
vigorous 
activity, no 
controls 
Fixed 
effects of 
variable 
on 
vigorous 
activity, 
with 
controls 
Fixed 
effects of 
variable on 
non-
smoker, no 
controls 
Fixed 
effects 
of 
variable 
on non-
smoker, 
with 
controls 
Fixed 
effects of 
variable 
on normal 
weight, 
with 
controls 
Fixed 
effects of 
variable 
on 
normal 
weight, 
with 
controls 
Age 
-0.120*** -0.098*** 0.266*** 0.176*** -0.033*** -0.041*** 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.011) (0.004) (0.005) 
Household 
income (1000's) 
0 0 0 0.001 -0.001* 0 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Household assets 
(1000's) 
0 0.000* 0.000** 0 -0.000*** -0.000*** 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
Education years 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Short term 
financial planning 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Reported change 
in health 
(1=much 
better… 5=much 
worse) 
-0.309*** -0.109*** 0.248*** -0.004 -0.041** -0.024 
(0.014) (0.017) (0.033) (0.042) (0.019) (0.023) 
Risk aversion: 
Very risk averse 
to job loss 
-0.110* -0.114* 0.167 -0.067 0.078 0.007 
(0.059) (0.060) (0.135) (0.156) (0.102) (0.107) 
Risk aversion: 
Very frequent 
seatbelt use 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Risk aversion: 
Life insurance 
0.169*** 0.054 -0.294*** 0.066 0.121*** 0.090* 
(0.030) (0.033) (0.070) (0.087) (0.042) (0.048) 
Risk aversion: 
Long term care 
insurance 
0.115*** 0.121*** -0.074 0.024 -0.073 -0.045 
(0.038) (0.040) (0.095) (0.111) (0.058) (0.064) 
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All columns show the marginal effect of the variable in question in separate models. Fixed effects logistic 
regression were used and controlled for working status (full time, part time, unemployed, partly retired, 
retired, disabled, other), number of household residents, self-reported health status, respondent's diagnosis 
of chronic conditions (high blood pressure, diabetes, cancer, lung disease, heart disease, stroke, arthritis), 
beneficiary of Social Security, mental health (CESD score), residence in one of 10 census divisions. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent, and 
10-percent level, respectively. 
 5. Discussion 
In this chapter I document the factors that influence the demand of preventive 
services among the elderly and near elderly. In order to ensure robustness, I explore the 
results of different probabilistic regression models without any other covariates and with 
different sets of covariates. Further, I use fixed effect models to control for individual 
characteristics that are unobservable in the data.  The results presented above generally agree 
with the predictions derived from the theoretical model of the previous chapter.  
The effect of age in the model cannot be signed unambiguously. Its effect on the 
demand for preventive services depends on the marginal efficiency of health capital. This is 
perhaps the reason why empirically the association of age varies for different preventive 
activities. In the context of activities such as flu shot which is quite efficient in protecting the 
health stock from being ravaged by influenza, might be an activity still worth pursuing even 
at advance ages. Other activities such as exercising or cancer screening might have a very low 
marginal efficiency in preserving the health stock as people get older and therefore the 
demand is negative. Alternatively, people might engage in these preventive activities less as 
they age simply because their health stock deteriorates more rapidly as time advances.  
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The theoretical model predicted that increased education lowers the user cost of 
health investment. The model, however predicts an inverse effect of education and age on 
preventive behavior. Such association was not observed empirically as education is positively 
associated with the demand of all preventive services in all the different specifications. It has 
been observed in the literature that more educated people tend to be healthier to begin with. 
Thus, one might question whether the correlation of education with prevention was 
influenced by confounding effect of respondents being in better health. However, it is worth 
remembering that the results on education were robust to the inclusion of controls on health 
stock such as self-reported health status, mental health score, and the presence of different 
chronic conditions.  
The results of this chapter also seem to agree with the model prediction regarding 
time preferences. As predicted, people that have a short planning horizon were less likely to 
invest in preventive activities. Therefore, as overviewed in the literature, there are indications 
that the interaction between time preferences and preventive activity might be mediated by 
other factors such as education, age or risk aversion.  
In addition, I observe the association of initiation of insurance coverage with the 
decision to start both lifestyle and clinical preventive behaviors. For this analysis, I used a 
more comprehensive sample in HRS than the one used for other aspects of the analysis in 
this chapter. I find that gain in coverage of insurance can be associated with the initiation of 
clinical preventive services. Yet, the effect of changes in insurance coverage is not significant 
in predicting changes in lifestyle behaviors. This is in agreement with the theoretical model 
in chapter 2 and with the findings of McWilliams et al. (2007). In such study, the authors of 
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reported that being uninsured prior to Medicare was associated with increased use of 
preventive screenings after joining the Medicare program. Despite the fact that both studies 
differ in design, since in theirs, the authors compare pre- and post- 65 demand of such 
services between uninsured and insured, the results show remarkable agreement. 
As pointed out before, a higher rate of depreciation may have an ambiguous 
association on the demand for prevention. On the one hand, prevention becomes less 
effective the higher the deterioration rate; on the other hand, more prevention is needed in 
order to retain the current state of health. The results in the estimated models reflect some 
of this dichotomy. While more health deterioration is negatively associated with the healthy 
lifestyle behaviors, as health deteriorates, respondents demand more clinical prevention. This 
is consistent with the effect of age and insurance presented above. In other words, it would 
seem that as the population age and their health gets worse, they seem to be replacing 
healthy lifestyle behaviors with medical interventions. 
Wealth and risk aversion were not explicitly modeled in the last chapter‘s model. 
However, given the availability of such variables in HRS and the theoretical analysis found in 
other models in the literature, their associations were empirically tested. Measures of wealth 
such as income and household assets had an overwhelmingly positive association with the 
demand for all preventive activities in cross section analysis. However, in the fully specified 
model, when education and other covariates, were included the wealth positive association 
with healthy lifestyle behaviors disappeared but on clinical care activities persisted.  
Finally, although no perfect risk aversion exist in the HRS, I attempted to examine 4 
different variables that were related to the perception of risk. In this, I find that risk aversion 
to changing jobs, very frequent use of seatbelt, having a life insurance policy or having a long 
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term care insurance policy were good predictors of most preventive behavior but in 
particular of the clinical ones. 
Table 2.12 summarizes the concordance between the model predictors and the 
empirical results. 
Table 2.12. Comparison of model prediction and empirical results on the demand for investment activities 
Variable Model prediction 
Average 
association for 
healthy lifestyle 
prevention 
Average 
association for 
clinical 
prevention 
Age, t Ambiguous but 
opposite to 
education 
ambiguous Ambiguous 
Education, E Opposite to age +++ +++ 
Price of medical care, pM + none None 
High discount rate for 
time, θ  
- - - 
Price of investment in 
health activities, pI 
- - - 
Rate of deterioration of 
health stock, δ 
Ambiguous but 
probably negative 
none None 
Insurance coverage + for activities such 
as cancer screening.  
– for healthy 
lifestyle activities. 
Not significant + 
Risk aversion N/A + + 
Wealth + + + 
 
 In sum, the model seems to be accurate in some of its predictions but not necessarily 
in all of them. It is worth mentioning that the prediction of the theoretical model are quite 
broad and encompass a very general understanding of what a preventive activity might be. 
As illustrated by the data available, there are substantial differences in the nature of the 
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variables that entail preventive behavior. So, it is not surprising that some of the predictions 
tended to be correct for a certain class of preventive behavior and not for others. In 
addition, it is worth noticing that there might be unobserved institutional or environmental 
factors for each of such preventive behaviors that are not controlled for in the empirical 
analysis. 
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6. Appendix  
 
Table A.2.1. Fully specified fixed effects logistic regressions on the effect of key independent variables and 
preventive services with all controls. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Type of model xtlogit xtlogit xtlogit 
 Variables 
Fully specified 
model for 
vigorous activity 
Fully 
specified 
model for 
nonsmoker 
Fully specified 
model for 
normal weight 
Age 
-0.031* 0.141*** -0.144*** 
(0.016) (0.052) (0.032) 
Household income 
(1000's) 
0.001 0.004 -0.001 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
Household assets 
(1000's) 
0 0 0 
0.000  0.000  0.000  
Insurance 
0.026 0.063 -0.274 
(0.137) (0.378) (0.255) 
Reported change in 
health (1=much 
better… 5=much 
worse) 
-0.149** -0.01 0.012 
(0.064) (0.172) (0.109) 
Risk aversion: Life 
insurance 
0.166  (0.495) 0.242  
(0.129) (0.393) (0.239) 
Risk aversion: Long 
term care insurance 
0.02 0.255 -0.152 
(0.151) (0.472) (0.299) 
All columns show the marginal effect of the variable in question in separate 
models. Fixed effects logistic regression were used and controlled for working 
status (full time, part time, unemployed, partly retired, retired, disabled, other), 
number of household residents, self-reported health status, respondent's 
diagnosis of chronic conditions (high blood pressure, diabetes, cancer, lung 
disease, heart disease, stroke, arthritis), beneficiary of Social Security, mental 
health (CESD score), residence in one of 10 census divisions. Standard errors 
are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5-
percent, and 10-percent level, respectively. 
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CHAPTER 3: SPOUSAL CORRELATION ON THE DEMAND FOR 
PREVENTION AMONG OLDER ADULTS 
 
1.  Introduction 
In the past chapter, I examined the factors driving the demand for preventive 
activities among older adults. Chapter 3 explores the demand for these services among 
members of the same household. In essence, the interest is to understand whether marriage 
can motivate behavioral change. Smoking, drinking, and obesity have all garnered much 
attention for their detrimental effects on health and other outcomes. Behaviors such as 
exercise and a healthy diet, in contrast, are thought to have positive effects on health. If 
indeed there is a public policy seeking to increase the demand for these preventive activities 
it is important to know if spousal influence can play a role. 
The increasingly recognized health benefit of marriage yields a rich context for 
exploring the influence of the social environment on individual health behavior. A growing 
literature documents that married individuals survive longer and enjoy better health than do 
their unmarried counterparts ( Burman & Margolin, 1992; Ross, Mirowsky, Goldsteen, 
1990). At the same time, smoking and obesity have all garnered much attention for their 
detrimental effects on health and other outcomes. Behaviors such as exercise and a healthy 
diet, in contrast, can have positive effects on health. Similarly, the use of preventive services, 
such as cholesterol screening and flu shots, are typically regarded as advisable activities. A 
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critical question is how to improve the health of the public by encouraging healthy decisions. 
This chapter focuses on exploring the nature and the causes for correlation of the household 
member‘s in their decision to use preventive care. 
 
It has been found that among married couples, there is evidence of initial matching 
and compatibility in many areas due to endogamy in race, religion, socioeconomic status 
(Mare 1991; Kalmijn 1998), substance use (Vanyukov et al., 1996), occupation (Hout, 1982; 
Smits, Ultee, and Lammers 1999), and leisure preferences (Houts, Robins, and Huston 
1996). Commonalities generated by assortative mating are well documented and discussed 
across several disciplines (Alpern and Reyniers 2005; Van Leeuwen and Maas 2005). 
Additionally, concordance has been documented for smoking (Sutton 1980; Venters, Jacobs, 
and Luepker 1984; Clark and Etilé 2006), drinking (Leonard and Das Eiden 1999), and diet 
and exercise (Macken, Yates, and Blancher 2000; Farrell and Shields 2002). 
In this chapter, I examine interactions between spouses in terms of behaviors that 
have both attracted notable attention lately and might have important repercussions on 
health: preventive behaviors. Using long-run panel data I find, as other have reported (Falba 
and Sindelar 2008), a strong correlation between husbands‘ and wives‘ behaviors regarding a 
wide array of different preventive activities that vary noticeably in nature. Nevertheless, the 
reasons for this correlation in such a wide range of preventive activities have not been 
studied before. The main contribution of this study is not only to provide more evidence 
regarding the existence of these correlations, but to formalize their possible causes and to 
use empirical evidence to disentangle them. In this sense, the insights of my analysis signify 
an important contribution to the field because understanding the dynamics underlying 
preventative behavior may be beneficial in trying to motivate behavior change. A thoughtful 
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consideration of the motivation for preventive behavior has the potential of finding the tools 
for both (a) improving population health and (b) reducing consumption of care (i.e. costs).   
The correlation in preventive behavior among spouses can have several sources. 
Firstly, individuals may tend to marry those who share the same preferences and 
characteristics. This phenomenon was described in the concept of assortative matching in 
the spousal market by Becker (1974). This sorting and mating process will induce what in the 
literature of identification problems is known as correlated effects (Manski 1995). 
A second hypothesis suggests that the correlation in partners‘ preventive behavior 
may reflect the household‘s decision-making process. The idea here is that the presence of 
some shared marital output, which is affected by a preventive behavior, may lead couples to 
interact via their preventive status in cooperative or non-cooperative bargaining. For 
instance, a couple may decide to stop smoking jointly in order to not only increase their own 
life expectancies but also to make the transition into non-smoking easier for each other.  
This can be likened to the endogenous effects in Manski (1995). 
Third, correlated effects may also arise because spouses share the same environment. 
In particular, they largely receive the same information about the costs and benefits of a 
preventive activity. In this context, households interact via learning about health risks, 
whereby the health developments of other household members reveal information about 
one‘s own risk from non preventive or unhealthy behavior (Clark and Etilé, 2002). 
This chapter uses six waves of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) data to look 
at the correlation in preventive behavior between elderly and near-elderly partners. I 
consider both participation in preventive activities (physical activity, nonsmoking status, 
normal weight maintenance, flu shot, cholesterol screening, prostate screening, pap smear 
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test, and mammography) using the panel aspect of the data, and the decision to start or stop 
a preventive activity.  I estimate a number of different specifications to try to distinguish 
between correlated and endogenous effects. Assortative matching on lifestyle preferences 
will be picked up by correlated effects in the male and female smoking equations. 
Under household decision-making, I expect partner´s behaviors to be correlated 
even after individual fixed effects have been introduced. This will be my key test of 
endogenous versus correlated. I will also test directly for learning by including partner‘s 
health shocks.  
My results show that, the spouse‘s past behavior is a significant predictor of the 
respondent‘s current preventive behavior. However, when individual fixed effects are added, 
the significance of the spouse‘s past physical activity disappears, all other preventive 
activities are unaffected by these individual effects. Furthermore, for all preventive activities 
studied except vigorous activity, initiation and termination of the preventive behaviors are 
significantly and positively correlated. Spouse‘s health shocks are not significant predictors 
of initiation or termination of any of the preventive activities, therefore reducing the 
likelihood that social learning about risks and benefits of a given lifestyle might be driving 
the correlation. These results suggest that the correlation between physical activity among 
elderly and near elderly spouses seems to be consistent with positive matching in marriage, 
while the correlation between all other preventive behaviors studied here appears to be 
connected to bargaining within the household. 
The chapter is organized as follows. In section 2, I present a simple life-cycle model 
of marriage and health. In section 3, I describe the literature concerning some of the ways in 
which to think of correlation between partner‘s behaviors: matching, social learning, and 
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household bargaining. Section 4 presents the data, and in Section 5 the econometric 
approach. My main findings are reported in Section 6. Section 7 discusses the results. 
 
2. Model 
This section modifies and extends the demand model examined in chapter 1 in order 
to analyze the demand for prevention among both members of the household. I use Wilson 
(2002), Bolin et al. (2003), Becker (1973), Grossman (1972), and Jacobson (2000) to create a 
simple conceptual framework to understand the inter-spousal demand for preventive health 
services and other kinds of inter-temporal investments in health. 
The household seeks to maximize the household lifetime utility. Utility is a function 
of a composite consumption goods by the household, Z(t), at each time t, and of the 
services of the stock of health. The services of health are defined as reduced illness in the 
form of healthy time for both members, i=M anf F, of the household, hi(t): 
(57)                              
 
 
  
where θ is the individual‘s subjective rate of time preferences. Healthy time h(t) is produced 
from the stock of health,     according to: 
 
(58)                , ϕ‘>0, ϕ‘‘<0  
The time of death, T, is defined by the stock of health. 
(59)                     
82 
 
Consider a simple economy with an equal number of men and women who each live two 
periods. At the beginning of the first period all the men and women enter the marriage 
market, which has a market-clearing equilibrium characterized by complete monogamous 
pairings between the men and women. As part of the marriage market equilibrium, 
individuals make agreements on how to divide the output from marriage. 
Potential partners observe a vector of characteristics. Among them, partners can 
observe a vector of characteristics that may affect the price of investment in healthy 
behaviors, XF and XM. These characteristics are assumed to be determined prior to entry into 
the marriage market and include variables such as education, time preference, wealth levels, 
and others.  
Following Liljas (1998) health stock changes over time, where in this model, as 
compared to Grossman‘s original model, the depreciation of health capital is also a function 
of other variables, Xi. For the sake of an argument, the woman‘s function would look like: 
 
(60) 
   
  
    
                            , for i=M, F. 
 
where I stands for investment in preventive measures. Health can be improved through 
investments I in one‘s health and by partner‘s investments, and deteriorates at the ―natural‖ 
health deterioration rate δ. f(t) is the input coefficient of preventive activities and satisfies the 
following condition: 
(61) f(t)>0 for all t, 
Z, represents investment in other consumption goods.    
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 Curative care can be purchased at price    for either member of the household. The 
amount of curative care is assumed to depend on the state of health which is represented by 
the stock of health capital H. Thus M=M(H) with: 
(62)                    
Since the decision on the amount of curative care is usually taken by the physician, it 
is not modeled here; it is simply included in the budget constraint. 
The next dynamic constraint in the model expresses the change in the household‘s 
stock of wealth,    , which is a function of W(t), income Y(t) and the costs of investments. 
In the marriage market, individuals contract to divide the output of the households. 
Household labor income in the first period, Y, is exogenously determined. In subsequent 
periods, labor income Y is a function of the level of health status of each spouse, HM and 
HF, even if individuals cannot know what their health status will be in the future. The price 
of investment in health is also affected by environmental factors, λ, which are common for 
both members of the household. Hence, the price of investments can be seen as pi(λ,t). 
 
(63) 
  
  
              
                                       
   , ∙   +  ( )∙  (  +  ( )∙  (  ), 
where pZ(t),  pF(λ, t), pM(λ, t)  are the prices of Z(t),      , and        respectively, r is a 
constant rate of interest and Y is earned income and Y(           ) meaning that 
household income is a function of health time for both household members as well as some 
other characteristics such as the ones that are involved in matching,      .  
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(64) 
  
  
      
 
In other words, the healthier a person is, the more favorable the conditions are for the 
earning of income. 
Like in the case for individuals, let‘s assume that preventive activities are positive 
throughout {0,T}. In this case, the optimization requires the following conditions. 
(65)         
   
(66)         
    
which are both assumed to be a constant. 
(67)             
(68)                   
(69)         
 
And 
(70)                                                      are non-
negative for all t. 
Where t is a continuous variable. 
Maximization of expression (1), taking into account (2), gives the following Hamiltonian: 
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(71)                                   
                   
  ( )−  ,  ∙  ( )+   ∙  ∙  ( )+  ∙  ( )−  ,  ∙  ( )+  ∙ ∙  + h 
, h ,  , 
  −[   ∙  +   , ∙   +   , ∙   +  ( )∙  (   +  ( )∙  (   )] 
 
where λ1 is the adjoint variable associated with the differential equation (4) for health H(t), 
λ2 is the adjoint variable associated with the differential equation (7) for wealth W(t). 
The necessary conditions for a maximum require, in addition to (4) and (7) and the 
boundary conditions, that the following conditions are satisfied: 
(72) 
  
     
             
    
(73)        
(74) 
  
      
   
           
     i=M, F 
(75)                       
(76) 
  
   
     
                
                        
  
    i=M, F 
(77) 
  
  
           
(78) 
  
   
         
                   i=M, F 
(79) 
  
   
=                                                 
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The individual‘s time of death, T, depends on the individual‘s investment in health 
capital in earlier periods and will occur when the level of health is equal to Hmin. The value of 
the maximized Hamiltonian at the unspecified final time T, equals zero: 
(80)                
(81)           
Meaning that at the time close to the individual‘s death, T, her gross investments in 
health capital are smaller than the depreciation of health capital, thus investing in health is of 
no value for the individual at the moment of death. 
The case that the individual never invests in health in t ≤ T may appear, but will not 
be considered in the following. Thus since I(t)>0, equation (18) can be set equal to zero by 
assumption: 
(82)    
  
    
 
    
     
     
Differentiating (26) renders: 
(83)    
       
          
     
Where,  
(84)       
  
    
 
Therefore, 
(85)                 
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Re-arranging equation (29) gives the marginal condition: 
(86) 
           
  
                        
         
            
 
Set i equal to M and F, respectively and divide the expression for M with the one for F to 
obtain the marginal condition: 
(87) 
  
   
  
   
 
        
  
  
            
  
  
 
        
  
  
            
   
  
 
 
In a two-person family with common preferences, husband and wife together invest 
in health until the rate of marginal consumption benefits (left hand side of Eq. 31 ) equals 
the rate of marginal net effective cost of health capital (right hand side). The net effective 
cost of health capital equals the user cost of capital less the marginal investment benefit of 
health capital (in brackets). 
From this conceptual framework I can extract the following insights that are relevant 
on the study of the joint-demand for preventive activities: 
a) Returns to investment in healthy behavior are captured in two ways: through the direct 
effect of improvements in spouses‘ health and indirectly through effects in household 
income. 
b) Observable characteristics on which spouses choose to mate have an effect in the 
depreciation function of the health stock equation. Before mating, a person is able to 
observe a series of characteristics in the potential spouse that might affect his or her 
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inclination for health-related investments, such as smoking, education, propensity to 
exercise, proclivity to go to the doctor for preventive care, risk aversion, and others. 
c) Another way that preventive investments in the model are affected is by environmental 
factors, λ. Environmental changes may have a crucial role in household decision-making 
since an environment that encourages investment in health-related behaviors such as 
easy access to physical fitness programs, anti-smoking bias in one‘s neighborhood, is 
shared by household members. These factors are not observable to the agents in this 
model prior to mating but affect the price that both household members face when 
choosing to invest in prevention. 
d) Investments in wife‘s healthy behaviors are assumed to have a positive impact on the 
wife‘s health but could also potentially have a direct positive impact on the husband‘s 
health. 
3. Literature Review 
In this section I briefly formalize and present some of the arguments derived from 
the theoretical model above which may account for a correlation between partners‘ 
preventive behavior. These explanations are not specific to preventive behavior and may 
apply to other lifestyle decisions. Among the plausible explanations, there are three that are 
particularly relevant to preventive behavior in health-related activities: assortative matching 
in the marriage market; social learning about health risks from the observation of one‘s 
partner; interactions due to bargaining within marriage. 
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3.1. Matching in the marriage market 
The first theoretical consideration refers to the process of matching on the marriage 
market. Becker‗s (1974) model considers the gains that two rational individuals can obtain 
from marriage. Becker posits that complementarities of partners‘ traits in the marital 
production function implies positive assortative matching. Preference for the preventive 
activities that are studied in this chapter such as physical activity, normal weight, nonsmoker 
status, and clinical preventive services may be considered as some of the traits that determine 
marriage assignments. It seems likely that these lifestyle variables will be complements in the 
marital production function, in the sense that partners enjoy sharing these activities. 
Moreover, Contoyannis and Jones (2004) have shown that a number of lifestyle variables are 
correlated between themselves. As such, I expect to find positive assortative matching with 
respect to lifestyle preferences.  
Matching with respect to life expectancy may be enhanced by preventive activities. 
Risk-aversion to time spent alone in widowhood will reinforce preferences for partners 
whose life expectancy coincides with one‘s own. Also, similarities within household 
members regarding risk aversion and taste for health care procedures might lead to a positive 
correlation in the uptake of clinical preventive services such as vaccination and preventive 
screenings. 
Marriage on the marriage market thus corresponds to correlated effects in partners‘ 
behaviors. The implication for empirical estimation is that partners‘ preventive behavior will 
be correlated due to similarities in unobservable individual traits. I control for this by 
including fixed effects in both male and female prevention equations. 
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3.2. Household decision- making 
The second interpretation of the correlation between partners‘ behavior relies on the 
ongoing decision-making process within household. Following Manser and Brown (1980) 
and McElroy and Horney (1981), spouses may have established preferences over decisions 
regarding preventive activities.  However, such decisions may be influence of adjustment 
over time due to changes in environmental factors that affect both households, i.e. in terms 
of the theoretical model this could be seen as changes in the price of prevention. 
Oftentimes, such environmental factors are unobserved by the econometrician. Yet, any 
household decision process over preventive behaviors for which the threat points do not 
involve divorce, an option that is excluded in this analysis, can be distinguished from 
matching, because the outcome is susceptible to change over time; further, any change in 
own preventive behavior should be systematically related to changes in both partners‘ past 
preventive behavior. The empirical interpretation is that respondent uptake of a preventive 
activity at t depends on partner´s decision at t−1, even after controlling for individual fixed 
effects. This effect is expected to be positive, since there is complementarity both between 
partners‘ health statuses in household production, and between past and current preventive 
behavior statuses in the personal return from prevention. If this relationship is not found in 
the data, I will conclude that household bargaining does not explain the correlation in 
spousal preventive behavior. 
Household bargaining regarding preventive behavior can also be interpreted more 
broadly in terms of decisions regarding life expectancy. Under uncertainty, one important 
benefit from marriage is risk-sharing (Weiss, 1997). In this respect, aversion to spending time 
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on one‘s own widowhood may lead spouses to under-invest in health. Preventive behaviors 
may be interpreted as signal of the partner‘s commitment to an increased health stock. 
3.3. Social learning 
In the theoretical model it is assumed that the health investments undertaken by one 
of the members of the couple has a positive impact in the stock of the other couple member. 
However, there is uncertainty about the risk that not carrying out these healthy behaviors 
conveys or about the importance of clinical preventive services for one‘s and each other‘s 
health; as such new information regarding these risks and benefits may be received by 
individuals, in particular through the observation of others. Partners will likely learn from 
each other, so that their information will be shared, and their risk assessments will be 
correlated. This leads naturally to a correlation in observed behavior. 
Information is difficult to assess. My empirical approach will control for correlated 
information by allowing for correlation in contemporaneous unobservable shocks: 
specifically, male and female preventive behavior equations are written as seemingly 
unrelated regressions where the error terms are not necessarily independent (Wooldridge 
2002). In addition, I look for direct evidence of correlated information effects using the 
approach taken by Clark and Etilé (2002), wherein health changes for one partner may affect 
the attitudes toward preventive behaviors. 
3.4. Empirical implications 
Sections 3.1-3.3 presented three different explanations of spousal correlation in 
preventive behavior. These provide us with arguments for the specification of an appropriate 
household empirical model for prevention in Section 5. Matching implies correlation in 
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individual traits, which leads us to a model with individual fixed effects. Further, social 
learning suggests that the error terms in male and female prevention equations may be 
correlated. Together, these suggest the use of seemingly unrelated regressions with correlated 
error terms. Regarding the right-hand side variables, household decision-making implies that 
both own and partner‘s lagged consumption will be important. 
These arguments yield three empirical predictions: 
• Prediction 1. If there is positive assortative matching over preventive behavior, partners‘ 
estimated individual fixed effects will be positively correlated. 
• Prediction 2. Household decision-making suggests that respondent‘s current uptake of 
preventive activities should be positively correlated with partner‘s lagged preventive 
behavior, once individual fixed effects are controlled for. 
• Prediction 3. Partner‘s health developments may affect respondent decisions regarding 
preventive behavior.  
In the following sections, I try to evaluate these three predictions using long-run 
American panel data. 
 
4. Data 
4.1. The Health and Retirement Study 
The data come from the six successive waves of the Health and Retirement Study 
(HRS) spanning from 1996 to 2006.3 The HRS is a panel data set, representative of non-
                                                          
3 HRS currently has 9 biannual waves running from 1992 to 2008. The first two waves were 
excluded from the analysis because several questions relevant to the analysis were either not 
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institutionalized individuals and their spouses in the United States. The study includes 
individuals aged 51 or older.4 All adults in the household are interviewed separately with 
respect to their socio-demographic characteristics, income, employment, and health. Further 
details of this survey are available at the following address: http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/ 
4.2. Prevention in the HRS  
Table 3.1 describes the different preventive activities available in the survey. It is 
important to mention that respondents were surveyed about clinical preventive activities 
only every other wave starting in wave 3. 
Table 3.1. Preventive services in the Health and Retirement Study. 
Type of 
preventive 
investment 
Preventive 
investment 
Description 
Healthy Lifestyle 
Preventive activities 
Vigorous physical 
exercise 
Performs vigorous exercise 3+ times per 
week 
Non-smoking Respondent currently does not smoke 
Normal weight Survey asked for weight and height. 
Clinical related 
Preventive activities 
 
Flu shot 
Whether the respondent has gotten the shot 
this wave. Only available in waves 3, 5, and 
7. 
Cholesterol Screening 
Whether the respondent has gotten the test 
this wave. Only available in waves 3, 5, and 
7. 
Breast Cancer 
Screening 
Whether the respondent has gotten a 
mammography this wave. Only available in 
waves 3, 5, and 7. 
Cervical Cancer Whether the respondent has gotten a Pap 
                                                                                                                                                                             
included or had a very different wording. The last wave, wave 9, was not included as data 
was not yet available as of the writing of this manuscript. 
4
 HRS originally started with a cohort of individuals born between 1931 and 1941 (otherwise 
known as the HRS cohort).  Soon after, the study added individuals born before 1923 from 
the Aging and Health Dynamic (AHEAD) Study. This cohort is known as the AHEAD 
cohort. In 1998, HRS added two extra cohorts: Children of Depression (CODA, born in 
1923-1930) and War babies (WB, born in 1942-1947). Finally, in 2004, a cohort of Early 
Baby Boomers (EBB, born in 1948-1953) was included. 
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Screening smears this wave. Only available in waves 3, 
5, and 7. 
Prostate Cancer 
Screening 
Whether the respondent has gotten any kind 
of prostate cancer test this wave. Only 
available in waves 3, 5, and 7. 
 
I first consider all individuals observed over at least two consecutive waves. This 
initial subsample (Sample 1) includes 97,946 observations (23,761 individuals). While 80.66% 
of the men in this sample are in couples, only 57.11% of the women are. It is possible that 
this reflects a widowhood effect. For the regression analysis, I consider couples who stay 
together over all six waves (waves 3-8), and for whom information on both partners (of 
different gender) is available, which leaves me with 18,900 observations on 3,150 couples 
observed (Sample 2).   
Descriptive statistics for Samples 1 and 2 are shown in Table 3.2. The rates of 
participation in different preventive activities are very similar between genders; however, 
men are more likely to engage in physical activity. Also, men are more likely to report having 
a prostate cancer screening test than women receiving a Pap smear test or a mammography. 
Participation in preventive behavior is high in almost all of the observed activities except for 
physical activity and maintenance of a normal weight5. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 Normal weight if Body mass index is ≥20.0 and ≤25.0 
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Table 3.2.  Descriptive statistics. 
 
Variable 
SAMPLE 1 SAMPLE 2 
Female Male Female Male 
Mean 
Std. 
Error Mean 
Std. 
Error Mean 
Std. 
Error Mean 
Std. 
Error 
Preventive 
activity at t 
        Physical 
activity 37.06% (47.91%) 48.73% (49.92%) 40.56% (49.10%) 50.63% (50.00%) 
Non-
smoking 82.51% (37.57%) 82.39% (38.52%) 84.98% (35.73%) 86.16% (34.54%) 
Normal 
weight 37.82% (48.27%) 28.95% (45.29%) 36.95% (47.85%) 25.94% (43.80%) 
Flu shot 57.13% (49.45%) 57.82% (49.54%) 64.21% (47.94%) 65.45% (47.56%) 
Cholester
ol screening 77.28% (42.18%) 77.60% (42.02%) 82.20% (38.26%) 83.81% (36.84%) 
Pap smear 62.32% (48.70%) 0.00% (0.00%) 68.47% (46.47%) 0.00% (0.00%) 
Mammogr
am 72.14% (45.53%) 0.00% (0.00%) 79.06% (40.69%) 0.00% (0.00%) 
Prostate 
screening 0.00% (0.00%) 72.40% (45.13%) 0.00% (0.00%) 78.11% (41.35%) 
Age 66.81 (11.67) 67.58 (10.03) 65.23 (8.39) 68.93 (7.73) 
Log individual 
yearly real 
income 10.27 (1.05) 10.59 (0.97) 10.72 (0.84) 10.72 (0.84) 
Household size 2.15 (1.22) 2.27 (1.13) 2.40 (0.92) 2.40 (0.92) 
Has at least 
one child 93.03% (25.71%) 93.14% (24.77%) 96.49% (18.40%) 96.49% (18.40%) 
Marital status     
Coupled 58.33% (49.49%) 79.94% (39.50%) 
100.00
% (0.00%) 
100.00
% (0.00%) 
Married 55.94% (49.77%) 76.54% (41.84%) 96.35% (18.77%) 97.45% (15.78%) 
Not in 
couple 41.67% (49.49%) 20.06% (39.50%) 0.00% (0.00%) 0.00% (0.00%) 
Length of 
current 
marriage 35.71 (15.32) 35.60 (15.40) 39.09 (13.07) 39.20 (13.00) 
Race     
White 75.34% (43.58%) 79.01% (41.87%) 81.02% (39.21%) 81.28% (39.01%) 
Black 14.63% (35.67%) 11.51% (32.80%) 8.81% (28.35%) 9.15% (28.83%) 
Hispanic 8.11% (27.82%) 7.47% (27.51%) 8.16% (27.37%) 7.88% (26.94%) 
Other 1.91% (14.27%) 2.00% (14.43%) 1.76% (13.14%) 1.70% (12.91%) 
Veteran status 0.98% (9.85%) 56.94% (49.72%) 0.92% (9.56%) 58.71% (49.24%) 
Labor force 
status     
Full time 21.60% (40.57%) 30.34% (46.14%) 19.37% (39.52%) 25.62% (43.66%) 
Part time 7.09% (25.37%) 2.65% (17.07%) 7.42% (26.22%) 2.91% (16.81%) 
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Unemploy
ed 0.85% (9.17%) 0.83% (9.05%) 0.31% (5.59%) 0.35% (5.87%) 
Retired 43.56% (49.53%) 52.74% (49.96%) 40.73% (49.13%) 55.46% (49.70%) 
Semi-
retired 6.28% (23.63%) 10.65% (29.70%) 7.88% (26.94%) 13.53% (34.21%) 
Disabled 3.19% (18.85%) 2.23% (16.80%) 2.34% (15.12%) 1.74% (13.09%) 
Not in 
labor force 17.44% (39.01%) 0.56% (8.91%) 20.57% (40.42%) 0.41% (6.38%) 
Education     
Less than 
high school 24.64% (44.04%) 23.31% (43.89%) 19.98% (39.98%) 24.34% (42.92%) 
High 
school/GED 38.67% (48.51%) 32.30% (46.63%) 41.15% (49.21%) 32.87% (46.98%) 
Some 
college 21.29% (40.56%) 20.07% (39.32%) 21.87% (41.34%) 17.70% (38.17%) 
College or 
above 15.40% (35.68%) 24.32% (41.86%) 16.60% (37.21%) 24.74% (43.15%) 
Years of 
education 12.13 (3.19) 12.49 (3.57) 12.39 (2.93) 12.41 (3.47) 
Self reported 
health status     
Excellent 12.45% (32.53%) 13.41% (33.36%) 13.46% (34.13%) 11.94% (32.42%) 
Very good 29.07% (44.97%) 28.98% (44.71%) 32.28% (46.76%) 30.38% (45.99%) 
Good 30.61% (45.91%) 31.78% (46.37%) 30.20% (45.91%) 33.60% (47.24%) 
Fair 19.53% (39.97%) 18.68% (39.65%) 16.16% (36.81%) 18.28% (38.65%) 
Poor 8.32% (29.46%) 7.15% (28.24%) 6.49% (24.64%) 5.76% (23.30%) 
CESD mental 
score 1.68 (2.06) 1.25 (1.76) 1.34 (1.85) 0.98 (1.52) 
Functional 
limitations 2.93 (3.06) 2.04 (2.72) 2.60 (2.82) 1.97 (2.47) 
Insurance 
status     
Any 
health 
insurance 89.95% (29.78%) 92.40% (28.64%) 90.18% (29.75%) 94.65% (22.50%) 
Public 
health 
insurance 58.62% (49.07%) 62.05% (48.62%) 53.23% (49.90%) 69.73% (45.95%) 
Private 
health 
insurance 50.09% (50.00%) 53.98% (49.88%) 57.78% (49.39%) 53.48% (49.88%) 
Life 
insurance 63.39% (48.46%) 74.18% (44.13%) 65.48% (47.54%) 76.40% (42.47%) 
Long 
term care 
insurance 10.90% (30.75%) 11.12% (30.65%) 13.36% (34.02%) 12.59% (33.18%) 
Census regions     
New 
England 3.89% (19.43%) 4.08% (19.60%) 3.73% (18.95%) 3.86% (19.27%) 
Mid-
Atlantic 12.47% (33.29%) 11.95% (32.52%) 11.83% (32.30%) 12.02% (32.52%) 
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EN 
Central 16.75% (37.17%) 16.83% (37.07%) 16.16% (36.81%) 16.48% (37.10%) 
WN 
Central 8.59% (27.53%) 9.00% (27.80%) 9.47% (29.28%) 9.57% (29.42%) 
South 
Atlantic 24.64% (42.98%) 24.24% (42.95%) 22.26% (41.60%) 22.64% (41.85%) 
ES 
Central 5.81% (23.37%) 5.35% (23.05%) 6.66% (24.93%) 6.73% (25.05%) 
WS 
Central 10.24% (30.61%) 9.69% (30.62%) 10.15% (30.20%) 10.19% (30.26%) 
Mountain  5.13% (21.92%) 5.48% (22.34%) 5.39% (22.59%) 5.34% (22.49%) 
Pacific 12.10% (32.70%) 13.04% (33.53%) 12.55% (33.13%) 12.80% (33.40%) 
Other 0.00% (2.95%) 0.00% (3.05%)     0.17% (4.17%) 
Number of 
observations 
                      
59,313  
                      
38,633                        15,750  
                      
15,750  
Number of 
individuals 
                      
13,948  
                        
9,813                          3,150  
                        
3,150  
 
In table 3.3, I calculate conditional probabilities to illustrate the correlation in 
spouses‘ behaviors in sample 1. For instance, the first panel in the table should be read as 
follows: given that the female engages in physical activity, the probability of the male spouse 
exercising is 62.2%; given that the woman does not decide to uptake physical activity, the 
probability that the male counterpart will is 41.9%. The odds ratio, 1.49 in the case 
described, is presented in the second panel of table 3.3.6 There is evidently a positive 
correlation between partners‘ decision to engage contemporaneously in preventive activities. 
There does not seem to be a marked difference between male and female‘s odds ratios. In 
the remainder of this chapter, I try to investigate this correlation in the light of Section 2‘s 
theoretical considerations. 
                                                          
6 The descriptive odds ratio is the ratio of the conditional probability of positive outcome 
when the conditioning variable is active to the conditional probability of positive outcome 
when the conditioning variable is inactive. Here: 
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It is important to mention that among the preventive behaviors studied in the 
survey, there are three gender specific activities: mammography, Pap smear test, and prostate 
screening. Since all of these activities relate to cancer prevention, in this analysis I try to 
correlate both the demand for prostate screening with the demand for Pap smear screenings, 
as well as the demand for prostate screening in men for that for mammography in women. 
Table 3.3. Conditional probabilities and odds ratios on spousal preventive behavior. 
  Panel A. Conditional Probabilities 
Panel B. Odds ratios 
(95% confidence 
interval) 
  
Male=positive 
prevention 
Female=positive 
prevention 
Male Female 
Preventive 
Activity 
Female=po
sitive 
prevention 
Female=neg
ative 
prevention 
Male=pos
itive 
prevention 
Male=neg
ative 
prevention 
Physical activity 62.17% 42.54% 51.09% 31.99% 
1.46 1.60 
(1.43-1.49) (1.55-1.64) 
Non-smoker 88.98% 56.16% 89.46% 57.36% 
1.58 1.56 
(1.54-1.63) (1.52-1.60) 
Normal weight 32.84% 22.43% 46.61% 34.06% 
1.46 1.37 
(1.41-1.52) (1.39-1.41) 
 Flu shot  78.99% 30.95% 77.31% 28.89% 
2.55 2.68 
(2.46-2.65) (2.57-2.78) 
 Cholesterol 
screening  
83.49% 64.73% 82.26% 62.72% 
1.29 1.31 
(1.26-1.32) (1.28-1.35) 
 Pap 
smear/Prostate 
screening  
78.04% 66.46% 72.71% 59.77% 
1.17 1.22 
(1.15-1.20) (1.18-1.25) 
 
Mammogram/Pros
tate screening  
78.62% 60.91% 81.23% 64.70% 
1.32 1.26 
(1.26-1.33) (1.23-1.29) 
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 4.3. Accounting for selection bias 
Since I am only interested in couples for this analysis, there is likely some selection 
bias involved in moving from Sample 1 to Sample 2, as a number of contemporaneous shocks 
may simultaneously affect the duration of the couple or the death of one of the spouses, and 
preventive behavior. As such, the regression sample (Sample 2) will not necessarily reflect the 
total population of couples. In particular, there could be an unobserved variable which 
determines couple stability, or that is to blame for the missing of a member of the couple in 
the survey perhaps due to death, which is also linked to their joint preventive behavior.  
To correct for any selection bias in moving from Sample 1 to Sample 2, I compute a 
Mills ratio using a selection variable that equals 1 at period t if the individual is observed over 
the six periods and does not separate or leaves the sample in period t. This selection 
equation is estimated on Sample 1, as shown in Appendix, table A.3.1, as a function of 
education (3 dummies), labor force status (6 dummies), U.S. Census division and age 
dummies.  
5. Econometric specification 
The econometric modeling of this analysis follows closely the one suggested by Clark 
and Etilé (2006). Let      be a binary indicator for each of the preventive activities by 
individual I during period t, and      a vector of exogenous individual and household 
covariates. The agent decide to engage in each of the preventive activities at time t (    =1) if 
the latent variable     
  is positive. I consider the following specification of the household 
preventive decision: 
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(10) 
Where       refers to the lagged effect of the preventive behavior of i‘s partner. The 
residuals have two components: an individual fixed effect    and a time-varying shock      . In 
terms of the three arguments presented in section 2, the addition of    and     will capture 
matching, whereas β corresponds to the bargaining effect. Last,       capture time-varying 
effects. I assume that    and       have zero expectations and covariance matrices    and   , 
respectively, and are mutually uncorrelated with the rest of the covariates, similarly for the 
spouse –i. 
Although Clark and Etilé (2006) use a dynamic bivariate probit model, in this analysis 
I find poor convergence properties of the bivariate specification, therefore I choose to use a 
system of linear probability models as a convenient approximation to the underlying 
response probabilities (Biørn, 2004). By using a seemingly unrelated regression system, I can 
ensure that the contemporaneous cross-equation error correlations for the equations of both 
members of the household are taken into account. As stated in section 3, this serves to 
account for contemporaneous information effects within households.  
I used two different kinds of seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR). In the first one, 
individual level fixed effects are omitted, i.e. this is the strict bargaining specification. The 
second specification includes individual fixed effects, which according to the specification 
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above, control for matching.  Last, in the specifications the use of control variables which 
take different values for the two partners (labor force status, age) allows the robust 
identification of the correlation coefficient ρ. 
In addition, I analyze the robustness of the estimates with SUR with all of the 
preventive behaviors predicted at the same time for each of the household members. 
To examine the effect of information on health risks, I use simple initiation and quit 
models for preventive behavior, with and without individual fixed effects to examine the 
effect of health shocks on each member of the household‘s decision to start or stop the 
different preventive services. 
6. Results 
6.1. Matching or Bargaining 
Table 3.4 reports results from two different specifications. The table has four 
columns. Columns 1 and 2 report benchmark estimates from a specification using seemingly 
unrelated regressions without fixed effects. The seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) in 
columns 3 and 4 add individual fixed effect for both partners as well as an individual fixed 
effect. The results show that physical activity behaves very different to the rest of the 
preventive behaviors. 
The results for the effect of physical activity are striking. First, in the specification 
with individual fixed effects (columns 3 and 4) the coefficient on own lagged participation in 
physical activity drops as compared with the specification without fixed effects although it 
remains significant. Second, individual physical activity participation is statistically 
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independent of partner‘s physical activity participation in the specification with fixed effects 
at the individual level. The statistically significant effect of partner‘s in the specification 
without the fixed effects entirely disappear in specification with fixed effects. 
In all other cases, the effect of spouses past behavior is relevant in determining each 
the respondent‘s behavior regardless of the presence of the individual fixed effects. Given 
the modeling presented above, these results suggest that while the correlation between 
spouses in smoking behavior, normal weight maintenance, flu shot, cholesterol screening, 
and cancer related screening (prostate, mammogram and pap smear) may arise as a 
consequence of a decision-making model, the correlation in physical activity is likely to be 
due to positive assortative matching.  
Table 3.4. Matching vs. bargaining. 
Dependent variable= 
Corresponding preventive 
activity at t 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
SUR with no fixed effects SUR with fixed effects 
Male Female Male Female 
(1) 
Respondent's Physical 
Activity at t-1 
0.325*** 0.333*** 0.263*** 0.281*** 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) 
Spouse's Physical Activity at 
t-1 
0.041*** 0.034*** 0.004 -0.006 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) 
(2) 
Respondent's Non-smoker 
status at t-1 
0.799*** 0.813*** 0.799*** 0.822*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Spouse's Non-smoker status 
at t-1 
0.020*** 0.031*** 0.021*** 0.026*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
(3) 
Respondent's normal weight 
at t-1 
0.753*** 0.737*** 0.753*** 0.748*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Spouse's normal weight at t-1 
0.010* 0.020*** 0.01 0.015** 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
(3) 
Respondent's flu shot at t-1 
0.440*** 0.465*** 0.438*** 0.472*** 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Spouse's flu shot at t-1 
0.098*** 0.101*** 0.094*** 0.092*** 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
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(4) 
Respondent's cholesterol 
screening at t-1 
0.265*** 0.239*** 0.266*** 0.248*** 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) 
Spouse's cholesterol 
screening at t-1 
0.042*** 0.074*** 0.042*** 0.072*** 
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) 
(5) 
Respondent's prostate 
screening (male)/Pap smear 
test (female) at t-1 
0.295*** 0.043*** 0.293*** 0.041*** 
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) 
Spouse's prostate screening 
(female)/Pap smear test 
(male) at t-1 
0.072*** 0.400*** 0.072*** 0.406*** 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) 
(6) 
Respondent's prostate 
screening 
(male)/mammography 
(female) at t-1 
0.294*** 0.424*** 0.292*** 0.426*** 
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) 
Spouse's prostate screening 
(female)/mammography 
(male) at t-1 
0.077*** 0.053*** 0.075*** 0.049*** 
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) 
Number of coupled observations 
                                                                                                     
15,750  
Number of couples 
                                                                                                       
3,150  
All columns show the marginal effect of the variable in question in separate models predicting the 
preventive activity at t. All regressions were controlled by controlled for the inverse mills ratio, age, age 
squared, race, veteran status, working status (full time, part time, unemployed, partly retired, retired, 
disabled, other), number of household residents, self-reported health status, insurance status, life insurance 
status, long term care insurance, education years, mental health (CESD score), residence in one of 10 census 
divisions and wave. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5-
percent, and 10-percent level, respectively. 
 
 In appendix table A.3.2, I repeat the analysis differentiating matching vs. bargaining 
but instead of pairing both members of household in the seemingly unrelated regressions for 
each preventive activity, I include all the preventive activities at once for each household 
member. In this manner, efficiency in the estimates is gained by the fact that the error terms 
are assumed to be correlated across the equations. The results are very similar to those in 
table 3.4. 
 In addition, I repeat table 3.4 but this time including the spouses‘ covariates 
alongside the respondent‘s covariates. The results, presented in appendix table A.3.3, show 
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little variation with respect to table 3.4. However, this specification proves to be highly 
collinear and thus is avoided. 
Some more evidence regarding the effect of bargaining within the household comes 
from examining the couple‘s decision to start or stop one of the preventive behaviors in the 
survey. I look into whether the respondent‘s decision to start or stop one of these behaviors 
at t is affected not only by past respondent‘s and spouse‘s behavior, but also by concurrent 
spouse‘s decision. Initiation of preventive behavior takes place strictly when the person had 
not engaged in such behavior at the previous wave. Similarly, termination is indicated when 
such activity was present at t-1 (t-2 for clinical activities) but no longer observed at t. Table 
3.5 presents summary statistics of preventive activity initiation and termination. 
Table 3.5. Summary statistics for initiation and termination of preventive activity. 
Preventive 
Activity 
Initiation of 
preventive activity 
Termination of 
preventive activity 
Male Female Male Female 
Physical activity 
13.85% 12.98% 16.49% 16.47% 
(34.54%) (33.61%) (37.11%) (37.09%) 
Nonsmoker status 
2.60% 2.32% 1.36% 1.23% 
(15.93%) (15.06%) (11.57%) (11.03%) 
Normal weight 
status 
4.22% 4.47% 4.43% 5.81% 
(20.12%) (20.66%) (20.58%) (23.39%) 
Flu shot 
17.91% 17.49% 4.41% 4.27% 
(38.35%) (37.99%) (20.53%) (20.23%) 
Cholesterol 
screening 
13.04% 14.21% 7.07% 7.95% 
(33.68%) (34.92%) (25.63%) (27.05%) 
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Prostate screening 
12.55%   9.90%   
(33.14%)   (29.87%)   
Pap smear test 
  9.87%   14.14% 
  (29.83%)   (34.85%) 
Mammography 
  9.12%   17.02% 
  (28.80%)   (37.58%) 
Standard errors in parenthesis 
    
Table 3.6 shows that for all behaviors except for physical activity, there is a strong 
and significant relationship between the household members‘ decision to initiate a 
preventive activity regardless of the presence of individual level fixed effects (table A.3.4 in 
appendix shows similar results for termination). This lends credibility to the household 
bargaining process in which spouses are constantly negotiating their participation and 
termination of preventive behavior jointly. Notably, the magnitude of the effects decreases 
considerably once the fixed effects are added. This might indicate that the omitted 
household effects in columns 1 and 2 biases upwards the coefficient on spouse activity 
initiation. 
Table 3.6. Effect of spouse decision to initiate a given preventive behavior on respondent’s decision to start 
such behavior, full sample. 
Dependent variables= 
Initiation of corresponding 
preventive activity at t 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
SUR with no fixed 
effects SUR with fixed effects 
Male Female Male Female 
Spouse initiation of physical 
activity at t 
0.128 0.128 0.066 0.065 
(0.090) (0.090) (0.089) (0.070) 
Spouse initiation of non-smoker 
status (i.e. quitting) at t 
0.267*** 0.261*** # # 
(0.011) (0.010)     
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Spouse initiation of normal weight 
status at t 
0.024*** 0.025*** 0.013 0.019** 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) 
Spouse initiation of flu shot at t 
0.538*** 0.552*** 0.296*** 0.299*** 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Spouse initiation of cholesterol 
screening at t 
0.105*** 0.115*** 0.052*** 0.063*** 
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) 
Spouse initiation of Pap smear 
screening (male respondents)  
prostate screening  (female 
screening) at t 
0.111*** 0.119*** 0.060*** 0.059*** 
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) 
Spouse initiation of 
mammography (male 
respondents)  prostate screening  
(female respondent) at t 
0.094*** 0.085*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 
(0.016) (0.014) (0.016) (0.013) 
Number of coupled observations 
                                                                                                                                                               
15,750  
Number of couples 
                                                                                                                                                                 
3,150  
All columns show the marginal effect of the variable in question in separate models predicting 
the initiation of each preventive activity at t. All regressions were controlled for respondent‘s 
and spouse's past participation in the relevant preventive activity at t-1, the inverse mills ratio, 
age, age squared, race, veteran status, working status (full time, part time, unemployed, partly 
retired, retired, disabled, other), number of household residents, self-reported health status, 
insurance status, life insurance status, long term care insurance, education years, mental health 
(CESD score), residence in one of 10 census divisions and wave. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent, and 10-percent level, 
respectively. # The models regarding smoking quitting did not converge when fixed 
effects at the individual level were included. 
  In 3.7, I repeat the analysis of the joint initiation of preventive activities with a 
reduced sample. Of the 15,750 observations of table 3.6, I dropped those observations that 
are not eligible to initiate a given preventive activity because they already engage in such. In 
appendix A.3.5, I do the proper for termination dropping those observations in which the 
dependent variable is not eligible to terminate a preventive activity because he or she is not 
undertaking it. The samples in both cases, initiation and termination, were reduced and is 
reported in both table 3.7 and table A.3.4, respectively. The results not only corroborate 
what was found in tables 3.6 and A.3.3, in fact, the magnitudes of the association between 
spouses are even stronger when only people that are eligible are studied. 
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Table 3.7. Effect of spouse decision to initiate a given preventive behavior on respondent’s decision to start 
such behavior among those eligible to initiate. 
Dependent variables= 
Initiation of 
corresponding preventive 
activity at t among people 
eligible to initiate 
SUR with no fixed 
effects 
SUR with fixed 
effects 
Number of 
observations (Number 
of individuals) 
Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Spouse initiation of physical 
activity at t 
0.02 0.012 0.011 0.008 
                 
7,187  
         
9,025  
(0.014) (0.009) (0.015) (0.012) (2,335) (2,915) 
Spouse initiation of non-
smoker status (i.e. quitting) 
at t 
0.609*** 0.226*** 0.327*** 0.259*** 
                 
2,183  
         
2,890  
(0.034) (0.012) (0.035) (0.024) (1,174) (1,815) 
Spouse initiation of normal 
weight status at t 
0.027** 0.022** 0.014 0.027** 
                 
9,202  
         
8,652  
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (2,420) (2,531) 
Spouse initiation of flu shot 
at t 
0.691*** 0.519*** 0.389*** 0.372*** 
                 
2,362  
         
2,653  
(0.021) (0.016) (0.022) (0.021) (1,537) (1,748) 
Spouse initiation of 
cholesterol screening at t 
0.184*** 0.094*** 0.090** 0.103*** 
                 
1,332  
         
1,584  
(0.039) (0.019) (0.039) (0.036) (927) (1,095) 
Spouse initiation of Pap 
smear screening (male 
respondents)  prostate 
screening  (female 
screening) at t 
0.204*** 0.193*** 0.111*** 0.095*** 
                    
783  
         
2,074  
(0.037) (0.033) (0.038) (0.031) (586) (1,425) 
Spouse initiation of 
mammography (male 
respondents)  prostate 
screening  (female 
respondent) at t 
0.137*** 0.147*** 0.085** 0.116*** 
                    
619  
         
1,441  
(0.040) (0.039) (0.042) (0.037) (466) (1,015) 
All columns show the marginal effect of the variable in question in separate models predicting the 
initiation of each preventive activity at t. All regressions were controlled for respondent‘s and spouse's past 
participation in the relevant preventive activity at t-1, the inverse mills ratio, age, age squared, race, veteran 
status, working status (full time, part time, unemployed, partly retired, retired, disabled, other), number of 
household residents, self-reported health status, insurance status, life insurance status, long term care 
insurance, education years, mental health (CESD score), residence in one of 10 census divisions and wave. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent, and 
10-percent level, respectively.                                                                                           .  
 
In addition, I look at a variation on the specification for changes in weight. Instead of 
examining the effect of spouse‘s initiation or termination of a normal weight status, I look at 
the association between spouses‘ changes in BMI. Table 3.8 presents the results of seemingly 
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unrelated regressions between spouses with and without fix effect. The correlations are 
positive and significant even when fixed effects are included. 
Table 3.8. Effect of spouse’s BMI change on respondent’s BMI change. 
Dependent 
variable=Respondent's 
change in BMI 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
SUR with no fixed 
effects 
SUR with fixed 
effects 
Male Female Male Female 
Spouse BMI change 
0.133*** 0.208*** 0.069*** 0.102*** 
(0.007) (0.012) (0.008) (0.011) 
Seemingly unrelated regression of both household members' BMI at t. All 
regressions were controlled with the inverse mills ratio, age, age squared, race, 
veteran status, working status (full time, part time, unemployed, partly retired, 
retired, disabled, other), number of household residents, self-reported health 
status, insurance status, life insurance status, long term care insurance, 
education years, mental health (CESD score), residence in one of 10 census 
divisions and wave. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote 
statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent, and 10-percent level, 
respectively. 
6.2. Effect of health changes 
The third prediction is that preventive behavior may be positively correlated with the 
partner‘s past health changes, as a consequence of either correlated effects (social learning) 
or household decision-making. Table 3.9 shows the percentage of people in sample 2 that 
undergo a health shock in the form of a new diagnosis of heart problems, diabetes, cancer, 
lung disease, or high blood pressure at each given wave. As expected, the number of people 
suffering a health shock increases as the population gets older. Men, probably due to being 
older than women, have a higher incidence of health shocks. 
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Table 3.9. Percentage of people suffering a health shock at each wave. 
  Health shocks 
  Male Female 
Wave 4 (1998) 
11.87% 10.28% 
(32.36%) (30.38%) 
Wave 5 (2000) 
14.49% 11.63% 
(35.20%) (3206.10%) 
Wave 6 (2002) 
16.67% 13.55% 
(35.20%) (34.23%) 
Wave 7 (2004) 
16.41% 13.98% 
(37.04%) (34.69%) 
Wave 8 (2006) 
18.17% 15.10% 
(38.56%) (35.82%) 
Standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
 Table 3.10 shows the results of the effect that a health shock, on the respondent‘s 
inclination to initiate or terminate at a given wave each one of the preventive behaviors 
studied here with and without individual fixed effects. Except for vigorous activity and 
normal weight status, a shock in respondent‘s own health is likely to increase the likelihood 
that the respondent initiates a preventive activity.  However, a shock in spouse‘s health does 
not translate into a change in respondent‘s behavior. The implications are interesting as the 
results suggest that the survey respondents update their perception of health risk and their 
inclination towards preventive behavior as a consequence of the diagnosis of the disease. 
Alternatively, a new health shock might increase the respondent‘s access to medical care 
therefore increasing the likelihood of performance of routine preventive care. Columns 5-8 
of table 3.10 show that health shocks in spouses have no effect in increasing the likelihood 
that a respondents start any of the preventive behavior studied. 
110 
 
Table A.3.6 in the appendix repeats the analysis but this time considering only 
cardiology related shocks (i.e. new diagnosis of heart disease, high blood pressure, diabetes, 
and stroke). The results are similar to table 3.10. Spouse‘s cardiac health shocks do not 
encourage initiation of any preventive activity. As expected, the magnitude of the effect of 
respondent‘s own cardiology related shocks are smaller than the effect that the more general 
measure of health shocks that included a new diagnosis of cancer and lung disease had. 
Interestingly, cardiology-related shocks were still significant in predicting initiation of cancer 
related tests like prostate screening or pap smear test, lending credibility to the hypothesis 
that health shocks increase clinical preventive behavior as a result of increased in contact to 
medical care, even if it‘s unrelated to the cause of the shock per se. 
Table 3.10. Effect of own and spouse’s health shock on initiation of preventive activities, full sample. 
Dependent 
variable= 
Initiation of 
corresponding 
preventive 
activity at t  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Effect of own health shock on preventive 
activity 
Effect of spouse's health shock on 
preventive activity 
SUR with no fixed 
effects 
SUR with fixed 
effects 
SUR with no 
fixed effects 
SUR with fixed 
effects 
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Health shock 
on vigorous 
physical activity 
-0.007 0.005 -0.004 0.001 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) 
Health shock 
on nonsmoker 
status 
0.020*** 0.013*** 0.027*** 0.013*** -0.001 0.004 -0.001 0.004 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
Health shock 
on normal 
weight status 
0.007 0.010* 0.008 0.008 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Health shock 
on flu shot 
0.033** 0.030** 0.032** 0.040*** -0.002 -0.009 0.007 0 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) 
Health shock 
on cholesterol 
screening 
0.051*** 0.041*** 0.050*** 0.046*** 0 0.008 0.002 0.014 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) 
Health shock 
on prostate 
screening 
(male)/Pap 
smear (female) 
0.315*** 0.264** 0.023** 0.027** 0.001 -0.009 0.002 -0.008 
(0.118) (0.108) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Health shock 0.021** 0.016 0.023** 0.016* 0.001 0.014 0.002 0.007 
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on prostate 
screening 
(male)/mamm
ography 
(female) 
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) 
Number of 
coupled 
observations 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
15,750  
Number of 
couples 
                                                                                                                                                                                                  
3,150  
All columns show the marginal effect of the variable in question in separate models predicting the initiation 
of each preventive activity at t. All regressions were controlled for respondent's and spouse's past 
participation in the relevant preventive activity at t-1, the inverse mills ratio, age, age squared, race, veteran 
status, working status (full time, part time, unemployed, partly retired, retired, disabled, other), number of 
household residents, self-reported health status, insurance status, life insurance status, long term care 
insurance, education years, mental health (CESD score), residence in one of 10 census divisions and wave. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent, and 
10-percent level, respectively.     
 
I repeat table 3.10 and table 3.6 in appendix but this time only with those eligible to 
initiate a preventive activity. In other words, I drop those observations that were already 
engaging in prevention. The results in table 3.11 for all health shocks, and table A.3.7 for 
cardio shocks reiterate the findings that except for physical activity, respondents react to 
their own health shocks by initiating a preventive activity but do not quite respond to health 
shocks in spouses‘ health in quite the same way. 
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Table 3.11. Effect of own and spouse’s health shock on initiation of preventive activities, among those eligible to initiate. 
Dependent 
variable= 
Initiation of 
corresponding 
preventive activity 
at t among eligible 
to initiate 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Effect of OWN health shock on preventive 
activity 
Effect of SPOUSE health shock on 
preventive activity 
Number of 
observations 
(Number of 
individuals) 
SUR with no fixed 
effects 
SUR with fixed 
effects 
SUR with no fixed 
effects 
SUR with fixed 
effects 
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Health shock on 
vigorous physical 
activity 
-0.011 0.004 -0.014 -0.015 -0.009 0.020** -0.009 0.013 
         
7,187  
                     
9,025  
(0.012) (0.008) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (2,335) (2,915) 
Health shock on 
nonsmoker status 
0.048*** 0.021** 0.055*** 0.035*** -0.022 -0.005 -0.01 0.006 
         
2,182  
                     
2,889  
(0.015) (0.009) (0.016) (0.011) (0.014) (0.009) (0.015) (0.012) (1,174) (1,814) 
Health shock on 
normal weight 
status 
-0.016*** -0.015*** -0.012* -0.007 -0.005 0.004 -0.003 0.009 
         
9,201  
                     
8,649  
(0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (2,420) (2,531) 
Health shock on flu 
shot 
0.100*** 0.038** 0.101*** 0.098*** 0.001 -0.031* 0.013 0.035* 
         
2,362  
                     
2,651  
(0.020) (0.017) (0.022) (0.020) (0.019) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021) (1,537) (1,747) 
Health shock on 
cholesterol 
screening 
0.162*** 0.092*** 0.166*** 0.181*** 0.024 -0.011 0.033 -0.01 
         
1,332  
                     
1,583  
(0.024) (0.018) (0.025) (0.023) (0.025) (0.017) (0.026) (0.024) (927) (1,095) 
Health shock on 
prostate screening 
(male)/mammograp
hy (female) 
0.146*** 0.131*** 0.146*** 0.075*** 0.018 -0.005 0.019 0.024 
            
619  
                     
1,441  
(0.038) (0.038) (0.041) (0.026) (0.036) (0.035) (0.039) (0.027) (466) (0,466) 
Health shock on 
prostate screening 
(male)/Pap smear 
(female) 
0.128*** 0.090*** 0.119*** 0.044** 0.018 0.003 0.014 -0.001 
            
783  
                     
2,073  
(0.033) (0.032) (0.035) (0.020) (0.031) (0.030) (0.034) (0.021) (586) (1,424) 
All columns show the marginal effect of the variable in question in separate models predicting the initiation of each preventive activity at t. All 
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regressions were controlled for respondent's and spouse's past participation in the relevant preventive activity at t-1, the inverse mills ratio, age, age 
squared, race, veteran status, working status (full time, part time, unemployed, partly retired, retired, disabled, other), number of household residents, 
self-reported health status, insurance status, life insurance status, long term care insurance, education years, mental health (CESD score), residence in 
one of 10 census divisions and wave. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent, and 10-
percent level, respectively.     
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Lastly, I look at the effect of a health shock in the decision to terminate a preventive 
behavior. Table 3.12 presents two panels: columns 1-4 evaluate the effect of a shock in 
respondent‘s health on the respondent‘s own preventive behavior; columns 5-8 evaluate the 
effect of a shock in spouse‘s health in the respondent‘s behavior. Table A.3.8 in appendix 
repeats this analysis but with a curtailed sample of those respondents who are actually 
eligible to terminate the behavior. Similar to tables 3.10 and 3.11, I found that a shock in 
spouse‘s health has no effect in the decision to terminate a preventive behavior. A health 
shock in one‘s own health had a positive effect in terminating physical activity and normal 
weight status. However, it has a negative effect in terminating all of the clinical preventive 
behaviors. In other words, the results for termination are clearly the opposite to the ones 
found for the initiation of these preventive behaviors. 
Table 3.12. Effect of own and spouse’s health shock on termination of preventive activities, full sample. 
Dependent 
variable= 
Terminatio
n of 
correspondi
ng 
preventive 
activity at t  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Effect of OWN health shock on termination 
of preventive activity 
Effect of SPOUSE health shock on 
termination of preventive activity 
SUR with no fixed 
effects 
SUR with fixed 
effects 
SUR with no 
fixed effects 
SUR with fixed 
effects 
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Health shock 
on vigorous 
physical 
activity 
0.016** 0.015** 0.021** 0.01 0.001 0 0.005 0.011 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Health shock 
on non-
smoker 
status 
-0.001 0.001 0 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.004 0 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Health shock 
on normal 
weight status 
0.008* 0.017*** 0.012** 0.028*** -0.005 0.004 0 0.008 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Health shock 
on flu shot 
-0.024*** -0.017** -0.025*** -0.012* -0.008 -0.011 -0.009 -0.01 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
Health shock 
on 
cholesterol 
-0.063*** -0.057*** -0.065*** -0.056*** 0.003 -0.01 0 -0.007 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) 
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screening 
Health shock 
on prostate 
screening 
(male)/mam
mography 
(female) 
-0.025** -0.015* -0.024** -0.016* -0.009 -0.003 -0.007 0.003 
(0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Health shock 
on prostate 
screening 
(male)/Pap 
smear 
(female) 
-0.026** 0.004 -0.024** 0.001 -0.012 -0.004 -0.009 -0.008 
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) 
Number of 
observations 
                                                                                                                                                             
15,750  
Number of 
couples 
                                                                                                                                                               
3,150  
All columns show the marginal effect of the variable in question in separate models predicting the 
termination of each preventive activity at t. All regressions were controlled for respondent's and spouse's 
past participation in the relevant preventive activity at t-1, the inverse mills ratio, age, age squared, race, 
veteran status, working status (full time, part time, unemployed, partly retired, retired, disabled, other), 
number of household residents, self-reported health status, insurance status, life insurance status, long term 
care insurance, education years, mental health (CESD score), residence in one of 10 census divisions and 
wave. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent, 
and 10-percent level, respectively.     
 
7. Discussion 
I used six waves of HRS data to examine intra-spousal correlations in preventive 
behavior. One of this chapter‘s contributions has been to the interpretation of observed 
correlation between spouses‘ behaviors. These can come about because partners‘ fixed traits 
are similar, as in matching models of marriage. Alternatively, household decision-making can 
lead people to make similar investments in preventive activities. Last, individuals may decide 
to switch behaviors into healthier ones by observing changes in spouses‘ health, i.e. due to 
social learning. 
Firstly, it is noted that there is indeed a correlation in preventive behavior in the raw 
data. Seemingly unrelated regressions without controls for unobserved household effects 
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reveal a positive correlation between partner‘s preventive activities participation: this is 
consistent with both matching and decision-making. The empirical approach used here has 
allowed me to investigate and distinguish between three different explanations for this 
correlation for a variety of preventive activities. Partners‘ propensities to engage in physical 
activity are statistically independent in seemingly unrelated regressions with individual fixed 
effects: all of the correlation in physical activity seems to work through the correlation in 
individual effects suggesting a case of assortative matching in those characteristics that drive 
physical activity. For all other preventive activities in HRS, the correlation withstood the 
inclusion of individual effects suggesting a household decision-making. I find very little 
evidence to support social learning from both members of the household as an explanation 
for the correlation in their preventive behavior. 
Although the approach used here was used by Clark and Etilé (2006) in British panel 
data, I have expanded its use not only to a different panel of data comprised by an older 
population but also to a wider set of preventive behaviors. It is important to mention that 
Clark and Etilé (2006), contrary to my own findings, found a strong assortative matching 
effect and not significant evidence on household decision-making on smoking behavior. An 
explanation may rely in the fact that the population studied in this chapter is much older 
than theirs. Moreover, the length of marriage in my sample is much longer than in their 
sample. Thus, it sounds perhaps credible that household-decision making is more important 
for older marriages than newer marriages. 
Clark and Etilé (2006) used the more appropriate bivariate models for binary 
outcomes like the ones studied here while I used an ordinary least square regression 
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framework. That is, a limitation of my study. Unless the range of the independent variables is 
severely restricted, linear probability models cannot be a good description of the population 
response probability P(y=1|x). For given values of the population parameters estimated, 
there would usually be feasible values of the covariates that fall outside the unit interval 
(Wooldridge, 2002). The hope is that linear probability models approximate the response 
probability for common values of the covariates. 
There are at least two important highlights of this empirical analysis of the 
interaction between household members. The first is purely descriptive or positive: if one is 
able to identify the source of similarity in couples‘ behaviors, one can build better and more 
accurate economic models of the household. The second is normative: optimal policy is 
bound to depend on the nature of household interactions. Given the interest in the 
American health care system to increase preventive behavior, is useful to know whether is 
more efficient to target one person per household in term of a given health intervention, to 
target all members. The evidence in this chapter shows that for most preventive activities, 
the demand is jointly driven by bargaining within the household, perhaps targeting only one 
household member, for example women, could have the spillover effect of shifting the 
behavior in men too. 
8. Appendix 
Table A.3.1. Instrumental regression for selection bias 
 
(1) (2) 
 
Males Females 
Labor force status 
Full time 
-0.363*** 1.076* 
(0.020) (0.602) 
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Part time 
-0.258*** 1.098* 
(0.026) (0.603) 
Unemployed 
-0.671*** 1.018* 
(0.076) (0.611) 
Semi-retired 
-0.184*** 1.066* 
(0.026) (0.602) 
Retired 
-0.217*** 1.035* 
(0.016) (0.602) 
Disabled 
-0.575*** 1.032* 
(0.038) (0.604) 
Not in the labor force (omitted) 
0 0 
0.000  0.000  
Education 
Less than high school 
-0.216*** 1.497*** 
(0.020) (0.087) 
High school/GED 
0.013 1.545*** 
(0.017) (0.087) 
Some college 
-0.025 1.490*** 
(0.019) (0.088) 
College or above (omitted) 
0 0 
0.000  0.000  
Census divisions YES YES 
Age dummies YES YES 
Heteroskedasticity-adjusted robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * 
denote statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent, and 10-percent level, 
respectively. 
 
Table A.3.2. Matching vs. bargaining with all preventive equations in the same set of seemingly 
unrelated regressions, full sample. 
Dependent variable= 
Corresponding preventive 
activity at t 
(1) (2) (1) (2) 
SUR spouses single activities 
simultaneously 
SUR, all preventive activities 
simultaneously 
Male Female Male Female 
(1) 
Respondent's Physical 
Activity at t-1 
0.325*** 0.333*** 0.297*** 0.324*** 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.015) (0.015) 
Spouse's Physical 0.041*** 0.034*** 0.004 0.015 
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Activity at t-1 (0.009) (0.008) (0.015) (0.015) 
(2) 
Respondent's Non-
smoker status at t-1 
0.799*** 0.813*** 0.782*** 0.800*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) 
Spouse's Non-smoker 
status at t-1 
0.020*** 0.031*** 0.022** 0.038*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) 
(3) 
Respondent's normal 
weight at t-1 
0.753*** 0.737*** 0.750*** 0.742*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.011) 
Spouse's normal weight 
at t-1 
0.010* 0.020*** 0.021** 0.013 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.009) (0.012) 
(3) 
Respondent's flu shot at 
t-1 
0.440*** 0.465*** 0.430*** 0.450*** 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) 
Spouse's flu shot at t-1 
0.098*** 0.101*** 0.089*** 0.089*** 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) 
(4) 
Respondent's 
cholesterol screening at 
t-1 
0.265*** 0.239*** 0.231*** 0.231*** 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) 
Spouse's cholesterol 
screening at t-1 
0.042*** 0.074*** 0.019 0.048*** 
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) 
(5) 
Respondent's prostate 
screening (male)/Pap 
smear test (female) at t-
1 
0.295*** 0.043*** 0.266*** 0.362*** 
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) 
Spouse's prostate 
screening (female)/Pap 
smear test (male) at t-1 
0.072*** 0.400*** 0.001 0.042*** 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.002) (0.016) 
(6) 
Respondent's prostate 
screening 
(male)/mammography 
(female) at t-1 
0.294*** 0.424*** 0.267*** 0.366*** 
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) 
Spouse's prostate 
screening 
(female)/mammography 
(male) at t-1 
0.077*** 0.053*** 0.001 0.037*** 
(0.014) (0.013) (0.002) (0.013) 
Number of observations 
                                                                                                                                  
15,750  
Number of individuals 
                                                                                                                                    
3,150  
All columns show the marginal effect of the variable in question in seemingly unrelated regressions 
predicting all the preventive activity at t simultaneously.. All regressions were controlled for the 
inverse mills ratio, age, age squared, race, veteran status, working status (full time, part time, 
unemployed, partly retired, retired, disabled, other), number of household residents, self-reported 
health status, insurance status, life insurance status, long term care insurance, education years, mental 
health (CESD score), residence in one of 10 census divisions and wave. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent, and 10-percent level, respectively. 
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Table A.3.3. Matching vs. bargaining with respondent’s AND spouse’s covariates included, full 
sample. 
Dependent variable= Corresponding 
preventive activity at t 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
SUR with no fixed 
effects 
SUR with fixed effects 
Male Female Male Female 
(1) 
Respondent's Physical Activity at t-1 
0.324*** 0.332*** 0.248*** 0.252*** 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
Spouse's Physical Activity at t-1 
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
(2) 
Respondent's Non-smoker status at t-1 
0.798*** 0.813*** 0.798*** 0.819*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Spouse's Non-smoker status at t-1 
0.020*** 0.028*** 0.020*** 0.023*** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
(3) 
Respondent's normal weight at t-1 
0.753*** 0.736*** 0.753***   
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Spouse's normal weight at t-1 
0.009 0.018*** 0.008 0.012* 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
(3) 
Respondent's flu shot at t-1 
0.438*** 0.463*** 0.437*** 0.474*** 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Spouse's flu shot at t-1 
0.097*** 0.100*** 0.098*** 0.094*** 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
(4) 
Respondent's cholesterol screening at t-
1 
0.263*** 0.237*** 0.264*** 0.245*** 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) 
Spouse's cholesterol screening at t-1 
0.042*** 0.074*** 0.043*** 0.069*** 
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) 
(5) 
Respondent's prostate screening 
(male)/Pap smear test (female) at t-1 
0.306*** 0.420*** 0.282*** 0.420*** 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) 
Spouse's prostate screening 
(female)/Pap smear test (male) at t-1 
0.071*** 0.039*** 0.077*** 0.039*** 
(0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) 
(6) 
Respondent's prostate screening 
(male)/mammography (female) at t-1 
0.306*** 0.397*** 0.285*** 0.398*** 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Spouse's prostate screening 
(female)/mammography (male) at t-1 
0.072*** 0.040*** 0.071*** 0.041*** 
(0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) 
Number of observations 
                                                                                    
15,750  
Number of individuals 
                                                                                      
3,150  
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All columns show the marginal effect of the variable in question in seemingly unrelated regressions 
predicting all the preventive activity at t simultaneously. All regressions were controlled for the inverse 
mills ratio, the respondent's and the spouse's age, age squared, race, veteran status, working status (full 
time, part time, unemployed, partly retired, retired, disabled, other), number of household residents, self-
reported health status, insurance status, life insurance status, long term care insurance, education years, 
mental health (CESD score), residence in one of 10 census divisions and wave. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent, and 10-percent level, 
respectively. 
  
 
 
 
 
Table A.3.4. Effect of spouse’s termination of preventive activities, full sample. 
  
Dependent variable= 
Termination of 
corresponding 
preventive activity at t 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
SUR with no fixed effects 
SUR with fixed 
effects 
Male Female Male Female 
Spouse termination of 
physical activity at t 
0.017 0.015 0.008 0.008 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.008) 
Spouse termination of 
non-smoker status (i.e. 
quitting) at t 
0.086*** 0.085*** 0.047*** 0.048*** 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
Spouse termination of 
normal weight status at t 
0.047*** 0.064*** 0.024*** 0.028*** 
(0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.010) 
Spouse termination of flu 
shot at t 
0.207*** 0.203*** 0.107*** 0.115*** 
(0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) 
Spouse termination of 
cholesterol screening at t 
0.147*** 0.164*** 0.074*** 0.080*** 
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) 
Spouse termination of Pap 
smear screening (male 
respondents)  prostate 
screening  (female 
screening) at t 
0.038*** 0.047*** 0.023* 0.028* 
(0.013) (0.017) (0.013) (0.016) 
Spouse termination of 
mammography (male 
respondents)  prostate 
screening  (female 
respondent) at t 
0.050*** 0.045*** 0.028* 0.016 
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) 
Number of 
coupled/observations 
                                                                                                                                                  
15,750  
Number of individuals 
                                                                                                                                                    
3,150  
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All columns show the marginal effect of the variable in question in separate 
models predicting the initiation of each preventive activity at t. All regressions were 
controlled for respondent‘s and spouse's past participation in the relevant 
preventive activity at t-1, the inverse mills ratio, age, age squared, race, veteran 
status, working status (full time, part time, unemployed, partly retired, retired, 
disabled, other), number of household residents, self-reported health status, 
insurance status, life insurance status, long term care insurance, education years, 
mental health (CESD score), residence in one of 10 census divisions and wave. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1-
percent, 5-percent, and 10-percent level, respectively.                                                                                            
 
 
Table A.3.5. Effect of spouse’s termination of preventive activities among those eligible to terminate the 
activity. 
 
Dependent variable= 
Termination of 
corresponding 
preventive activity at t 
among eligible to 
terminate 
(1) (2) (3) (4)   
SUR with no fixed 
effects 
SUR with fixed 
effects 
Number of 
observations (Number 
of individuals) 
Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Spouse termination of 
physical activity at t 
0.210*** 0.142*** 0.110*** 0.128*** 
                   
7,857  
         
7,257  
(0.014) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014) (2,428) (2,498) 
Spouse termination of 
non-smoker status (i.e. 
quitting) at t 
0.114*** 0.076*** 0.062*** 0.053*** 
                   
8,871  
         
9,780  
(0.013) (0.009) (0.012) (0.010) (2,566) (2,985) 
Spouse termination of 
normal weight status at t 
0.144*** 0.064*** 0.064** 0.049** 
                   
3,427  
         
5,339  
(0.025) (0.011) (0.025) (0.022) (1,078) (1,663) 
Spouse termination of 
flu shot at t 
0.246*** 0.180*** 0.127*** 0.167*** 
                   
3,304  
         
3,493  
(0.020) (0.015) (0.020) (0.021) (1,999) (2,145) 
Spouse termination of 
cholesterol screening at 
t 
0.160*** 0.158*** 0.080*** 0.085*** 
                   
4,229  
         
4,568  
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (2448) (2,717) 
Spouse termination of 
Pap smear screening 
(male respondents)  
prostate screening  
(female screening) at t 
0.038*** 0.054*** 0.024* 0.034* 
                   
3,511  
         
4,152  
(0.014) (0.020) (0.014) (0.020) (2088) (2,485) 
Spouse termination of 
mammography (male 
respondents)  prostate 
screening  (female 
respondent) at t 
0.052*** 0.041*** 0.028 0.012 
                   
3,738  
         
4,443  
(0.018) (0.015) (0.018) (0.014) (2187) (2,615) 
All columns show the marginal effect of the variable in question in separate models predicting the 
termination of each preventive activity at t. All regressions were controlled by controlled for respondent‘s 
and spouse's past participation in the relevant preventive activity at t-1, the inverse mills ratio, age, age 
squared, race, veteran status, working status (full time, part time, unemployed, partly retired, retired, 
disabled, other), number of household residents, self-reported health status, insurance status, life insurance 
status, long term care insurance, education years, mental health (CESD score), residence in one of 10 
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census divisions and wave. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at 
the 1-percent, 5-percent, and 10-percent level, respectively. 
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Table A.3.6. Effect of own and spouse’s cardiology related health shock on initiation of preventive activities. 
 
Dependent variable= Initiation 
of corresponding preventive 
activity at t  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Effect of own cardiology related health shock 
on preventive activity 
Effect of spouse's cardiology related health 
shock on preventive activity 
SUR with no fixed 
effects 
SUR with fixed 
effects 
SUR with no fixed 
effects 
SUR with fixed 
effects 
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Health shock on vigorous 
physical activity 
-0.005 0.005 -0.008 0.001 -0.006 -0.011 -0.005 -0.006 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
Health shock on nonsmoker 
status 
0.019*** 0.010*** 0.027*** 0.010** 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.002 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Health shock on normal weight 
status 
0.011* 0.006 0.012** 0.004 -0.002 0.004 -0.001 0.005 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Health shock on flu shot 0.032** 0.022 0.030** 0.035** 0.001 -0.014 -0.002 -0.003 
(0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.010) (0.014) 
Health shock on cholesterol 
screening 
0.051*** 0.041*** 0.050*** 0.046*** 0 0.008 0.002 0.014 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) 
Health shock on prostate 
screening (male)/Pap smear 
(female) 
0.264** 0.237** 0.020* 0.026** -0.005 -0.009 -0.006 -0.008 
(0.128) (0.115) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Health shock on prostate 
screening (male)/mammography 
(female) 
0.018 0.013 0.021** 0.013 -0.005 0.013 -0.007 0.006 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) 
Number of coupled/observations 
                                                                                                                                                             
15,750  
Number of couples 
                                                                                                                                                               
3,150  
All columns show the marginal effect of the variable in question in separate models predicting the initiation of each preventive activity at t. All 
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regressions were controlled for respondent's and spouse's past participation in the relevant preventive activity at t-1, the inverse mills ratio, age, 
age squared, race, veteran status, working status (full time, part time, unemployed, partly retired, retired, disabled, other), number of household 
residents, self-reported health status, insurance status, life insurance status, long term care insurance, education years, mental health (CESD 
score), residence in one of 10 census divisions and wave. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1-
percent, 5-percent, and 10-percent level, respectively.     
 
Table A.3.7. Effect of own and spouse’s cardiology related health shock on initiation of preventive activities among those eligible to initiate. 
Dependent 
variable= 
Initiation of 
corresponding 
preventive 
activity at t 
among eligible 
to initiate 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Effect of OWN cardiac related shock on 
preventive activity 
Effect of SPOUSE cardiac related on preventive 
activity 
Number of 
observations 
(Number of 
individuals) 
SUR with no fixed 
effects 
SUR with fixed 
effects 
SUR with no fixed 
effects SUR with fixed effects 
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Health shock on 
vigorous physical 
activity 
-0.019* 0.005 -0.022* -0.011 -0.015 0.008 -0.014 0.002 
         
7,187  
         
9,025  
(0.011) (0.008) (0.012) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (2,335) (2,915) 
Health shock on 
nonsmoker status 
0.041*** 0.027*** 0.047*** 0.035*** -0.021 -0.009 -0.008 0.002 
         
2,182  
         
2,889  
(0.014) (0.009) (0.015) (0.011) (0.014) (0.008) (0.014) (0.011) (1,174) (1,814) 
Health shock on 
normal weight 
status 
-0.015*** -0.018*** -0.013** -0.013* -0.003 0.004 -0.001 0.007 
         
9,201  
         
8,649  
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (2,420) (2,531) 
Health shock on 
flu shot 
0.081*** 0.038** 0.089*** 0.084*** -0.003 -0.019 0.01 0.016 
         
2,362  
         
2,651  
(0.019) (0.017) (0.021) (0.020) (0.018) (0.016) (0.020) (0.020) (1,537) (1,747) 
Health shock on 
cholesterol 
screening 
0.152*** 0.077*** 0.157*** 0.185*** 0.012 -0.013 0.02 0.004 
         
1,332  
         
1,583  
(0.024) (0.018) (0.025) (0.023) (0.024) (0.016) (0.025) (0.023) (927) (1,095) 
Health shock on 
prostate screening 0.136*** 0.119*** 0.136*** 0.068*** 0.044 -0.022 0.041 0.017 
            
619  
         
1,441  
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(male)/mammogr
aphy (female) 
(0.036) (0.038) (0.040) (0.026) (0.035) (0.035) (0.038) (0.025) (466) (0,466) 
Health shock on 
prostate screening 
(male)/Pap smear 
(female) 
0.130*** 0.101*** 0.120*** 0.041** 0.037 -0.015 0.032 -0.01 
            
783  
         
2,073  
(0.031) (0.031) (0.033) (0.020) (0.030) (0.029) (0.032) (0.020) (586) (1,424) 
All columns show the marginal effect of the variable in question in separate models predicting the initiation of each preventive activity at t. All 
regressions were controlled for respondent's and spouse's past participation in the relevant preventive activity at t-1, the inverse mills ratio, age, 
age squared, race, veteran status, working status (full time, part time, unemployed, partly retired, retired, disabled, other), number of household 
residents, self-reported health status, insurance status, life insurance status, long term care insurance, education years, mental health (CESD 
score), residence in one of 10 census divisions and wave. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1-
percent, 5-percent, and 10-percent level, respectively.     
 
 
 
Table A.3.8. Effect of own and spouse’s health shock on termination of preventive activities among those eligible to terminate. 
Dependent 
variable= 
Termination of 
corresponding 
preventive 
activity at t 
among those 
eligible to 
terminate 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Effect of OWN health shock on termination 
of preventive activity 
Effect of SPOUSE health shock on 
termination of preventive activity 
Number of 
observations 
(Number of 
individuals) 
SUR with no fixed 
effects 
SUR with fixed 
effects 
SUR with no fixed 
effects 
SUR with fixed 
effects 
Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Health shock on 
vigorous physical 
activity 
0.019* 0.013 0.025** 0.014 -0.001 -0.005 0.006 0.019 
         
7,857  
                     
7,257  
(0.011) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (2,428) (2,498) 
Health shock on 
non-smoker status 
0 0 0.001 0.004 0.003 0 0.004 0.002 
         
8,871  
                     
9,777  
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (2,566) (2,985) 
Health shock on 
normal weight 
status 
0.030** 0.021** 0.031* 0.060*** -0.021 -0.006 0.001 0.016 
         
3,425  
                     
5,335  
(0.014) (0.009) (0.016) (0.012) (0.013) (0.009) (0.016) (0.012) (1,078) (1,662) 
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Health shock on 
flu shot 
-0.040*** -0.017** -0.042*** -0.016* -0.014 -0.019** -0.014 -0.018* 
         
3,304  
                     
3,492  
(0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (1,999) (2,145) 
Health shock on 
cholesterol 
screening 
-0.075*** -0.055*** -0.075*** -0.061*** 0.003 -0.003 0 -0.008 
         
4,229  
                     
4,565  
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (2448) (2,716) 
Health shock on 
prostate screening 
(male)/mammogra
phy (female) 
-0.031** -0.016 -0.029** -0.019* -0.005 -0.005 -0.002 0.003 
         
3,738  
                     
4,440  
(0.013) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (2187) (2,614) 
Health shock on 
prostate screening 
(male)/Pap smear 
(female) 
-0.034*** 0.006 -0.032** 0.001 -0.009 0.001 -0.006 -0.009 
         
3,511  
                     
4,150  
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.013) (2088) (2,485) 
All columns show the marginal effect of the variable in question in separate models predicting the termination of each preventive activity at t. All 
regressions were controlled for respondent's and spouse's past participation in the relevant preventive activity at t-1, the inverse mills ratio, age, 
age squared, race, veteran status, working status (full time, part time, unemployed, partly retired, retired, disabled, other), number of household 
residents, self-reported health status, insurance status, life insurance status, long term care insurance, education years, mental health (CESD 
score), residence in one of 10 census divisions and wave. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1-
percent, 5-percent, and 10-percent level, respectively.     
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CHAPTER 4: THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN PREVENTION AND 
MEDICARE EXPENDITURES 
1. Introduction 
It has been suggested that preventive lifestyle interventions targeted at lifestyle-
related risk factors, such as smoking and obesity, have the potential of not only increasing 
public health but at the same time lowering health-care expenditures (Fries et al., 1993; 
OECD, 2005). In fact, in the recent debate over health reform where questions regarding 
national resources and how they should be used were raised, prevention was among the 
contested topics. The Obama administration and several others policy makers promoted 
prevention of unhealthy lifestyles as simultaneously reducing costs and improving public 
health but this has yet to be proven  to be true. In fact, although some preventive measures 
do save money, the vast majority reviewed in the health economics literature do not (Cohen 
et al., 2007). For many, it remains counterintuitive that a healthy lifestyle results in more 
rather than in less lifetime health-care expenditures. This is problematic as it may result in 
inefficient use of health-care resources based on overly optimistic assumptions regarding 
lower health-care expenditures due to prevention, and thus may cause disappointment, 
particularly among policymakers, when prevention fails to meet these expectations.  
An important observation regarding the value of preventive services is that they 
might still provide desirable benefits in the form of improved health. However, the fact that 
prevention may increase lifetime expenditures due to an increase of unrelated diseases in life 
years gained is currently not adequately reflected in most economic evaluations (Rappange et 
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al., 2009). Most studies fail to take into account the costs of unrelated diseases in life years 
gained. For example, NICE recently investigated the cost-effectiveness of several smoking 
cessation interventions and concluded that many interventions result in cost savings (Flack, 
Taylor, Trueman, 2009) This conclusion was reached, however, by ignoring the unrelated 
medical costs in life years gained. If these costs would be included, the interventions may not 
be cost saving anymore. Therefore, a crucial aspect of an analysis of the value of preventive 
services is to know whether life expectancy is affected by preventive behavior. 
The push for prevention pre-empts the recent health care reform debate. In fact, 
prevention was emphasized back in 1993 when President Clinton attempted to reform the 
health care system (Keigher, 1993). Again, in 2002 when the US Congressed passed the 
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA), 
beneficiaries were entitled to a new expanded menu of preventive benefits by covering an 
initial preventive physical examination. This benefit, also referred to as the "Welcome to 
Medicare" visit, represented a way for new Medicare beneficiaries to get up-to-date on 
screenings and vaccinations. According to the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS), the Welcome to Medicare visit enables the health care provider to comprehensively 
review his or her patient's health, to identify risk factors that may be associated with various 
diseases, and to detect diseases early when outcomes are best (Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services 2010). Beneficiaries enrolled in Medicare Part B have one year from their 
Part B enrollment date to take advantage of the ―Welcome to Medicare‖ visit. Nevertheless, 
the demand for the ―Welcome to Medicare‖ program is very low. An analysis of claims data 
in preparation for this study shows that less than 5% of beneficiaries take advantage of this 
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program. However, the existence of this program is useful in this analysis as a reason to 
benchmark the preventive behaviors of older adults at age 65.  
This chapter examines the question of whether prevention affects health 
expenditures from a different perspective. Taking into consideration that the ―Welcome to 
Medicare‖ program is meant to provide preventive services as soon as a person enrolls in the 
program presumably at age 65, I ask whether beneficiaries who undergo different kinds of 
preventive behaviors close to that age have higher or lower expenditures than people who 
do not engage in such activities.   Similarly, in this chapter I analyze whether people who 
engaged in preventive behaviors close to age 65 end up living longer lives or not.  
This chapter aims to add to the empirical question of whether prevention can affect 
health expenditures. Rather than evaluate the cost effectiveness of different preventive 
interventions, I use observational data from the Health and Retirement Study linked to 
Medicare Claims data. Using a variety of econometric specifications to try to understand 
endogeneity bias, I find that the term prevention as a tool for cost effectiveness or cost 
saving is used remarkably expansively as the different preventive activities have markedly 
diverse effects on expenditures. Only physical activity and non-smoking behavior show signs 
of unequivocal reductions in Medicare spending. Other interventions such as flu shot and 
cholesterol screening are associated with increased expenditures. Cancer screenings such as 
breast, cervical and prostate cancer screenings do not seem to affect the expenditures trends 
of respondents in sample. In addition, I find that only non-smoking can be associated with 
an increase in life expectancy. 
 This chapter is organized as follows. In section 2, I present a review of the literature 
relevant to the relationship between different kinds of preventive services and health 
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expenditures and life expectancy. Section 3, presents the data and section 4 discusses the 
empirical strategy. Findings are reported in section 5, section 6 discusses them, and section 7 
concludes. 
2. Background 
2.1.  Lifestyle  prevention 
Lifestyle changes are often thought of obvious targets for interventions that can 
produce both better health and medical savings. However, the evidence in these activities is 
not always clear cut.  
On the one hand, studies such as Daviglus et al. (2004) used longitudinal data to find 
that body mass index (BMI) assessed during young adulthood and middle age was 
significantly and positively associated with average annual cardiovascular disease-related and 
total Medicare health care charges in older age as well as with cardiovascular disease (CVD)-
related and total cumulative charges from age 65 years to death or to age 83 years.  In 
addition, Daviglus et al. (2005) studied participants in the Chicago Heart Association 
Detection Project in Industry (CHA) study. The sample consisted on men and women aged 
32 to 64 years at baseline in 1967 through 1973, who died at ages 66 to 99 years and had 
Medicare coverage for at least one year in 1984 through 2002. In it, CVD expenditures were 
obtained for 39,522 adults from Medicare Claims data. Participants were classified as having 
favorable levels of all major cardiovascular risk factors (low risk), that is, serum cholesterol 
level lower than 200 mg/dL (>.2 mmol/L), blood pressure 120/80 mm Hg or lower and no 
antihypertensive medication, body mass index (calculated as weight in kilograms divided by 
the square of height in meters) lower than 25, no current smoking, no diabetes, and no 
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electrocardiographic abnormalities. The study shows categorically that in the last year of life, 
average Medicare charges were lowest for low-risk persons.   
On the other hand, the Diabetes Prevention Study showed that lifestyle changes 
could substantially reduce the risk of developing diabetes (Tuomilehto et al., 2001). Middle-
aged overweight people whose oral glucose tests put them at high risk of diabetes were 
randomly assigned to a lifestyle program or a control group. The program provided 
individually tailored diet and exercise plans, backed up by visits to a nutritionist and physical 
training sessions. Over the following four years, only 11% of those enrolled in the program 
developed diabetes, compared with 23% in the control group. Even so, the program added 
substantially to medical costs (―health plan‖ costs in the study). Medical costs were $192,000 
for each healthy year gained in 2007 dollars. 
For smoking cessation programs, costs ranged from $2200-2300 per quitter (1995 
dollars) for intensive group counseling to $7,922 per quitter for minimal counseling by a 
physician with no nicotine replacement, a relatively ineffective approach (Eddy, Schlessinger, 
Kahn 2005). Averaged over the various programs, the cost for each healthy year gained was 
low, about $5,000 even in 2007 dollars. Though even they do not reduce medical spending, 
smoking cessation programs are a very cost-effective way to improve health. 
Among the few studies that have used publicly available data, one of them used data 
from four waves of the HRS to assess the impact of smoking on use of hospital and 
physicians‘ services and nursing home care. The authors uncovered that smoking increased 
medical utilization and dollar outlays by 5 to 8 percent on average, with substantial variation 
in incidence by payer.  Public payers bore a disproportionate burden.  
133 
 
In sum, the evidence that lifestyle changes necessarily reduce health expenditures is 
not obvious. Importantly, it is worth noting than the studies mentioned here as well as in the 
majority of the literature fail to take into account the time that the subjects spend engaging 
in these activities. Nevertheless, lifestyle changes involve expenditures outside the medical 
sector and use people‘s time. The people who incur the expenditures and spend the time 
realize that they must take money and time from other uses. They make their choices based 
on the costs and benefits they see. Savings to the medical sector are more akin to cost 
shifting than true savings since, to produce them additional resources must be spent outside 
the medical sector (Russell, 2007). 
2.2. Screening 
Screening, or early detection, is only useful if a condition can be treated more 
effectively when it is discovered early. For heart disease, screening makes treatment of risk 
factors possible, and new medications make it effective; evaluations have tended to focus on 
the medications rather than the screening. For other diseases, perhaps because the treatment 
for early disease is not so different from treatment for later disease, studies more often begin 
with screening and focus on evaluating the costs and health outcomes of screening people 
with different risks, of screening them more or less frequently, or of using different 
screening tests. Since screening is only successful if it leads to more effective treatment, 
understanding its medical costs and savings depends on tracing the complete path of events. 
If the medical costs of screening and early treatment are less than those of treating when the 
disease declares itself through symptoms, screening reduces medical spending. 
Studies of cancer screening find that, like other preventive measures, it usually adds 
more to medical costs than it saves. How much medical costs increase depends, in part, on 
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patients‘ risk. Screening targeted to high-risk groups is more cost-effective than general 
screening. Screening frequency and the cost of follow up tests can also have a major impact 
on costs. Annual screening for cervical cancer, usually a slow-moving disease, adds greatly to 
medical costs, with little additional health benefit, compared to screening less often (Eddy, 
1990). Studies agree that screening for colorectal cancer in adults aged 50 or older adds to 
medical costs and that the additional cost per healthy year of life gained is within the range 
of accepted medical practices; there are, however, several different screening tests, many 
ways to combine them, and no consensus on the most cost-effective ways (Frazier et al., 
2000; Pignone et al., 2005). Mammography to screen for breast cancer, MRI screening for 
women with genetic mutations that put them at high risk for breast cancer, all add more to 
medical expenditures than they save (Lindfors, Rosenquist, 1995; Mandelblatt et al., 2003). 
The last 40 years have seen the rise of medications to control ‗risk factors‘ for 
disease, especially risk factors for cardiovascular disease such as elevated blood pressure and 
cholesterol. Risk factors are not themselves diseases, but are associated with higher risk of 
developing disease. After clinical trials showed that medications could reduce blood 
pressure, and with it, strokes and heart attacks, national guidelines were developed to 
encourage their use (Russell, 1986). Other trials showed that lowering blood cholesterol with 
medication could prevent heart disease and guidelines for those medications followed 
(Russell 1994). In each case, the prevention process has two parts: people are first screened 
to discover their blood pressure or cholesterol levels; then, for those whose levels warrant it, 
medications are prescribed. Screening is conducted every year or every few years. Treatment, 
once begun, is supposed to continue indefinitely. Evaluations sometimes examine screening, 
sometimes treatment, sometimes both. One of the earliest cost-effectiveness studies 
135 
 
estimated medical costs and savings, and gains in health, from prescribing medication to 
lower blood pressure in people whose elevated pressures had already been identified by 
screening (Weinstein 1976). Even ignoring the costs of screening, the study found that 
medication added to medical costs more than it saved. 
2.3. Flu shot 
Vaccines are among the most cost-effective preventive interventions. Even when 
they do not save money, they prevent disease and death, and preserve health, at a much 
lower cost than many other medical interventions, either preventive or therapeutic. They 
sometimes reduce medical spending as well, but the examples cited indicate that spending 
reductions depend on a number of circumstances – disease risk in the population, vaccine 
effectiveness, price per dose – and cannot be assumed to happen as a matter of course. 
Evaluations of the pneumococcal vaccine have shown that it can reduce medical 
costs in older adults. In people 65 or older vaccination reduced medical spending as long as 
the price per dose was less than $35 in 2007 dollars (Sisk et al. 1997). Vaccination can also 
reduce medical spending among high-risk people aged 50-64 (people with heart disease, 
emphysema, diabetes, and other chronic conditions), and, in some circumstances, in the 
general population aged 50-64 – especially among blacks, who suffer higher rates of invasive 
pneumococcal disease (Sisk et al. 2003). The cost of the vaccine and its administration was 
lower in the second analysis, $25 in 2007 dollars. The 2007 cost per dose, which excludes 
costs of administration, is $15-17 to CDC and $26-29 for private sector purchasers (Centers 
for Disease Control).  
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3. Data 
3.1. The Health and Retirement Study linked to Medicare claims data 
 In this study I use publicly available data from the Health and Retirement Study 
(HRS), a nationally representative, longitudinal study sponsored by the National Institute on 
Aging and conducted by the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan, Ann 
Arbor. Designed to assess health status, retirement decisions, and economic security during 
retirement, this study enrolled non-institutionalized adults in the 48 contiguous US states 
who were born during the years 1931 through 1941, with oversampling of blacks, Hispanics, 
and Florida residents. I use waves 3, 5, and 7 collected in 1996, 2000, and 2004, respectively 
as only these waves contained all the necessary variables regarding preventive behavior. 
Further details of this survey are available at the following address: 
http://hrsonline.isr.umich.edu/ 
In addition, HRS data was linked to claim data from 1996 to 2005 extracted from 
Medicare inpatient, outpatient, carrier (physician), home care and hospice care analytical files.  
3.2. Prevention in the Health and Retirement Study. 
HRS asks respondents questions regarding lifestyle preventive choices such as 
exercising, smoking and body weight in each of the 8 rounds. However, respondents were 
surveyed about medical care related preventive activities, namely flu shot, cholesterol 
screening, pap smear test, mammography, and prostate screening (table 4.1),  only every 
other wave starting in wave 3. As such and in order to preserve consistency, only waves 3, 5, 
and 7 are considered for all preventive variables and covariates. Since the primarily interest 
of this study is to understand the effect of preventive services performed close to the age of 
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enrollment into Medicare, the wave of origin was chosen to be that for which the interview 
age was closer to when the respondents turned 65.  
 
Table 4.1. Preventive services in the Health and Retirement Study. 
Type of 
preventive 
investment 
Preventive 
investment 
Description 
Healthy Lifestyle 
Preventive activities 
Vigorous physical 
exercise 
Performs vigorous exercise 3+ times per 
week 
Non-smoking Respondent currently does not smoke 
Normal weight 
Respondent whose body mass index 
(body weight in pounds divided by the 
square of one's height in inches) is more 
than 20 and less than 25.  
Clinical Preventive 
activities 
 
Flu shot 
Whether the respondent has gotten the 
shot this wave 
Cholesterol Screening 
Whether the respondent has gotten the 
test this wave 
Breast Cancer 
Screening 
Whether the respondent has gotten a 
mammography this wave 
Cervical Cancer 
Screening 
Whether the respondent has gotten a Pap 
smears this wave 
Prostate Cancer 
Screening 
Whether the respondent has gotten any 
kind of prostate cancer test this wave 
 
3.3. Health Expenditures 
In order to better understand the expenditure trends among respondents in sample, I 
analyze different types of expenditure variable found in Medicare claims data from years 
1996 to 2005. The main specification for health expenditures includes those expenditures 
within the first 5 years in the Medicare program, among those respondents that had 5 or 
more years as beneficiaries. In order to standardize the expenditures, all monetary measures 
were adjusted to 2005 dollars using the Consumer Price Index (CPI): 
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a) Inpatient expenditures: include final action claims data submitted by inpatient 
hospital providers for reimbursement of facility costs. 
b) Outpatient expenditures: encompass final action claims data submitted by 
institutional outpatient providers. Examples of institutional outpatient providers 
include hospital outpatient departments, rural health clinics, renal dialysis facilities, 
outpatient rehabilitation facilities, comprehensive outpatient rehabilitation facilities, 
and community mental health centers. 
c) Physician expenditures: contains final action claims data submitted by non-
institutional providers. Examples of non-institutional providers include physicians, 
physician assistants, clinical social workers, nurse practitioners, independent clinical 
laboratories, ambulance providers, and free-standing ambulatory surgical centers. 
d) All Medicare expenditures: includes inpatient, outpatient, carrier (physician), plus 
home care and hospice care. 
I repeat the analysis for alternative definitions of the expenditure measures. In the 
appendix, I include the results for expenditures during the first 10 years in Medicare (ages 
65-74) and average yearly expenditures. 
3.4. Sample 
The working sample includes all respondents who had no missing answers in the 
round closer to age 65. Since the main outcome analyzed in section 5 is the expenditures 
during the first 5 years during in Medicare (ages 65 to less than 70), I describe the 
characteristics of the subsample of respondents that have all 5 years of data in table 4.2.  
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Table 4.2. Descriptive characteristics of main sample. 
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Preventive Behaviors 
Vigorous Physical Activity 49.48% (50.01%) 
Non-smoker status 86.54% (34.13%) 
Normal weight status 30.34% (45.98%) 
Flu shot 60.19% (48.96%) 
Cholesterol screening 81.44% (38.89%) 
Mammogram 78.80% (40.89%) 
Pap smear test 67.03% (47.03%) 
Prostate screening 80.20% (39.87%) 
Variables in model (plausible instruments) 
Life insurance 72.53% (44.65%) 
Long term care insurance 13.10% (33.75%) 
Health Insurance in previous round 92.43% (26.46%) 
Long term planning horizon 71.32% (45.70%) 
Risk averse to job change 62.94% (48.31%) 
Less than high school 23.38% (42.33%) 
High School or GED 40.12% (49.03%) 
Some College 17.45% (37.96%) 
College or above 19.00% (39.24%) 
Health depreciation (Change in self-
reported measures) 3.09 (0.76) 
Covariates 
Female 56.63% (49.57%) 
Non-Hispanic white 80.15% (39.90%) 
Non-Hispanic black 13.03% (33.67%) 
Hispanic 5.36% (22.53%) 
Other race 1.46% (11.99%) 
Veteran status 27.91% (44.86%) 
Working full time or part time 15.99% (36.66%) 
Total assets/1000 396.76 (733.67) 
Married 72.86% (44.48%) 
Number of household residents 2.16 (0.99) 
Self Reported Health (1. excellent, 2. 
very good, 3. good, 4. fair, 5. poor) 2.70 (1.09) 
Ever diagnosed with high blood 
pressure 49.15% (50.00%) 
140 
 
Ever diagnosed with heart disease 19.71% (39.79%) 
Ever diagnosed with diabetes 8.56% (27.98%) 
Ever diagnosed with lung disease 15.24% (35.95%) 
Ever diagnosed with cancer 10.79% (31.03%) 
Ever diagnosed with a stroke 4.66% (21.08%) 
Ever diagnosed with psychiatric 
problems 10.49% (30.65%) 
Ever diagnosed with arthritis 58.17% (49.34%) 
Activities of Daily Living 0.22 (0.71) 
Recipient of SS benefits 8.14% (27.35%) 
Functional limitations 2.44 (2.76) 
Mental Health score 1.35 (1.81) 
Census division New England 3.57% (18.57%) 
Census Division Mid-Atlantic 9.08% (28.74%) 
Census Division Eastern North 
Central 19.24% (39.43%) 
Census Division Western North 
Central 11.34% (31.71%) 
Census Division South Atlantic 24.88% (43.24%) 
Census Division Western South 
Central 7.86% (26.91%) 
Census Division Eastern South Central 12.79% (33.41%) 
Census Division Mountain 3.95% (19.49%) 
Census Division Pacific 7.15% (25.77%) 
Census Division Other 0.14% (3.75%) 
N 1966 
3.4. Accounting for selection bias 
Since I am only interested in the respondents who have agreed to have their 
Medicare data linked to Medicare, there is likely some selection bias involved in moving 
from a sample in which people choose not to make their Medicare files available to HRS and 
the sample in which they do. As such, the samples used for regression will not necessarily 
reflect the total population of couples. In particular, there could be an unobserved variable 
which determines the desire to share health expenditure data publicly, which is also linked to 
the outcome of interest.  
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To correct for any selection bias in moving from the HRS interviewed sample to the 
sample with Medicare data, I compute a Mills ratio using a selection variable that equals 1 at 
period t if the individual has Medicare data. This selection equation is estimated as a function 
of HRS birth cohort, education (3 dummies), labor force status (working or not), U.S. 
Census division and age dummies. The identifying variables were the labor force status at age 
65 and cohort membership. This dummy variable (1 if the person works full time or part 
time, 0 if she does not) was not used in this way in the list of controls. Membership in each 
of the HRS cohorts was not used as a control either. 
4. Econometric Specification 
4.1. Descriptive statistics and naïve models 
Three methods were used to analyze the association of preventive activities on 
expenditures: 
1) Ordinary Least Square with Propensity Scores Weights: Here, the outcome 
variable is regressed on the treatment indicator and weighted with the estimated 
propensity score inverse weights.  
                    
       
2) Two part model with Propensity Scores Weights: In this model I estimate a 
probit model for the probability of any expenditure and a log-linear conditional 
expenditure function (Manning and Mullahy, 2001). The log-linear model was 
weighted with the estimated propensity score inverse weights.  
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3) Generalized Linear Models (GLM) with a log link function, with a variance 
proportional to the E(y|x): This GLM estimator assumes that the raw-scale 
variance is proportional to the conditional expectation, which is a Poisson-like 
assumption with overdispersion, but without the discrete nature of the usual 
Poisson variate. 
For all three models, I assume robust heteroskedastic standard errors to account for 
the correct variance-covariance matrix.  
The combination of all covariates and dependent variable were checked for multi-
colinearity. Condition indexes were found to be acceptably less than 30 in most of the cases 
and less than 40 in only a few of them (Belsley, 1991). 
The marginal effect of prevention on expenditures (y) was calculated for two part 
models by considering that when xp is a dummy for the preventive activity in question: 
                   
                                           
                                             
4.1.1. Propensity scores 
 As mentioned above, the OLS models include propensity scores inverse weights. I 
used a propensity-score weighting technique (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1984) to balance the 
distributions of numerous characteristics between comparison groups at age 65, 
approximately. These characteristics were chosen to be those that were found in the 
theoretical model (chapters 1) of this study and in the empirical section of the demand for 
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prevention (chapter 2) to have an important role in driving the use of preventive services.  I 
used logistic regression to model the odds of using each of the preventive behaviors 
analyzed in here as a function of these characteristics. Predicted probabilities of using each 
of the preventive behaviors (propensity scores) were used to derive individual weights equal 
to the probability of belonging to the opposite group, making the weighted distribution of 
characteristics of preventive and non preventive users identical. Weighted analyses therefore 
adjusted for potential confounding due to measured predictors of both preventive and use 
of services. 
4.2. Problems with naïve approach 
The first problem inherent in my OLS estimation is that ordinary least squares 
estimation is biased because an explanatory variable in the regression is correlated with the 
error term in the regression cov (Prevention · ε) ≠ 0. Such a correlation can result from an 
endogenous, mismeasured, or omitted explanatory variable, or a lagged dependent variable 
among the explanatory variables (Murray, 2006). In the particular general equation above, an 
omitted explanatory variable may arise when individuals who engage in preventive behavior 
might do so because they are in a healthier status to begin with. Conversely, people with 
chronic conditions might be less likely to exercise. Bias due to an omitted explanatory 
variable will be evident if more health conscious people are inherently more inclined towards 
preventive services and healthy living. It is foreseeable that such healthier populations or 
more health conscious populations will then have diminished health expenditures when in 
Medicare. If that is the case, then the coefficient of preventive behavior in the empirical 
models outlined before will be overestimated (in absolute value): │β1│>│βtrue│. In other 
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words, the OLS strategy will over-emphasize the estimates of the true effect that preventive 
services have in affecting cardiovascular expenditures. 
If, on the other hand, the engagement in preventive activities is correlated with the 
visit to a physician office where an ailment has been diagnosed, then the opposite might be 
true. In this case, the subject who undertakes activities after physician advice might already 
have a more detrimental health status which influences the amount of Medicare expenditures 
incurred in later in life. One such service that comes in mind that illustrates this situation is 
cholesterol screening. If respondents undertake this type of screening because they know or 
suspect they might have a health problem, these respondents can be expected to have higher 
health costs in the future.  In this case, the magnitude of coefficient of preventive behavior 
in the specification above will be underestimated: │β1│<│βtrue│. In table 4.3, I summarize 
the main biases that can be found in the empirical approach   
Table 4.3. Summary of Biases. 
Type of bias Description Effect on Preventive Behavior 
Bias due to  better 
underlying health 
Preventive activity is 
undertaken by people that 
are healthier to begin with. 
It is hypothesized that this bias will 
tend to overestimate the effect of  
the explanatory variable: 
│β1│>│βtrue│ 
Bias due to more 
health consciousness 
Preventive activity is 
undertaken by people that 
worry more about their 
health status. 
Presumably, │β1│>│βtrue│ 
Bias due to more 
contact with the 
medical system 
A person might engage in 
preventive behavior upon a 
physician advice to do so. 
Alternatively, increased 
preventive behavior might 
simply be a proxy for 
better access to medical 
care. 
A bias of this type will most likely 
lead to an underestimation of the 
explanatory variable: │β1│<│βtrue│ 
145 
 
Bias due to health 
care preferences 
When undertaking of 
preventive behaviors 
proxies for other 
unmeasured preferences in 
the consumption of health 
care services that 
themselves have a causal 
effect on health 
expenditures 
Ambiguous 
 
4.3. Solutions to endogeneity problems 
4.3.1. Examination of alternative explanations 
As explained before, comparisons of observational data to estimate the effect of a 
given intervention are problematic due to the fact that assignment of treatment is typically 
not random in these data. Instead, it is plausible that it is based on several confounding 
factors that may also affect outcomes. In section 5.2, I will explore the distribution of some 
of these potentially confounding factors among those that engage in each of the studied 
preventive activities and those that do not. Also, I will analyze how the coefficients change 
in response to inclusion and exclusion of these variables. Among those plausible variables 
affecting the distribution of the decision to engage in prevention, I will study the distribution 
of the following: 
a) Education: In traditional health production models, education improves the 
efficiency of the production of health therefore decreasing the use of medical 
services. Also, more education has been associated with a preference for longer 
term investments. Thus it is reasonable to believe that more educated 
respondents will have a higher demand for preventive services, as it was 
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examined in chapter 2. It is less clear as to whether or how higher education 
levels might impact health expenditures. 
b) Self-reported health status: It is hypothesized that people with better health 
status are more inclined to undertake preventive activities, particularly those 
preventive activities that involve lifestyle decisions (e.g. physical activity, normal 
weight maintenance, and non-smoking behavior). However, for other preventive 
activities, the effect of the underlying health of the respondent is not as clear as a 
decision to engage in clinical preventive activities might come as a result of a 
doctor‘s recommendation upon an ailment.  
c) Chronic conditions: The existence of chronic conditions among the respondents 
might increase the demand for these preventive services often as a consequence 
of the treatment and management for these conditions, i.e. tertiary prevention. 
Also, the demand for these activities such as mammogram and Pap smear cancer 
might be related to the future existence of these conditions, i.e., secondary 
prevention. So, chronic conditions might indicate a higher demand for 
preventive services and very likely higher health expenditures. Not including 
controls for the existence of the prevalence of these conditions at baseline might 
tend to underestimate the positive effects of some preventive activities on health 
expenditures 
d) Preference for medical care: The demand for preventive services can also be 
explained by the fact that respondents might have more proximity the health care 
system either because they have a preference for more health care services, a 
history of having insurance coverage before joining Medicare. A history of more 
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frequent contacts with the health care system also is likely to be correlated to 
higher expenditures as well. 
4.3.2. Propensity scores for average treatment effect 
 Another way to deal with cases in which confounding factors that affect the 
propensity to receive any one treatment exist, in this case prevention, is by using propensity 
scores methods. In such methods, one estimates how various characteristics affect the 
probability of treatment receipt, creates a score based on this estimation and then compares 
observed outcomes between treated and untreated subjects conditional on this score 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). The theory of propensity scores suggests that, conditional on 
this scalar propensity score, all of the selection bias generated by differences in observed 
covariate values between the treatment and control group can be removed. 
 In section 5.5, I attempt to use propensity score methods to determine the average 
treatment effect (ATE) of the different prevention activities studied. The difference in 
weighted average of the outcomes between treatment and untreated group gives a consistent 
estimate of the ATE, where the weights are proportional to the inverse of the estimated 
propensity scores. The propensity score for each preventive service is calculated using a 
logistic regression where the variables that were also attempted to use as instruments (see 
table 4.4) are used as regressors. The average treatment effect was calculated using the 
nearest neighbor matching.  
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4.3.3. Instruments 
 Another plausible solution to the endogeneity problem of my estimation models may 
lie in the use of instrumental variables. Any instrument must comply with two conditions. 
Firstly, for a variable to serve as a valid instrumental variable for preventive behavior, it must 
be the case that the instruments affect the undertaking of preventive activities. Second, it 
should also be the case that the instrument is not correlated with unobservable 
characteristics of respondents that affect health expenditures other than through preventive 
behaviors (Angrist, Imbens, Rubin 1996). 
 In section 5.5, I use the insights from the theoretical model in chapter 1 to explore 
the feasibility of using the following variables as instruments. 
Table 4.4. Summary of plausible instruments to be used in two- stage least squares models. 
Instrument Description 
1. Spouse preventive 
activity 
Indicator of whether the spouse engages in the corresponding 
preventive activity 
2. Education Number of years of education 
3. Time discount rate 
 
Long term financial planning (next few years, next 5-10 years). 
4. Deterioration of 
health stock 
This question asks the respondent to assess retrospectively 
how his/her health has changed since the last interview 
5. Wealth Household assets 
6. Risk aversion 
if the respondent is found to be among the most risk- adverse 
category to changing jobs 
7. Life insurance 
Indicator on whether the respondent has a long term care 
insurance policy 
8. Long term Health 
insurance 
Indicator of whether the respondent has a long term care 
insurance policy. 
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5. Results 
5.1. Descriptive results and naïve regressions 
5.1.1. Physical activity 
Table 4.5 presents the overall descriptive statistics for the expenditures during the 
first 5 years in Medicare. The results show that people who engage in regular vigorous 
physical activity at age 65 tend to have significantly less overall, inpatient and outpatient 
expenditures and number of claims. The results are similar when analyzing the results for 
expenditures throughout the first 10 years of Medicare and average annual expenditures (see 
appendix 8.1). 
Table 4.5. Medicare first 5 year expenditures by physical activity. 
 Type of 
expenditure/claim  
Not vigorous activity 
P-value 
(T-
test) 
With vigorous activity 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Expenditures through first 5 years in Medicare 
Overall $19,224.64  ($34,404.55) <0.001 $14,372.58  ($27,948.19) 
Inpatient $9,273.83  ($22,947.73) <0.001 $5,690.27  ($15,132.73) 
Physician $6,181.22  ($9,722.61) 0.447 $6,047.54  ($16,790.94) 
Outpatient $3,021.64  ($6,499.24) 0.005 $2,417.34  ($5,460.12) 
Number of claims through first 5 years in Medicare 
All kind 50.3 (58.50) 0.002 43.73 (48.06) 
Inpatient 0.84 (1.75) <0.001 0.54 (1.19) 
Physician 38.04 (48.32) 0.02 33.92 (40.82) 
Outpatient 11.06 (18.01) 0.002 9.15 (14.46) 
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The histograms of the logarithm of the expenditures depicts a similar story whereby 
people that engage in physical activity have slightly less overall, inpatient and outpatient 
expenditures than people than do not (figure 1).  
Figure 1. Histogram of the logarithm of expenditures by physical activity. 
 
Another useful way to analyze and illustrate the relationship of prevention and 
expenditures is by looking at the time trends in expenditures. One could argue that Medicare 
leads people to do preventive care at 65 then those most likely to do preventive care would 
have a relative decline in expenditures over time. Looking at trends might also prove useful 
to separate the fixed effect of the healthiness of a person at age 65 from the impact on a 
preventive activity on subsequent expenditure. Figure 2 shows the time trends for the yearly 
average of overall Medicare expenditures over the first 5 years in Medicare. In this 
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representation, the differences between people that engage in physical activity and those that 
do not become more evident. 
Figure 2. Trends in annual average Medicare expenditures by level of physical activity. 
 
In regressions with a wide variety of controls though, the significance of the 
differences between the physically active and the non-physically active tends to go away (see 
table 4.6). Interestingly, the savings in inpatient expenditures, although insignificant, cancel 
out with increased expenditures in physician services. Hence, once controlled for 
observables at age 65, vigorous physical activity does not have a significant association with 
Medicare expenditures. 
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Table 4.6. Association of vigorous physical activity in multivariate regression analysis, weighted by propensity 
scores. 
Model 
Reported 
statistic 
description 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Vigorous 
physical 
activity on 
all 
Medicare 
expenditur
es age 65 
to 69 
Vigorous 
physical 
activity on 
Inpatient 
expenditures 
age 65 to 69 
Vigorous 
physical 
activity on 
Physician 
expenditures 
age 65 to 69 
Vigorous 
physical 
activity on 
Outpatient 
expenditures 
age 65 to 69 
OLS 
Marginal effect 
on expenditures 
-1,628.87 -2,363.913*** 815.461 57.114 
Robust standard 
error 
(1337.890) (867.223) (726.586) (224.648) 
Two part 
log linear 
model 
Marginal effect 
on expenditures 
-3,350.10 -2,292.14 -925.44 -312.54 
Coefficient in 
log linear 
conditional 
equation 
-0.082 -0.158** -0.002 0.109 
Robust standard 
error in log 
linear 
conditional 
equation 
(0.072) (0.078) (0.058) (0.086) 
GLM, log 
link 
function, 
Poisson 
family  
Marginal effect 
on expenditures 
-6,275.75 -4,548.06 -529.93 -589.55 
Coefficient in 
GLM equation 
-0.105 -0.334*** 0.128 0.017 
Robust standard 
error in GLM 
equation  
(0.079) (0.116) (0.104) (0.080) 
All columns show the marginal effect of the preventive behavior at age 65 (or close) in separate 
models predicting Medicare expenditures at age 65-69. All regressions were controlled for 
respondent's variables at age 65: inverse mills ratio (for selection bias), propensity weights, 
insurance status, risk aversion, time preference, gender, race, veteran status, working status, 
number of household residents, self-reported health status, insurance status, life insurance 
status, long term care insurance, education (less than high school, high school/GED, some 
college, college or above), assets,  mental health (CESD score), functional limitations, previous 
diagnosis of cancer, heart disease, lung disease, stroke, diabetes, arthritis, high blood pressure, 
residence in one of 10 census divisions and year when age 65. Heteroskedasticity adjusted 
standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5-
percent, and 10-percent level, respectively.     
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5.1.2. Smoker status 
Smokers tend to have greater yet insignificant more expenditures than non-smokers 
(table 4.7). The only difference that is significant is the amount of inpatient expenditures 
where smokers tend to have significantly more of.  
Table 4.7. Medicare first 5 year expenditures by smoking status. 
 Type of 
expenditure/claim  
Smoker P-
value 
(T-
test) 
Non-smoker 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Expenditures through first 5 years in Medicare 
Overall $20,750.89  ($32,676.48) 0.12 $17,420.65  ($33,856.53) 
Inpatient $11,411.31  ($24,494.88) 0.008 $7,714.42  ($21,331.87) 
Physician $5,622.34  ($8,785.09) 0.472 $6,286.30  ($14,097.29) 
Outpatient $3,211.38  ($6,982.59) 0.196 $2,715.21  ($6,021.46) 
Number of claims through first 5 years in Medicare 
Overall 45.54 (53.09) 0.499 48.11 (54.87) 
Inpatient 0.86 (1.73) 0.11 0.71 (1.59) 
Physician 32.59 (41.96) 0.15 36.97 (46.01) 
Outpatient 11.77 (19.35) 0.135 10.16 (16.34) 
 
Figure 3 shows the histograms for 5 years of expenditures. The histograms for all 
Medicare, physician, and outpatient expenditures are virtually identical. Smokers do seem to 
have a different inpatient expenditure profile. 
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Figure 3. Histogram of the logarithm of expenditures by smoking status 
 
The time trends of overall expenditures shows that in most years, smokers have 
more expenditures on average than non-smokers (figure 4). 
Figure 4. Trends in annual average Medicare expenditures by smoking status. 
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 Table 4.8. Association of smoker status in multivariate regression analysis, weighted by propensity scores. 
Model 
Reported 
statistic 
description 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Reported 
statistic 
description 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
Smoker 
status on 
all 
Medicare 
expenditu
res age 65 
to 69 
Smoker 
status on 
Inpatient 
expenditures 
age 65 to 69 
Smoker 
status on 
Physician 
expenditu
res age 65 
to 69 
Smoker 
status on 
Outpatien
t 
expenditu
res age 65 
to 69 
Smoker 
status on all 
Medicare 
expenditure
s age 65 to 
69 
Smoker 
status on 
Inpatient 
expenditur
es age 65 
to 69 
Smoker 
status on 
Physician 
expenditu
res age 65 
to 69 
Smoker 
status on 
Outpatie
nt 
expendit
ures age 
65 to 69 
OLS 
Marginal effect 
of NON-
SMOKER 
-3,990.7* -4,153.1** 703.3 -548.8 
Marginal 
effect of 
CURRENT 
NON-
SMOKER 
vs. smoker 
-921 -261.7 944.8 -633.278 
Robust 
standard error 
of NON 
SMOKER 
(2,294.1) (1,773.4) 
(615.6) (437.1) 
Standard 
error of 
CURRENT 
SMOKER 
(2,560.8) (1,718.2) (773.9) (590.091) 
Marginal effect 
of SMOKER 
omitted category 
Marginal 
effect of 
NEVER-
SMOKER 
vs. smoker 
-2,688.19 -915.404 -669.439 -338.161 
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Robust 
standard error 
of SMOKER 
Standard 
error of 
NEVER 
SMOKER 
(2518.237) (1748.514) (920.340) (800.575) 
Two 
part log 
linear 
model 
Marginal effect 
on 
expenditures 
-2,376.6 -3,440.1 156.5 -330.5 
Marginal 
effect of 
CURRENT 
NON-
SMOKER 
vs. smoker 
-2,508 -519.1 1,126.1 -230.9 
Coefficient in 
log linear 
conditional 
equation 
-0.151 -0.492*** 0.068 -0.168 
Coefficient 
in log linear 
conditional 
equation for 
CURRENT 
SMOKER 
-0.11 -0.280* 0.094 -0.114 
Robust 
standard error 
in log linear 
conditional 
equation 
(0.100) (0.109) (0.085) (0.125) 
Standard 
error for 
CURRENT 
SMOKER 
(0.123) (0.152) (0.119) (0.165) 
Marginal effect 
of SMOKER 
omitted category 
Marginal 
effect of 
NEVER-
SMOKER 
vs. smoker 
-2,693.90 -897.08 -828.61 -322.02 
Robust 
standard error 
of SMOKER 
Coefficient 
in log linear 
conditional 
equation for 
NEVER 
SMOKER 
-0.226* -0.310* -0.078 -0.194 
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Robust 
standard error 
in log linear 
conditional 
equation 
SMOKER 
Standard 
error for 
NEVER 
SMOKER 
(0.129) (0.160) (0.122) (0.170) 
GLM, 
log link 
function
, 
Poisson 
family  
Marginal effect 
on 
expenditures 
-4,326.05 -4,448.34 689.57 -599.01 
Marginal 
effect of 
CURRENT 
NON-
SMOKER 
vs. smoker 
-1452.35 -253.30 1379.51 -183.33 
Coefficient in 
GLM equation 
-0.210* -0.456*** 0.124 -0.183 
Coefficient 
in log linear 
conditional 
equation for 
CURRENT 
SMOKER 
-0.07 -0.087 0.093 -0.24 
Robust 
standard error 
in GLM 
equation  
(0.111) (0.164) (0.100) (0.133) 
Standard 
error for 
CURRENT 
SMOKER 
(0.140) (0.226) (0.132) (0.178) 
Marginal effect 
of SMOKER 
omitted category 
Marginal 
effect of 
NEVER-
SMOKER 
vs. smoker 
-1,544.51 -398.35 -1,042.20 -26.18 
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Robust 
standard error 
of SMOKER 
Coefficient 
in log linear 
conditional 
equation for 
NEVER 
SMOKER 
-0.15 -0.127 -0.132 -0.132 
Robust 
standard error 
in log linear 
conditional 
equation 
SMOKER 
Standard 
error for 
NEVER 
SMOKER 
(0.151) (0.240) (0.147) (0.231) 
All columns show the marginal effect of the preventive behavior at age 65 (or close) in separate models predicting Medicare expenditures at age 
65-69. In columns 1-4, non-smoker is the key independent variable and smoker is the omitted category. In columns 5-8, dummies for current 
non-smoker and never smoker were included, the omitted category is current smoker..All regressions were controlled for respondent's variables 
at age 65: inverse mills ratio (for selection bias), propensity weights, insurance status, risk aversion, time preference, gender, race, veteran status, 
working status, number of household residents, self-reported health status, insurance status, life insurance status, long term care insurance, 
education (less than high school, high school/GED, some college, college or above), assets,  mental health (CESD score), functional limitations, 
previous diagnosis of cancer, heart disease, lung disease, stroke, diabetes, arthritis, high blood pressure, residence in one of 10 census divisions 
and year when age 65. Heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5-
percent, and 10-percent level, respectively.     
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 Once controlled for observables, non smokers tend to have negative and significant 
coefficients on all, and inpatient expenditures (table 4.8, columns 1-4). The results are very 
similar when one compares never smokers to current smokers (i.e. those respondents who 
currently do not smoke but who reported to have smoked before), and current smokers 
(table 4.8, columns 5-8). Both never smokers and current non smokers tend to have a 
negative association with health expenditures compared to current smokers (omitted 
category).  Never smokers tend to have a slight less negative association than current non-
smokers. Yet those differences between each other are hardly significant. 
5.1.3. Normal weight 
Respondents with normal weight report less expenditures for overall Medicare 
expenditures as well as inpatient and outpatient expenditures compared to overweight and 
obese respondents. However, only inpatient expenditures and claims tend to be significant at 
the 10% and 5% respectively (table 4.9). 
Table 4.9. Medicare first 5 year expenditures by weight status. 
 Type of 
expenditure/claim  
Obese/Overweight  P-value 
(T-test) 
Normal weight 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Expenditures through first 5 years in Medicare 
Overall $19,140.39  ($28,436.47) 0.11 $17,317.44  ($34,122.80) 
Inpatient $9,746.64  ($19,833.52) 0.08 $7,739.17  ($21,442.02) 
Physician $5,622.34  ($8,785.09) 0.963 $6,286.30  ($14,097.29) 
Outpatient $3,211.38  ($6,982.59) 0.291 $2,715.21  ($6,021.46) 
Number of claims through first 5 years in Medicare 
Overall 48.53 (54.86) 0.109 45.14 (51.54) 
Inpatient 0.76 (1.69) 0.01 0.61 (1.23) 
Physician 37.06 (46.04) 0.14 34.55 (42.37) 
Outpatient 10.4 (17.03) 0.429 9.8 (15.26) 
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The histograms for expenditures of normal weight and overweight/obese 
respondents reveal to be very similar to each other (figure 5). However, the time trends for 
mean overall expenditures by weight status show that overweight or obese respondents 
might have higher expenditures than normal weight respondents (figure 6). 
Figure 5. Histogram of the logarithm of expenditures by weight status. 
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Figure 6. Trends in annual average Medicare expenditures by weight status. 
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Table 4.10. Association of weight status in multivariate regression analysis, weighted by propensity scores. 
Model 
Reported 
statistic 
description 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Weight 
status on all 
Medicare 
expenditures 
age 65 to 69 
Weight status 
on Inpatient 
expenditures 
age 65 to 69 
Weight 
status on 
Physician 
expenditu
res age 65 
to 69 
Weight 
status on 
Outpatient 
expenditur
es age 65 
to 69 
Weight 
status on all 
Medicare 
expenditures 
age 65 to 69 
Weight 
status on 
Inpatient 
expenditur
es age 65 
to 69 
Weight 
status on 
Physicia
n 
expendit
ures age 
65 to 69 
Weight 
status on 
Outpatien
t 
expenditu
res age 65 
to 69 
OLS 
Marginal effect 
of NORMAL 
WEIGHT vs. 
overweight 
626.863 575.171 253.284 28.849 1672.441 1147.991 -92.245 725.714 
Standard error 
NORMAL 
WEIGHT 
(1379.188) (919.117) (591.078) (247.380) (1808.545) (1190.582) (291.789) (794.194) 
Marginal effect 
of 
UNDERWEIG
HT vs. 
overweight 
NA NA NA NA -329.734 -389.452 -306.552 512.658 
Standard error 
UNDERWEIG
HT 
NA NA NA NA (2757.858) (1607.573) (528.055) (1169.464) 
Two 
part log 
linear 
model 
Marginal effect 
of NORMAL 
WEIGHT vs. 
overweight 
-1,727.27 -765.11 -720.34 -307.31 -2,967.30 -1,585.04 -504.54 -547.96 
Coefficient in log 
linear conditional 
-0.01 0.06 -0.06 0.01 -0.05 0.09 -0.08 -0.02 
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equation for 
NORMAL 
WEIGHT 
Standard error 
for NORMAL 
WEIGHT 
(0.078) (0.088) (0.063) (0.091) (0.094) (0.110) (0.108) (0.080) 
Marginal effect 
of 
UNDERWEIG
HT vs. 
overweight 
NA NA NA NA -2,217.00 -1,589.59 -755.15 -1,347.59 
Coefficient in log 
linear conditional 
equation for 
UNDERWEIG
HT 
NA NA NA NA 0.11 0.07 -0.16 -0.16 
Standard error 
for 
UNDERWEIG
HT 
NA NA NA NA (0.180) (0.195) (0.237) (0.196) 
GLM, 
log link 
functio
n, 
Poisson 
family  
Marginal effect 
of NORMAL 
WEIGHT vs. 
overweight 
-2,778.36 -4,448.34 -462.17 -446.46 -770.20 -485.17 -457.17 520.02 
Coefficient in log 
linear conditional 
equation for 
NORMAL 
WEIGHT 
0.04 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.13 0.18 -0.03 0.16 
Standard error (0.082) (0.123) (0.093) (0.096) (0.107) (0.166) (0.111) (0.122) 
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for NORMAL 
WEIGHT 
Marginal effect 
of 
UNDERWEIG
HT vs. 
overweight 
NA NA NA NA -3,223.40 -1,527.54 -843.39 -347.60 
Coefficient in log 
linear conditional 
equation for 
UNDERWEIG
HT 
NA NA NA NA 0.00 -0.01 -0.18 0.09 
Standard error 
for 
UNDERWEIG
HT 
NA NA NA NA (0.204) (0.297) (0.261) (0.215) 
All columns show the marginal effect of the preventive behavior at age 65 (or close) in separate models predicting Medicare expenditures at age 65-
69. Columns 5-8 include an additional dummy variable indicating whether a person is underweight (BMI<20).  All regressions were controlled for 
respondent's variables at age 65: inverse mills ratio (for selection bias), propensity weights, insurance status, risk aversion, time preference, gender, 
race, veteran status, working status, number of household residents, self-reported health status, insurance status, life insurance status, long term care 
insurance, education (less than high school, high school/GED, some college, college or above), assets,  mental health (CESD score), functional 
limitations, previous diagnosis of cancer, heart disease, lung disease, stroke, diabetes, arthritis, high blood pressure, residence in one of 10 census 
divisions and year when age 65. Heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1-
percent, 5-percent, and 10-percent level, respectively.     
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In multivariate regressions, no significant differences were found between the two 
groups (table 4.10). 
5.1.4. Flu shot 
Persons with flu shot tend to have greater expenditures and number of claims than 
persons without a flu shot. Yet, only outpatient expenditures, overall claims, physician 
claims, and outpatient claims are significantly different. 
Table 4.11. Medicare first 5 year expenditures by flu shot. 
 Type of 
expenditure/claim  
Without Flu shot  P-
value 
(T-
test) 
With Flu shot 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Expenditures through first 5 years in Medicare 
Overall $16,756.36  ($37,231.79) 0.41 $18,000.71  ($31,129.61) 
Inpatient $7,742.92  ($19,944.95) 0.59 $8,268.50  ($22,906.42) 
Physician $6,052.46  ($17,386.83) 0.846 $6,202.85  ($9,813.04) 
Outpatient $2,201.18  ($4,590.06)  <0.001  $3,086.80  ($6,631.75) 
Number of claims through first 5 years in Medicare 
Overall 41.3 (51.37)  <0.001  51.45 (56.39) 
Inpatient 0.67 (1.56) 0.16 0.77 (1.67) 
Physician 32.09 (42.67)  <0.001  38.87 (47.33) 
Outpatient 8.26 (14.31)  <0.001  11.54 (17.96) 
 
The figure showing the histogram of expenditures show that the trends that 
respondents with and without flu shot resemble each other in their expenditures trends. 
Respondents with flu shot tend to have greater outpatient and physician expenditures (figure 
7). Similarly, the time trends in figure 8 reveal that respondents with flu shot had higher 
expenditures throughout the years. 
 
166 
 
 
Figure 7. Histogram of the logarithm of expenditures by flu shot. 
 
Figure 8. Trends in annual average Medicare expenditures by flu shot. 
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In multivariate regressions, respondents with flu shots have less, but insignificantly 
so, of overall, inpatient and physician expenditures. Yet they tend to have significantly more 
outpatient expenditures. 
Table 4.12. Association of flu shot in multivariate regression analysis, weighted by propensity scores. 
Model 
Reported 
statistic 
description 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Flu shot on 
all Medicare 
expenditures 
age 65 to 69 
Flu shot on 
Inpatient 
expenditures 
age 65 to 69 
Flu shot on 
Physician 
expenditures 
age 65 to 69 
Flu shot 
on 
Outpatient 
expenditur
es age 65 
to 69 
OLS 
Marginal effect 
on expenditures 
-366.44 -12.074 -854.948 898.736*** 
Robust standard 
error 
(1551.017) (916.894) (798.535) (258.926) 
Two 
part log 
linear 
model 
Marginal effect 
on expenditures 
3,450.23 560.38 1,166.33 650.40 
Coefficient in log 
linear conditional 
equation 
0.209*** -0.083 0.081 0.251*** 
Robust standard 
error in log linear 
conditional 
equation 
(0.073) (0.083) (0.060) (0.085) 
GLM, 
log link 
function, 
Poisson 
family  
Marginal effect 
on expenditures 
2,737.58 1,438.35 392.70 1,172.51 
Coefficient in 
GLM equation 
-0.003 -0.011 -0.108 0.359*** 
Robust standard 
error in GLM 
equation  
(0.084) (0.118) (0.112) (0.097) 
All columns show the marginal effect of the preventive behavior at age 65 (or close) in separate models 
predicting Medicare expenditures at age 65-69. All regressions were controlled for respondent's variables 
at age 65: inverse mills ratio (for selection bias), propensity weights, insurance status, risk aversion, time 
preference, gender, race, veteran status, working status, number of household residents, self-reported 
health status, insurance status, life insurance status, long term care insurance, education (less than high 
school, high school/GED, some college, college or above), assets,  mental health (CESD score), 
functional limitations, previous diagnosis of cancer, heart disease, lung disease, stroke, diabetes, arthritis, 
high blood pressure, residence in one of 10 census divisions and year when age 65. Heteroskedasticity 
adjusted standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5-
percent, and 10-percent level, respectively.     
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5.1.5. Cholesterol screening 
Respondents with cholesterol screening had significant more overall, physician and 
outpatient expenditures and claims that those without cholesterol screening.  
Table 4.13. Medicare first 5 year expenditures by cholesterol screening. 
Type of 
expenditure/claim  
No cholesterol 
screening 
 P-
value 
(T-
test) 
Cholesterol screening 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Expenditures through first 5 years in Medicare 
Overall $13,889.40  ($22,442.83) 0.02 $18,476.25  ($36,213.45) 
Inpatient $6,744.87  ($15,432.49) 0.21 $8,337.18  ($22,647.26) 
Physician $4,773.36  ($7,790.21) 0.02 $6,549.61  ($14,829.82) 
Outpatient $2,123.75  ($4,591.30) 0.02 $2,927.87  ($6,401.51) 
Number of claims through first 5 years in Medicare 
Overall 36.57 (43.09) <0.001 50.24 (57.01) 
Inpatient 0.63 (1.33) 0.24 0.75 (1.67) 
Physician 28.26 (36.94) <0.001 38.23 (47.43) 
Outpatient 7.54 (12.90) <0.001 10.95 (17.46) 
 
The histograms of respondents with and without cholesterol screening reflect the 
results from the table above. The histograms of those with cholesterol screening tend to be 
shifted to the right of those without cholesterol screening hinting higher expenditures (figure 
9). This is also corroborated by the time trends in figure 10. Respondents with cholesterol 
screening have higher Medicare expenditures every year during the first 5 years in the 
program than those who do not have cholesterol screening. 
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Figure 9. Histogram of the logarithm of expenditures by cholesterol screening 
 
Figure 10. Trends in annual average Medicare expenditures by cholesterol screening. 
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As with flu shot, once I control for observables, the differences in expenditures 
between people receiving cholesterol screening at age 65 and those that do not are not 
significant. 
Table 4.14. Association of cholesterol screening in multivariate regression analysis, weighted by propensity 
scores. 
Model 
Reported 
statistic 
description 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Cholesterol 
screening on 
all Medicare 
expenditures 
age 65 to 69 
Cholesterol 
screening on 
Inpatient 
expenditures 
age 65 to 69 
Cholesterol 
screening on 
Physician 
expenditures 
age 65 to 69 
Cholesterol 
screening on 
Outpatient 
expenditures 
age 65 to 69 
OLS 
Marginal effect 
on expenditures 
734.63 -104.493 443.922 370.533 
Robust standard 
error 
(1474.531) (1008.452) (519.797) (322.856) 
Two 
part log 
linear 
model 
Marginal effect 
on expenditures 
3,038.26 248.70 1,477.90 604.93 
Coefficient in log 
linear conditional 
equation 
0.115 -0.161 0.136* 0.184 
Robust standard 
error in log linear 
conditional 
equation 
(0.095) (0.108) (0.076) (0.116) 
GLM, 
log link 
function, 
Poisson 
family  
Marginal effect 
on expenditures 
5,074.22 1,757.09 2,075.82 879.41 
Coefficient in 
GLM equation 
0.078 0.013 0.11 0.165 
Robust standard 
error in GLM 
equation  
(0.099) (0.145) (0.101) (0.140) 
All columns show the marginal effect of the preventive behavior at age 65 (or close) in separate models predicting 
Medicare expenditures at age 65-69. All regressions were controlled for respondent's variables at age 65: inverse 
mills ratio (for selection bias), propensity weights, insurance status, risk aversion, time preference, gender, race, 
veteran status, working status, number of household residents, self-reported health status, insurance status, life 
insurance status, long term care insurance, education (less than high school, high school/GED, some college, 
college or above), assets,  mental health (CESD score), functional limitations, previous diagnosis of cancer, heart 
disease, lung disease, stroke, diabetes, arthritis, high blood pressure, residence in one of 10 census divisions and 
year when age 65. Heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical 
significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent, and 10-percent level, respectively.     
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5.1.6. Mammogram 
Female respondents have significant more physician and outpatient expenditures as 
well as more overall, physician and outpatient claims. 
Table 4.15. Medicare first 5 year expenditures by mammography. 
Type of 
expenditure/claim  
No mammogram  P-
value 
(T-
test) 
Mammogram 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Expenditures through first 5 years in Medicare 
Overall $16,673.54  ($32,871.11) 0.78 $17,385.57  ($34,723.78) 
Inpatient $8,963.06  ($22,320.41) 0.13 $6,826.34  ($18,695.47) 
Physician $4,959.67  ($8,210.37) 0.073 $6,742.69  ($15,025.29) 
Outpatient $2,084.00  ($6,509.52) 0.013 $3,040.61  ($5,485.98) 
Number of claims through first 5 years in Medicare 
Overall 41.14 (53.62) <0.001 56.3 (60.79) 
Inpatient 0.87 (1.93) 0.12 0.69 (1.45) 
Physician 31.66 (43.77) 0 42.49 (50.45) 
Outpatient 8.17 (13.93) <0.001 12.84 (18.90) 
 
The histograms of women with cholesterol screening hint for lower expenditures in 
inpatient care but higher in outpatient and physician care (figure 11). The time trends of 
mean yearly expenditures for women with and without a mammography reveal to be very 
close to each other (figure 12). 
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Figure 11. Histogram of the logarithm of expenditures by mammogram 
 
Figure 12. Trends in annual average Medicare expenditures by mammography 
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Once controlled for observables in multivariate regressions, the association of a 
mammogram is insignificantly negative for inpatient care and significantly positive for 
physician and outpatient expenditures. 
Table 4.16. Association of mammography in multivariate regression analysis, weighted by propensity scores. 
Model 
Reported 
statistic 
description 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Mammogram 
on all 
Medicare 
expenditures 
age 65 to 69 
Mammogram 
on Inpatient 
expenditures 
age 65 to 69 
Mammogram 
on Physician 
expenditures 
age 65 to 69 
Mammogram 
on Outpatient 
expenditures 
age 65 to 69 
OLS 
Marginal effect 
on expenditures 
694.32 -1849.085 1,620.242** 756.989 
Robust standard 
error 
(2219.894) (1589.577) (706.738) (489.578) 
Two 
part log 
linear 
model 
Marginal effect 
on expenditures 
1,269.37 -1,187.07 1,666.15 697.02 
Coefficient in 
log linear 
conditional 
equation 
0.05 -0.222* 0.293*** 0.314** 
Robust standard 
error in log 
linear 
conditional 
equation 
(0.116) (0.134) (0.092) (0.150) 
GLM, 
log link 
functio
n, 
Poisson 
family  
Marginal effect 
on expenditures 
1,327.37 -2,005.19 2,209.05 848.37 
Coefficient in 
GLM equation 
0.025 -0.246 0.286** 0.306* 
Robust standard 
error in GLM 
equation  
(0.128) (0.184) (0.130) (0.184) 
All columns show the marginal effect of the preventive behavior at age 65 (or close) in separate models 
predicting Medicare expenditures at age 65-69. All regressions were controlled for respondent's variables at 
age 65: inverse mills ratio (for selection bias), propensity weights, insurance status, risk aversion, time 
preference, gender, race, veteran status, working status, number of household residents, self-reported health 
status, insurance status, life insurance status, long term care insurance, education (less than high school, high 
school/GED, some college, college or above), assets,  mental health (CESD score), functional limitations, 
previous diagnosis of cancer, heart disease, lung disease, stroke, diabetes, arthritis, high blood pressure, 
residence in one of 10 census divisions and year when age 65. Heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors 
are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent, and 10-percent level, 
respectively.     
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5.1.7. Pap smear test 
The difference in expenditures and number of claims between female respondents 
with and without Pap smear test is not significant (table 4.17).  
Table 4.17. Medicare first 5 year expenditures by Pap smear test. 
Type of 
expenditure/claim  
No pap smears  P-value 
(T-test) 
Pap smears 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Expenditures through first 5 years in Medicare 
Overall $18,322.87  ($43,345.55) 0.46 $16,780.67  ($29,005.05) 
Inpatient $8,133.11  ($22,861.69) 0.27 $6,850.48  ($17,380.29) 
Physician $6,017.87  ($12,015.65) 0.51 $6,614.30  ($15,209.42) 
Outpatient $2,640.94  ($6,903.97) 0.38 $2,941.29  ($5,136.61) 
Number of claims through first 5 years in Medicare 
Overall 49.89 (60.02) 0.129 54.96 (59.29) 
Inpatient 0.79 (1.81) 0.33 0.7 (1.43) 
Physician 38.04 (49.73) 0.22 41.52 (49.02) 
Outpatient 10.48 (17.46) 0.381 12.55 (18.17) 
 
The expenditure histograms of respondents with and without Pap smear test are 
remarkable similar to one another. The time trends, however, tell a slightly different story 
(figure 13). In years 1, 2, 3, and 4, expenditures were greater for the women without a Pap 
smear test. On year 3, the mean annual expenditures for women with a Pap smear were 
higher than for those without one. 
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Figure 13. Histogram of the logarithm of expenditures by Pap smear test 
 
Figure 14. Trends in annual average Medicare expenditures by Pap smear test 
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Controlled for covariates, the association of Pap smear screening in expenditures 
tends to be positive but only significant for outpatient expenditures (table 4.18).  
Table 4.18. Association of Pap smear test in multivariate regression analysis, weighted by propensity scores. 
Model 
Reported 
statistic 
description 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Pap smears 
test on all 
Medicare 
expenditure
s age 65 to 
69 
Pap smears 
test on 
Inpatient 
expenditures 
age 65 to 69 
Pap smears 
test on 
Physician 
expenditures 
age 65 to 69 
Pap smears 
test on 
Outpatient 
expenditures 
age 65 to 69 
OLS 
Marginal effect 
on 
expenditures 
380.50 -286.71 797.618 611.496* 
Robust 
standard error 
(2033.092) (1213.751) (693.375) (333.482) 
Two 
part log 
linear 
model 
Marginal effect 
on 
expenditures 
405.25 -1,138.38 896.22 237.35 
Coefficient in 
log linear 
conditional 
equation 
0.167* -0.031 0.238*** 0.272** 
Robust 
standard error 
in log linear 
conditional 
equation 
(0.091) (0.110) (0.076) (0.113) 
GLM, log 
link 
function, 
Poisson 
family  
Marginal effect 
on 
expenditures 
-2,069.50 -1,801.52 534.51 272.51 
Coefficient in 
GLM equation 
0.028 -0.046 0.136 0.239** 
Robust 
standard error 
in GLM 
equation  
(0.095) (0.149) (0.098) (0.112) 
All columns show the marginal effect of the preventive behavior at age 65 (or close) in separate models 
predicting Medicare expenditures at age 65-69. All regressions were controlled for respondent's variables at 
age 65: inverse mills ratio (for selection bias), propensity weights, insurance status, risk aversion, time 
preference, gender, race, veteran status, working status, number of household residents, self-reported 
health status, insurance status, life insurance status, long term care insurance, education (less than high 
school, high school/GED, some college, college or above), assets,  mental health (CESD score), functional 
limitations, previous diagnosis of cancer, heart disease, lung disease, stroke, diabetes, arthritis, high blood 
pressure, residence in one of 10 census divisions and year when age 65. Heteroskedasticity adjusted 
standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent, and 
10-percent level, respectively.     
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5.1.8. Prostate screening 
Similar to the case of other cancer related preventive services, respondents with 
prostate cancer screening have higher but insignificant expenditures and number of claims 
than people without prostate screening. The only significant difference is in the number of 
physician claims (table 4.19). 
Table 4.19. Medicare first 5 year expenditures by prostate cancer screening. 
Type of 
expenditure/claim  
No prostate screening  P-value 
(T-test) 
Prostate Screening 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Expenditures through first 5 years in Medicare 
Overall $15,653.84  $22,976.49  0.35 $17,914.80  $34,180.84  
Inpatient $8,055.75  $16,092.67  0.73 $8,620.77  $23,586.54  
Physician $4,993.01  $8,567.59  0.23 $6,151.93  $14,175.53  
Outpatient $2,470.17  $4,018.99  0.56 $2,760.39  $7,175.25  
Number of claims through first 5 years in Medicare 
Overall 34.77 (43.33) 0.06 41.71 (47.42) 
Inpatient 0.74 (1.41) 0.76 0.69 (1.65) 
Physician 26.09 (37.01) 0.05 32.37 (40.34) 
Outpatient 7.85 (14.41) 0.57 8.42 (14.69) 
  
The histograms of overall Medicare expenditures between respondents with and 
without prostate screening are virtually identical. Respondents with prostate screening have 
slightly less inpatient and outpatient expenses but more physician expenses (figure 15). The 
time trends of the annual average of Medicare expenditures of respondents with prostate 
screening shows higher expenditures than those without prostate screening (figure 16) 
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Figure 15. Histogram of the logarithm of expenditures by prostate cancer screening. 
 
Figure 16. Trends in annual average Medicare expenditures by prostate cancer screening 
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When controlled for observables, the association of the prostate screening tends to 
be positive yet insignificant. 
Table 4.20. Association of prostate cancer screening in multivariate regression analysis, weighted by 
propensity scores. 
Model 
Reported 
statistic 
description 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Prostate 
cancer 
screening on 
all Medicare 
expenditures 
age 65 to 69 
Prostate 
cancer 
screening on 
Inpatient 
expenditures 
age 65 to 69 
Prostate 
cancer 
screening on 
Physician 
expenditures 
age 65 to 69 
Prostate 
cancer 
screening on 
Outpatient 
expenditures 
age 65 to 69 
OLS 
Marginal effect 
on 
expenditures 
3,120.51 2,244.591 493.115 77.236 
Robust 
standard error 
(2436.888) (1780.832) (864.945) (495.958) 
Two part 
log linear 
model 
Marginal effect 
on 
expenditures 
1,172.21 -352.57 1,350.46 -69.86 
Coefficient in 
log linear 
conditional 
equation 
0.286* 0.016 0.355*** 0.087 
Robust 
standard error 
in log linear 
conditional 
equation 
(0.159) (0.184) (0.133) (0.213) 
GLM, log 
link 
function, 
Poisson 
family  
Marginal effect 
on 
expenditures 
3,591.92 2,076.46 1,221.53 121.41 
Coefficient in 
GLM equation 
0.249* 0.334 0.135 0.059 
Robust 
standard error 
in GLM 
equation  
(0.151) (0.227) (0.158) (0.182) 
All columns show the marginal effect of the preventive behavior at age 65 (or close) in separate models 
predicting Medicare expenditures at age 65-69. All regressions were controlled for respondent's variables at age 
65: inverse mills ratio (for selection bias), propensity weights, insurance status, risk aversion, time preference, 
gender, race, veteran status, working status, number of household residents, self-reported health status, insurance 
status, life insurance status, long term care insurance, education (less than high school, high school/GED, some 
college, college or above), assets,  mental health (CESD score), functional limitations, previous diagnosis of 
cancer, heart disease, lung disease, stroke, diabetes, arthritis, high blood pressure, residence in one of 10 census 
divisions and year when age 65. Heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote 
statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent, and 10-percent level, respectively.     
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5.1.9. Preventive activities altogether 
In the past sub-sections I have tried to examine the association of each of the 
preventive services by adding it to the covariates individually. In this section, I examine the 
marginal effect of the preventive activities when added all at once in the regression models. 
As the cancer related preventive measures (mammogram, Pap smear test, and prostate 
cancer screening) are gender specific, I run the models (OLS, two part log-linear, and GLM 
log Poisson) separately for women (table 4.21) and for men (table 4.22). The results are very 
comparable to the ones found when models are run separately.  
Table 4.21. Association of all preventive activities on expenditures when used altogether among women. 
Model 
Preventi
ve 
Activity 
Reported 
statistic 
description 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Prevention 
on all 
Medicare 
expenditur
es age 65 
to 69 
Preventio
n on 
Inpatient 
expendit
ures age 
65 to 69 
Preventio
n on 
Physician 
expendit
ures age 
65 to 69 
Prevention 
on 
Outpatient 
expenditures 
age 65 to 69 
 
OLS 
Physical 
Activity 
Marginal 
effect on 
expenditures 
-1,358.87 -948.17 832.12 -297.67 
Robust 
standard error 
(2407.065) (1125.833) (1205.070) (277.026) 
Non-
smoker 
status 
Marginal 
effect on 
expenditures 
-3,158.17 -3,158.55 1,499.62 -1,248.148** 
Robust 
standard error 
(2971.334) (1940.838) (1008.807) (607.989) 
Normal 
weight 
status 
Marginal 
effect on 
expenditures 
1,945.63 953.77 1,588.60 25.15 
Robust 
standard error 
(2302.576) (1156.528) (1416.458) (320.527) 
Flu shot 
Marginal 
effect on 
expenditures 
3,563.08 209.90 -2,262.96 581.916** 
Robust 
standard error 
(3675.092) (1294.884) (1809.656) (290.455) 
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Choleste
rol 
screenin
g 
Marginal 
effect on 
expenditures 
405.20 1,153.52 -637.67 577.869* 
Robust 
standard error 
(2201.562) (1319.256) (845.805) (300.557) 
Mammo
gram 
Marginal 
effect on 
expenditures 
2,213.71 -789.69 176.74 508.66 
Robust 
standard error 
(3291.814) (1406.381) (1140.335) (347.539) 
Pap 
smear 
test 
Marginal 
effect on 
expenditures 
4,553.44 -449.83 
2,364.837*
* 
659.069* 
Robust 
standard error 
(3758.718) (1852.410) (1179.460) (386.565) 
Two 
part log 
linear 
model 
Physical 
Activity 
Marginal 
effect on 
expenditures 
-4,910.11 -2,195.10 -1,179.34 -580.88 
Coefficient in 
log linear 
conditional 
equation 
-0.077 -0.094 0.029 -0.004 
Robust 
standard error 
in log linear 
conditional 
equation 
(0.101) (0.112) (0.082) (0.105) 
Non-
smoker 
Marginal 
effect on 
expenditures 
-2,160.46 -1,977.74 424.50 -574.69 
Coefficient in 
log linear 
conditional 
equation 
-0.251* -0.518*** 0.066 -0.394** 
Robust 
standard error 
in log linear 
conditional 
equation 
(0.131) (0.190) (0.129) (0.163) 
Normal 
weight 
Marginal 
effect on 
expenditures 
-3,633.40 -1,855.91 -1,056.44 -566.91 
Coefficient in 
log linear 
conditional 
equation 
-0.02 -0.01 -0.014 -0.089 
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Robust 
standard error 
in log linear 
conditional 
equation 
(0.104) (0.118) (0.084) (0.121) 
Flu shot 
Marginal 
effect on 
expenditures 
3,984.92 284.43 1,194.19 853.92 
Coefficient in 
log linear 
conditional 
equation 
0.169 -0.125 0.001 0.270** 
Robust 
standard error 
in log linear 
conditional 
equation 
(0.109) (0.125) (0.087) (0.121) 
Choleste
rol 
screenin
g 
Marginal 
effect on 
expenditures 
3,763.29 382.60 1,512.81 794.78 
Coefficient in 
log linear 
conditional 
equation 
0.038 -0.049 -0.044 0.086 
Robust 
standard error 
in log linear 
conditional 
equation 
(0.149) (0.158) (0.114) (0.167) 
Mammo
gram 
Marginal 
effect on 
expenditures 
1,687.12 -469.58 1,767.46 851.77 
Coefficient in 
log linear 
conditional 
equation 
0.009 -0.045 0.229* 0.264 
Robust 
standard error 
in log linear 
conditional 
equation 
(0.167) (0.172) (0.117) (0.201) 
Pap 
smear 
test 
Marginal 
effect on 
expenditures 
-178.93 -1,428.33 764.14 238.08 
Coefficient in 
log linear 
conditional 
0.138 -0.028 0.13 0.158 
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equation 
Robust 
standard error 
in log linear 
conditional 
equation 
(0.113) (0.122) (0.095) (0.136) 
GLM, 
log link 
functio
n, 
Poisson 
family  
Physical 
Activity 
Marginal 
effect on 
expenditures 
-6,821.38 -3,948.06 -640.42 -1,107.82 
Coefficient in 
log linear 
conditional 
equation 
-0.055 -0.201 0.126 -0.115 
Robust 
standard error 
in log linear 
conditional 
equation 
(0.103) (0.161) (0.107) (0.102) 
Non-
smoker 
Marginal 
effect on 
expenditures 
-801.47 -2,299.80 1,947.21 -1,282.22 
Coefficient in 
log linear 
conditional 
equation 
-0.158 -0.492** 0.267* -0.348** 
Robust 
standard error 
in log linear 
conditional 
equation 
(0.153) (0.237) (0.139) (0.143) 
Normal 
weight 
Marginal 
effect on 
expenditures 
-3,746.18 -2,227.37 116.35 -561.08 
Coefficient in 
log linear 
conditional 
equation 
0.129 0.129 0.181* -0.013 
Robust 
standard error 
in log linear 
conditional 
equation 
(0.113) (0.173) (0.110) (0.111) 
Flu shot 
Marginal 
effect on 
expenditures 
1,274.29 1,293.62 89.29 1,054.96 
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Coefficient in 
log linear 
conditional 
equation 
-0.086 0.023 -0.15 0.255** 
Robust 
standard error 
in log linear 
conditional 
equation 
(0.109) (0.169) (0.111) (0.106) 
Choleste
rol 
screenin
g 
Marginal 
effect on 
expenditures 
5,896.51 1,837.39 2,112.50 1,463.97 
Coefficient in 
log linear 
conditional 
equation 
0.071 0.15 -0.086 0.291* 
Robust 
standard error 
in log linear 
conditional 
equation 
(0.126) (0.217) (0.129) (0.152) 
Mammo
gram 
Marginal 
effect on 
expenditures 
3,195.44 -1,044.69 2,591.52 1,326.65 
Coefficient in 
log linear 
conditional 
equation 
0.14 -0.109 0.383*** 0.293* 
Robust 
standard error 
in log linear 
conditional 
equation 
(0.145) (0.213) (0.145) (0.173) 
Pap 
smear 
test 
Marginal 
effect on 
expenditures 
1,382.92 -362.61 585.35 542.81 
Coefficient in 
log linear 
conditional 
equation 
-0.017 -0.034 0.025 0.184 
Robust 
standard error 
in log linear 
conditional 
equation 
(0.100) (0.156) (0.105) (0.123) 
All columns show the marginal effect of the preventive behavior at age 65 (or close) in separate 
models predicting Medicare expenditures at age 65-69 among women with all preventive 
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activities included at the same time. All regressions were controlled for respondent's variables 
at age 65: inverse mills ratio (for selection bias), propensity weights, insurance status, risk 
aversion, time preference, gender, race, veteran status, working status, number of household 
residents, self-reported health status, insurance status, life insurance status, long term care 
insurance, education (less than high school, high school/GED, some college, college or 
above), assets,  mental health (CESD score), functional limitations, previous diagnosis of 
cancer, heart disease, lung disease, stroke, diabetes, arthritis, high blood pressure, residence in 
one of 10 census divisions and year when age 65. Heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors 
are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent, and 10-
percent level, respectively.     
Table 4.22. Association of all preventive activities on expenditures when used altogether among men. 
Model 
Preventiv
e Activity 
Reported 
statistic 
description 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Prevention 
on all 
Medicare 
expenditur
es age 65 to 
69 
Preventi
on on 
Inpatient 
expendit
ures age 
65 to 69 
Prevention 
on 
Physician 
expenditur
es age 65 
to 69 
Prevention 
on 
Outpatient 
expenditur
es age 65 
to 69 
OLS 
Physical 
Activity 
Marginal effect 
on 
expenditures 
-5,260.696** -5,130.1*** 8.11 70.56 
Robust 
standard error 
(2546.252) (1781.152) (1048.732) (404.724) 
Non-
smoker 
status 
Marginal effect 
on 
expenditures 
-4,421.21 -4,403.72 281.52 -145.74 
Robust 
standard error 
(4477.984) (3445.384) (1208.659) (769.175) 
Normal 
weight 
status 
Marginal effect 
on 
expenditures 
-2,080.88 -1,326.44 -179.74 -333.14 
Robust 
standard error 
(2425.617) (1681.526) (821.624) (434.576) 
Flu shot 
Marginal effect 
on 
expenditures 
641.35 -42.03 -404.78 1,079.883*** 
Robust 
standard error 
(2804.473) (1730.328) (1427.642) (404.798) 
Cholester
ol 
screening 
Marginal effect 
on 
expenditures 
1,428.58 -1,701.43 681.28 -473.95 
Robust 
standard error 
(3869.539) (2443.091) (1187.751) (895.924) 
Prostate 
cancer 
screening 
Marginal effect 
on 
expenditures 
6,267.184* 4,915.93** 815.99 211.27 
Robust 
standard error 
(3260.826) (2174.142) (1100.336) (698.418) 
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Two 
part log 
linear 
model 
Physical 
Activity 
Marginal effect 
on 
expenditures 
-4,297.87 -3,908.73 -1,667.90 -117.11 
Coefficient in 
log linear 
conditional 
equation 
-0.221 -0.320** -0.161 0.165 
Robust 
standard error 
in log linear 
conditional 
equation 
(0.140) (0.142) (0.107) (0.189) 
Non-
smoker 
Marginal effect 
on 
expenditures 
-791.99 -6,977.44 390.67 -469.18 
Coefficient in 
log linear 
conditional 
equation 
0.002 -0.670*** 0.055 -0.265 
Robust 
standard error 
in log linear 
conditional 
equation 
(0.205) (0.199) (0.152) (0.233) 
Normal 
weight 
Marginal effect 
on 
expenditures 
1,247.73 -117.24 31.94 -106.52 
Coefficient in 
log linear 
conditional 
equation 
0.08 -0.184 0.003 0.009 
Robust 
standard error 
in log linear 
conditional 
equation 
(0.145) (0.154) (0.119) (0.171) 
Flu shot 
Marginal effect 
on 
expenditures 
5,146.13 1,103.03 1,776.91 636.06 
Coefficient in 
log linear 
conditional 
equation 
0.363*** -0.162 0.218** 0.221 
Robust 
standard error 
in log linear 
conditional 
equation 
(0.138) (0.150) (0.110) (0.161) 
Cholester
ol 
screening 
Marginal effect 
on 
expenditures 
3,906.39 -193.48 1,641.84 523.18 
Coefficient in 0.099 -0.272 0.007 0.047 
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log linear 
conditional 
equation 
Robust 
standard error 
in log linear 
conditional 
equation 
(0.178) (0.221) (0.168) (0.225) 
Prostate 
cancer 
screening 
Marginal effect 
on 
expenditures 
1,900.85 221.53 1,681.60 -83.20 
Coefficient in 
log linear 
conditional 
equation 
0.267 0.276 0.395** 0.183 
Robust 
standard error 
in log linear 
conditional 
equation 
(0.186) (0.230) (0.164) (0.267) 
GLM, 
log link 
function, 
Poisson 
family  
Physical 
Activity 
Marginal effect 
on 
expenditures 
-8,547.23 -7,103.61 -825.42 -315.69 
Coefficient in 
log linear 
conditional 
equation 
-0.272** -0.552*** -0.022 0.052 
Robust 
standard error 
in log linear 
conditional 
equation 
(0.133) (0.184) (0.125) (0.157) 
Non-
smoker 
Marginal effect 
on 
expenditures 
-5,595.73 -5,710.48 444.25 -171.14 
Coefficient in 
log linear 
conditional 
equation 
-0.262 -0.444* 0.024 -0.085 
Robust 
standard error 
in log linear 
conditional 
equation 
(0.204) (0.259) (0.198) (0.284) 
Normal 
weight 
Marginal effect 
on 
expenditures 
-2,335.70 -721.49 -742.51 -604.93 
Coefficient in 
log linear 
conditional 
equation 
-0.115 -0.126 -0.041 -0.104 
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Robust 
standard error 
in log linear 
conditional 
equation 
(0.134) (0.180) (0.141) (0.179) 
Flu shot 
Marginal effect 
on 
expenditures 
4,361.15 2,648.39 418.23 1,441.15 
Coefficient in 
log linear 
conditional 
equation 
0.034 -0.017 -0.011 0.481*** 
Robust 
standard error 
in log linear 
conditional 
equation 
(0.157) (0.207) (0.138) (0.163) 
Cholester
ol 
screening 
Marginal effect 
on 
expenditures 
3,697.18 1,325.66 2,200.60 90.56 
Coefficient in 
log linear 
conditional 
equation 
-0.08 -0.144 0.094 -0.189 
Robust 
standard error 
in log linear 
conditional 
equation 
(0.224) (0.255) (0.234) (0.339) 
Prostate 
cancer 
screening 
Marginal effect 
on 
expenditures 
4,766.99 3,258.57 1,851.38 -392.26 
Coefficient in 
log linear 
conditional 
equation 
0.470** 0.689** 0.233 0.143 
Robust 
standard error 
in log linear 
conditional 
equation 
(0.192) (0.276) (0.193) (0.244) 
All columns show the marginal effect of the preventive behavior at age 65 (or close) in separate 
models predicting Medicare expenditures at age 65-69 with all preventive activities included at 
the same time among men. All regressions were controlled for respondent's variables at age 65: 
inverse mills ratio (for selection bias), propensity weights, insurance status, risk aversion, time 
preference, gender, race, veteran status, working status, number of household residents, self-
reported health status, insurance status, life insurance status, long term care insurance, education 
(less than high school, high school/GED, some college, college or above), assets,  mental health 
(CESD score), functional limitations, previous diagnosis of cancer, heart disease, lung disease, 
stroke, diabetes, arthritis, high blood pressure, residence in one of 10 census divisions and year 
when age 65. Heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote 
statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent, and 10-percent level, respectively.     
189 
 
5.2. Alternative Explanations 
 In this section, I explore plausible alternative explanations that might bias the results 
of the results of section 5.1. Among these explanations for differences in expenditures, I 
identify the following that can be observed and controlled for in the data: differences in 
education levels, different underlying health status, differences in the prevalence of chronic 
conditions, differences in the number of difficulties with activities of daily living, differences 
in preference for medical care. 
5.2.1. Education 
 Higher levels of education are often thought to improve the efficiency of the health 
production process (Grossman 1972) possibly diminishing the quantity of care needed in the 
later stages of life. Schooling might also affect time preference those with more schooling 
are more willing to invest at a lower rate of return. Thus more schooling could result in 
better health by increasing investments in health such as preventive investments (Fuchs 
1982). Similar to the effect of health status depicted above, if not take into account 
appropriately, one can overestimate the negative effect that prevention has on health 
expenditures. 
 The results of table 23 show that higher levels of education seem to be significantly 
and positively associated with every preventive activity.  Respondents with not even high 
school or GED education are more likely to avoid each of the preventive behaviors studied.  
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Table 4.23. Education level by preventive activity participation. 
Preventive 
Activity 
No 
degree GED 
High 
School 
High 
School/ 
GED 
AA/ 
LT BA 
MA/ 
MBA 
Law/ 
MD 
Chi-
square 
test 
No vigorous 
activity 28.46% 5.98% 33.97% 13.38% 2.37% 8.25% 5.69% 1.90% 
<0.001 
With vigorous 
activity 18.89% 4.42% 35.58% 16.28% 3.52% 12.26% 6.23% 2.81% 
Smoker 32.03% 7.47% 33.10% 18.51% 2.14% 4.63% 1.07% 1.07% 
<0.001 Non-smoker 22.51% 4.86% 35.01% 14.20% 3.05% 11.09% 6.73% 2.55% 
Overweight/
Obese 32.03% 7.47% 33.10% 18.51% 2.14% 4.63% 1.07% 1.07% 
0.10 
Normal 
Weight 20.93% 4.19% 34.14% 16.59% 4.03% 11.27% 6.28% 2.58% 
No flu shot 25.07% 5.67% 35.01% 14.01% 2.45% 9.73% 5.81% 2.24% 
0.004 With flu shot 20.93% 4.19% 34.14% 16.59% 4.03% 11.27% 6.28% 2.58% 
No 
cholesterol 
screening 31.94% 6.28% 33.51% 11.78% 2.09% 8.12% 4.97% 1.31% 
0.001 
With 
cholesterol 
screening 21.88% 5.00% 35.02% 15.55% 3.13% 10.67% 6.15% 2.59% 
No 
mammogram 32.10% 5.76% 37.86% 11.93% 1.65% 7.00% 3.70% 0.00% 
0.011 
With 
mammogram 21.70% 4.79% 37.66% 17.02% 3.09% 9.04% 5.85% 0.85% 
No Pap Smear 
test 29.35% 6.75% 35.84% 12.99% 3.64% 5.45% 5.71% 0.26% 
0.001 
With Pap 
smear test 21.23% 4.15% 38.44% 17.46% 2.39% 10.18% 5.28% 0.88% 
No prostate 
cancer 
screening 38.92% 7.19% 28.74% 13.17% 1.80% 6.59% 0.60% 2.99% 
<0.001 
With Prostate 
Cancer 
screening 19.88% 5.19% 31.41% 13.11% 3.46% 13.69% 8.21% 5.04% 
 
 As further sensitivity analysis I now run 4 OLS models (results in table 4.24). 
Column 1 shows the association of prevention with expenditures in different models for 
each preventive activity without any controls. Column 2 shows the associations controlled 
only for education. Column 3 uses all the controls used in the regression models of section 
5.1 except for educations and column 4 uses all controls including education. 
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 The effect of adding education to the list of controls is not homogenous. The 
coefficients of some preventive activities become more positive when education is added, 
e.g. physical activity, normal weight status, while the others become less positive. In all cases 
the significance is not changed much. These results indicate that education, or other 
unobservables associated with it, might not play a significant source of bias for the 
association between prevention and expenditures. 
Table 4.24. Results of OLS regression for all Medicare expenditures with and without education controls 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Preventive activity No controls 
Controlled only 
for education 
All 
controls 
except for 
education 
All controls 
including 
education 
Physical Activity 
-5,690.445*** -5,493.832*** -1,684.27 -1,628.87 
(1371.878) (1351.279) (1344.906) (1337.890) 
Non-smoker status 
-3,494.233* -3,330.31 -3,106.97 -3,990.709* 
(2115.511) (2130.759) (2280.746) (2294.134) 
Normal weight status 
-2,502.271* -2,212.25 605.80 626.863 
(1453.442) (1417.205) (1393.317) (1379.188) 
Flu shot 
2,556.424* 2,854.951* 321.35 -366.442 
(1531.809) (1525.274) (1542.666) (1551.017) 
Cholesterol screening 
5,346.954*** 5,870.765*** 1,507.19 734.631 
(1435.728) (1513.369) (1478.697) (1474.531) 
Mammogram 
1,344.45 2,000.37 1,342.87 694.323 
(2240.249) (2360.992) (2171.866) (2219.894) 
Pap smear test 
-2,698.55 -2,240.28 911.76 380.495 
(2438.321) (2360.524) (2033.579) (2033.092) 
Prostate cancer 
screening 
4,394.425** 4,825.132** 4,515.449* 3120.506 
(2091.318) (2257.388) (2529.736) (2436.888) 
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1-percent, 
 5-percent and 10-percent level, respectively.     
5.2.2. Health care status 
A potential bias in the estimation of the models may lie in the fact that the 
underlying health status of a person might be unobservable but could affect not only the 
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propensity of a person to undergo prevention and the utilization of health care services. 
While it is not possible to obtain detailed information regarding the health of a person, HRS 
does inquire for the self-reported health status (poor, fair, good, very good or excellent) at 
each wave. If healthier respondents are likelier to both undergo prevention and have less 
expenditures, the adjusted analyses would overestimate (in absolute value): │β1│>│βtrue│. 
Therefore, the OLS strategy would over-emphasize the estimates of the true effect that 
preventive services have in affecting expenditures. Also, if the preventive activity is a 
product of proximity to the health system as a consequence of a lower health status and 
disease, then the coefficient β1 would be overestimating the positive effect of prevention. 
 The descriptive analysis in table 4.25 of the differences in health status reveals that 
the distribution is significantly different among users and non users of every preventive 
activity (Chi square less than 0.1).  Respondents who answered affirmative to exercising, 
being in non smoker or normal weight status, and have pap smear and prostate cancer 
screenings tend to be more likely to  report excellent or very good health status. 
Respondents with positive responses to flu shot and cholesterol screening are slightly more 
likely to find themselves in fair or poor health than those who did not. 
Table 4.25. Self-reported health status by preventive activity participation 
 Preventive Activity Excellent 
Very 
good Good Fair Poor  
Chi-
square 
test 
No vigorous activity 7.29% 26.80% 34.47% 21.31% 10.13% 
<0.001 
With vigorous activity 20.70% 36.28% 29.65% 10.25% 3.12% 
Smoker 8.51% 26.24% 35.46% 21.63% 8.16% 
0.001 Non-smoker 14.64% 32.22% 31.60% 15.04% 6.50% 
Overweight/Obese 11.69% 29.25% 34.43% 17.00% 7.63% 
<0.001 
Normal Weight 18.65% 36.33% 26.85% 13.50% 4.66% 
No flu shot 15.74% 33.09% 30.75% 14.64% 5.78% 0.067 
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With flu shot 12.53% 30.32% 33.06% 16.81% 7.28% 
No cholesterol 
screening 17.75% 32.64% 30.81% 15.67% 3.13% 
0.006 
With cholesterol 
screening 12.95% 31.20% 32.53% 15.90% 7.41% 
No mammogram 10.29% 31.69% 28.40% 23.46% 6.17% 
0.054 With mammogram 12.66% 31.81% 33.51% 15.64% 6.38% 
No Pap Smear test 9.61% 29.61% 30.65% 21.82% 8.31% 
0.005 With Pap smear test 13.44% 32.79% 33.29% 15.08% 5.40% 
No prostate cancer 
screening 16.67% 25.60% 30.95% 14.29% 12.50% 
0.03 
With Prostate Cancer 
screening 15.97% 32.23% 32.09% 13.96% 5.76% 
 
  The effect of adding health status as control is that the estimate becomes less 
negative for physical activity and non-smoker status signaling that the people engaging in 
such activities are in better underlying health. However, the difference in the estimates in 
column 3 and 4 are not significantly different nor do they change the main conclusion for 
the effect of such preventive decisions. For flu shot and cholesterol screening, the effect of 
underlying health, as measured by health status is exactly the opposite. When self reported 
measures of health are not included, the estimator for the association of flu shot or 
cholesterol screening is much more positive. When control variables for health status are 
added, the estimates go down considerably. This might be a consequence of respondents 
having worst health and hence more expenditures associated with the use of this services. 
The rest of the estimates are barely affected when controls for health status are added. Thus, 
health status levels have the effect of decreasing the overestimation of the association of 
prevention. 
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Table 4.26. Results of OLS regression for all Medicare expenditures with and without health status controls 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Preventive 
activity 
No controls 
Controlled 
only for 
health status 
All controls 
except for 
health status 
All controls 
including health 
status 
Physical 
Activity 
-5,690.445*** -2,227.88 -2,108.07 -1,628.87 
(1371.878) (1398.287) (1313.636) (1337.890) 
Non-smoker 
status 
-3,494.233* -1,592.27 -4,299.069* -3,990.709* 
(2115.511) (2109.655) (2305.475) (2294.134) 
Normal weight 
status 
-2,502.271* -677.08 612.97 626.863 
(1,453.442) (1,408.606) (1,371.645) (1,379.188) 
Flu shot 
2,556.424* 1,558.90 -223.96 -366.442 
(1,531.809) (1493.717) (1,560.204) (1,551.017) 
Cholesterol 
screening 
5,346.954*** 3,800.923*** 1,048.49 734.631 
(1,435.728) (1,363.704) (1,481.377) (1,474.531) 
Mammogram 
1,344.45 2,295.36 591.36 694.323 
(2,240.249) (2128.474) (2,217.620) (2,219.894) 
Pap smear test 
-2,698.55 -640.03 185.07 380.495 
(2,438.321) (2,176.014) (2,087.702) (2,033.092) 
Prostate 
cancer 
screening 
4,394.425** 6,266.280*** 3,152.34 3120.506 
(2,091.318) (2,325.498) (2,425.761) (2,436.888) 
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1-percent, 
5-percent, and 10-percent level, respectively.     
 
5.2.3. Chronic conditions 
In order to determine whether the expenditure differences by preventive behavior 
are attributable to chronic health conditions, I applied several empirical tests. First, I 
considered whether there were differences in the prevalence of such conditions between 
users and non-users of prevention. These conditions included diabetes, high blood pressure, 
heart disease, lung disease, stroke, and cancer (table 4.27). 
  Respondents who engaged in physical activity were significantly more likely to have 
less prevalence of heart disease, diabetes, stroke, lung disease, and high blood pressure but 
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not cancer. Not entirely unexpectedly, non-smoker have significantly less prevalence of lung 
disease and high blood pressure but not different from other disease.  Normal weight 
respondents have significantly lower rates of diabetes and high blood pressure, but not for 
the other chronic diseases. 
  Respondents who received a flu shot were significantly more likely to suffer higher 
rates of heart disease, diabetes, lung disease, and high blood pressure. Respondents with 
positive cholesterol screening have significantly higher rates of heart disease, diabetes and 
high blood pressure. Respondents with mammogram were significantly less likely to report a 
stroke but more likely to have diabetes, high blood pressure and cancer. - Respondents with 
Pap smear test are less likely to have stroke, lung disease, but more likely to report cancer 
prevalence. Respondents with prostate cancer screening were less likely to report stroke 
prevalence but more likely to report high blood pressure. 
Table 4.27. Prevalence of chronic conditions by preventive activity participation 
Preventive 
behavior 
Heart 
Disease 
P 
Value 
in T-
test 
Diabetes  
P Value 
in T-
test 
Stroke 
P 
Value 
in T-
test 
No vigorous 
activity 22.35% 
0.003 
16.86% 
0.014 
6.82% 
<0.001 
With vigorous 
activity 16.88% 13.17% 2.41% 
Smoker 21.99% 
0.316 
11.70% 
0.105 
6.38% 
0.174 
Non-smoker 19.33% 15.60% 4.41% 
Overweight/Obese 20.29% 
0.293 
18.75% 
<0.001 
4.76% 
<0.001 
Normal Weight 18.33% 6.59% 4.50% 
No flu shot 16.61% 
0.001 
12.05% 
0.004 
4.56% 
0.822 
With flu shot 21.75% 17.06% 4.77% 
No cholesterol 
screening 9.92% 
<0.001 
8.88% 
<0.001 
3.92% 
0.364 
With cholesterol 
screening 21.87% 16.45% 4.88% 
No mammogram 13.99% 0.122 12.76% <0.001 7.82% 0.010 
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With mammogram 17.77% 13.19% 3.83% 
No Pap Smear test 19.22% 
0.191 
17.40% 
0.798 
7.29% 
0.003 With Pap smear 
test 15.95% 11.06% 3.39% 
No prostate cancer 
screening 18.45% 
0.150 
13.10% 
0.132 
7.74% 
0.027 
With Prostate 
Cancer screening 24.32% 18.56% 3.88% 
Preventive 
behavior 
Lung 
Disease 
P 
Value 
in T-
test 
High 
Blood 
Pressure 
P Value 
in T-
test 
Cancer  
P 
Value 
in T-
test 
No vigorous 
activity 12.03% 
<0.001 
53.79% 
<0.001 
10.54% 
0.590 
With vigorous 
activity 5.13% 45.03% 11.26% 
Smoker 17.02% 
<0.001 
42.91% 
0.028 
10.00% 
0.579 
Non-smoker 7.35% 50.59% 11.03% 
Overweight/Obese 8.96% 
0.525 
56.47% 
<0.001 
10.71% 
0.622 
Normal Weight 8.04% 33.60% 11.29% 
No flu shot 4.92% 
<0.001 
46.37% 
0.012 
8.38% 
0.001 
With flu shot 11.16% 51.66% 12.54% 
No cholesterol 
screening 7.57% 
0.406 
39.16% 
<0.001 
7.59% 
0.016 
With cholesterol 
screening 8.86% 51.93% 11.64% 
No mammogram 12.35% 
0.208 
44.03% 
0.056 
7.85% 
0.032 
With mammogram 9.36% 50.00% 12.25% 
No Pap Smear test 12.47% 
0.034 
50.65% 
0.409 
8.62% 
0.038 With Pap smear 
test 8.79% 47.99% 12.69% 
No prostate cancer 
screening 7.14% 
0.975 
38.69% 
<0.001 
8.93% 
0.439 
With Prostate 
Cancer screening 6.91% 53.24% 10.66% 
 
 Adding chronic conditions as controls makes the prevention coefficient estimates for 
flu shot, cholesterol screening, mammograms and prostate cancer screening less positive. 
Yet, the significance is only changed in the cases of cholesterol screening and prostate cancer 
197 
 
screening. For physical activity and for non-smoker status, the inclusion of chronic 
conditions enhances the magnitude of the association of the preventive activity in question.  
Table 4.28. Results of OLS regression for all Medicare expenditures with and without chronic conditions 
controls. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Preventive 
activity 
No controls Controlled 
only for 
chronic 
conditions 
All controls 
except for 
chronic 
conditions 
All controls 
including 
chronic 
conditions 
Physical Activity 
-5,690.445*** -4,162.791*** -1,536.86 -1,628.87 
(1371.878) (1305.105) (1359.317) (1337.890) 
Non-smoker 
status 
-3,494.233* -3,122.98 -2,622.60 -3,990.709* 
(2115.511) (2095.232) (2257.400) (2294.134) 
Normal weight 
status 
-2,502.271* -396.269 54.894 626.863 
(1453.442) (1332.137) (1436.177) (1379.188) 
Flu shot 
2,556.424* 506.895 1,406.95 -366.442 
(1531.809) (1498.285) (1564.809) (1551.017) 
Cholesterol 
screening 
5,346.954*** 2,762.871** 2,598.995* 734.631 
(1435.728) (1368.266) (1466.235) (1474.531) 
Mammogram 
1,344.45 1,508.78 1,351.82 694.323 
(2240.249) (2162.567) (2205.341) (2219.894) 
Pap smear test 
-2,698.55 -659.238 201.765 380.495 
(2438.321) (2195.684) (2153.214) (2033.092) 
Prostate cancer 
screening 
4,394.425** 3,387.496* 5,271.307** 3,120.51 
(2091.318) (1976.105) (2572.457) (2436.888) 
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent, 
and 10-percent level, respectively.     
5.2.4. Difficulties with activities of daily living 
 An additional variable used to identify underlying health is the sum of the activities 
of daily living which respondents might have difficulty performing. Such activities of daily 
living (ADLA) are: bathing, dressing, eating, getting in bed, getting out of bed, and walking. 
Table 4.29 describes the distribution of the number of difficulties in these activities by 
preventive activities. People with physical activity, normal weight status, Pap smear, and 
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Prostate cancer have a significantly different distribution to those without these activities. In 
general, people who participate in these preventive activities have fewer difficulties than 
people that do not. 
 
 Table 4.29. Difficulties with activities of daily living (ADLA) by preventive activity participation 
Preventive 
activity 
No 
difficult
ies 
Difficul
ties 
with 1 
ADLA 
Difficulti
es with 2 
ADLA's 
Difficul
ties 
with 3 
ADLA's 
Difficul
ties 
with 4 
ADLA's 
Difficulti
es with 5 
ADLA's 
P value 
for 
Chi-
square 
test 
No vigorous 
activity 81.06% 10.21% 3.81% 2.69% 1.30% 0.93% 
<0.001 
With vigorous 
activity 93.99% 4.58% 0.95% 0.10% 0.38% 0.00% 
Smoker 84.27% 10.49% 2.80% 1.75% 0.35% 0.35% 
0.321 
Non-smoker 87.84% 7.04% 2.31% 1.38% 0.94% 0.50% 
Overweight/
Obese 85.08% 8.77% 2.97% 1.59% 1.17% 0.41% 
<0.001 
Normal 
Weight 82.17% 4.79% 1.12% 1.12% 0.16% 0.64% 
No flu shot 88.09% 7.19% 1.77% 1.18% 1.42% 0.35% 
0.115 
With flu shot 87.00% 7.60% 2.82% 1.57% 0.47% 0.55% 
No 
cholesterol 
screening 89.85% 6.85% 1.78% 1.02% 0.51% 0.00% 
0.497 
With 
cholesterol 
screening 87.06% 7.54% 2.44% 1.51% 0.93% 0.52% 
No 
mammogram 83.60% 11.20% 2.80% 0.80% 1.60% 0.00% 
0.336 
With 
mammogram 85.74% 7.44% 3.35% 1.89% 1.36% 0.21% 
No Pap 
Smear test 81.07% 10.49% 3.84% 1.28% 3.07% 0.26% 
0.004 
With Pap 
smear test 87.30% 7.15% 2.96% 1.85% 0.62% 0.12% 
No prostate 
cancer 
screening 84.36% 10.61% 2.23% 1.12% 0.56% 1.12% 
0.024 
With Prostate 
Cancer 
screening 91.87% 5.42% 1.08% 0.95% 0.00% 0.68% 
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 Adding and removing the ADLA control variables hardly makes a difference in the 
estimates of the association of physical activity with expenditures (table 4.30) signifying that 
in this age group, difficulties with these activities, which usually signals for serious illness, is 
not a huge source of bias. 
 
Table 4.30. Results of OLS regression for all Medicare expenditures with and without difficulties with 
ADLA 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Preventive activity No controls 
Controlled 
only for access 
for medical 
care 
All controls 
except for 
access for 
medical care 
All controls 
including 
access for 
medical care 
Physical Activity 
-5,690.445*** -4,051.416*** -1,634.00 -1,628.87 
(1371.878) (1327.445) (1336.775) (1337.890) 
Non-smoker status 
-3,494.233* -3,209.70 -3,898.727* -3,990.709* 
(2115.511) (2120.379) (2289.420) (2294.134) 
Normal weight status 
-2,502.271* -1,642.99 635.99 626.863 
(1453.442) (1382.513) (1370.735) (1379.188) 
Flu shot 
2,556.424* 2,467.97 -401.92 -366.442 
(1531.809) (1511.563) (1567.907) (1551.017) 
Cholesterol screening 
5,346.954*** 4,714.220*** 841.10 734.63 
(1435.728) (1405.370) (1467.371) (1474.531) 
Mammogram 
1,344.45 1,258.53 879.88 694.32 
(2240.249) (2216.692) (2229.982) (2219.894) 
Pap smear test 
-2,698.55 -1,326.55 257.882 380.495 
(2438.321) (2081.822) (2120.298) (2033.092) 
Prostate cancer 
screening 
4,394.425** 5,044.930** 3,162.53 3,120.51 
(2091.318) (2156.388) (2439.982) (2436.888) 
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent, 
and 10-percent level, respectively.     
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5.2.5. All health variables 
 As a final test of what might be the most important concern in terms of sources of 
bias, I analyze the effect on the estimates of adding the sets of health related variables one at 
a time (self-reported health status, chronic conditions, and difficulties with ADLA). The 
concern is that health is presumably endogenous to the decision to undertake a preventive 
activity. Thus, if not captured perfectly by the existent variables, a significant amount of bias 
might be introduced to the equation. In order to understand the directionality of this bias, 
table 4.31 shows the coefficient for preventive activities in separate OLS models under 
different covariate specifications.
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Table 4.31. Results of OLS regression for all Medicare expenditures adding health variables. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Preventive 
activity 
No health 
variables 
Adding 
ADLA 
difficulties 
only 
Adding 
health 
status 
only 
Adding 
chronic 
conditions 
only 
Adding 
ADLA 
difficultie
s and 
health 
status 
Adding 
ADLA 
difficulties 
and 
chronic 
conditions 
Adding 
health 
status and 
chronic 
conditions 
Adding 
ALL 
health 
variables 
Physical 
Activity 
-2,273.103* -2,268.133* -1,652.81 -2,116.798 -1,640.05 -2,108.07 -1,785.86 -1,628.87 
(1,341.853) (1,342.758) (1,360.129) (1,313.076) (1,360.513) (1,313.636) (1,346.105) (1,337.890) 
Non-
smoker 
status 
-3,740.29 -3,848.698* -3,589.55 -4,207.448* -3,663.47 -4,299.069* -4,119.360* -3,990.709* 
(2283.642) (2,280.530) (2,253.174) (2,301.391) (2,254.114) (2,305.475) (2,277.921) (2,294.134) 
Normal 
weight 
status 
-272.91 -261.46 9.61 618.748 28.96 612.97 624.35 626.86 
(1407.491) (1,407.557) (1,441.072) (1,363.748) (1,435.071) (1,371.645) (1,395.543) (1,379.188) 
Flu shot 
1,385.08 1,417.40 785.73 -257.811 810.02 -223.96 -292.53 -366.44 
(1620.211) (1,602.135) (1,591.772) (1,576.896) (1,574.745) (1,560.204) (1,559.386) (1,551.017) 
Cholesterol 
screening 
2,996.474** 2,892.156* 1,794.22 1,158.092 1,723.32 1,048.49 687.10 734.63 
(1478.474) (1,487.496) (1,488.765) (1,473.522) (1,496.939) (1,481.377) (1,501.835) (1,474.531) 
Mammogra
m 
1,143.36 928.49 840.69 778.262 662.35 591.36 724.21 694.32 
(2,279.378) (2,271.410) (2,232.362) (2,223.614) (2,232.674) (2,217.620) (2,186.623) (2,219.894) 
Pap smear 
test 
-687.92 -588.70 -328.70 64.152 -249.08 185.07 281.58 380.50 
(2,294.593) (2,214.829) (2,220.058) (2,178.590) (2152.026) (2,087.702) (2,117.886) (2,033.092) 
Prostate 
cancer 
screening 
4,156.855* 4,146.082* 4,263.667* 3,197.635 4,249.927* 3,152.34 3,501.74 3,120.51 
(2,468.576) (2,471.493) (2,536.761) (2,428.563) (2,540.464) (2,425.761) (2,446.953) (2,436.888) 
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent, and 10-percent level, respectively.     
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 For physical activity, Pap smears, and normal weight, the addition of health related 
control variables render the estimates of the coefficients more positive. This result would 
indicate that the negative association between these preventive activities and expenditures is 
driven by a selection bias due to better underlying health. On the other hand, for flu shot, 
cholesterol screening, mammogram and prostate cancer screening, adding the controls for 
health related variables tend to make the estimates less positive, possibly indicating that 
respondents with these preventive interventions are in worse health thereby biasing the 
results toward less expenditures.  
 In sum, the evidence presented here signals that underlying health status is a 
significant source of bias in this analysis. The observables found in HRS help to distinguish 
the source of the bias. It seems that lifestyle medical activities are positively associated with 
the error term. Clinical preventive activities are negatively associated with the error term. 
However, it is possible that the measures of health (self reported health status, chronic 
conditions, and difficulties with daily life activities) are inadequate in terms of controlling for 
one‘s true health status such that unobserved measures of health still play a roll. 
5.2.6. Preventions with and without chronic conditions: returns to prevention 
 In addition to the analysis of section 5.2.5 where I looked at the differential estimates 
of the association between prevention and Medicare expenditures in two different cases: 
when no diagnosis of a chronic disease (heart disease, diabetes, stroke, high blood pressure, 
lung disease or cancer) was reported, and when there was a diagnosis. In other words, in the 
first case I examine the case for what is often termed primary (or secondary in the case of 
screening) prevention. When a diagnosis is present, one could argue that engaging in these 
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preventive activities represents more appropriately tertiary prevention or disease 
management whereby further complications related to the disease in question are forestalled. 
Tables 4.32 and 4.33 look at the associations of prevention in the cases of primary and 
tertiary prevention, respectively.  
 For those without diagnosis of chronic conditions (43% of the sample), lifestyle 
preventive activities such as non smoker status and normal weight are negatively yet not 
significantly associated with 5 year Medicare expenditures. All other preventive activities are 
positively but not significantly associated with overall Medicare expenditures. Therefore, it 
would seem that there are very few, if any, quantifiable returns on prevention for those 
respondents that have no history of chronic conditions. 
Table 4.32. Results of OLS regression on Medicare expenditures among those without chronic conditions 
diagnoses. 
Diagnoses 
Preventive 
activity 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Prevention 
on all 
Medicare 
expenditures 
age 65 to 69 
Prevention 
on Inpatient 
expenditures 
age 65 to 69 
Prevention 
on Physician 
expenditures 
age 65 to 69 
Prevention 
on 
Outpatient 
expenditur
es age 65 
to 69 
No diagnosis of 
heart disease, 
diabetes, stroke, 
high blood 
pressure or lung 
disease 
Physical 
Activity 
254.46 -1,488.54 1,653.32 100.49 
(1,759.947) (967.812) (1,202.253) (280.946) 
Non-
smoker 
status 
-895.58 -6.87 -66.10 -850.91 
(2,018.422) (1,083.407) (1,099.986) (561.524) 
Normal 
weight 
status 
-2,125.15 -1,809.344** -19.92 -266.35 
(1,415.807) (884.822) (798.885) (268.532) 
Flu shot 
170.67 927.94 -1,318.47 576.199** 
(1,910.061) (859.559) (1,583.856) (270.787) 
Cholesterol 
screening 
342.04 -176.77 279.54 266.46 
(1,458.124) (985.003) (720.712) (310.543) 
No cancer 
diagnosis  
Mammogra
m 
1,673.10 -638.10 1,425.325** 800.81 
(2,011.557) (1,386.949) (668.015) (521.038) 
Pap smear 1,072.33 719.06 654.11 613.506* 
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test (2,094.372) (1,082.287) (742.049) (343.426) 
Prostate 
cancer 
screening 
2,974.11 2,326.83 376.32 -85.67 
(2,638.062) (1,956.342) (926.324) (422.026) 
All columns show the marginal effect of the preventive behavior at age 65 (or close) in separate 
models predicting Medicare expenditures at age 65-69 with all preventive activities included at 
the same time among men. All regressions were controlled for respondent's variables at age 65: 
inverse mills ratio (for selection bias), propensity weights, insurance status, risk aversion, time 
preference, gender, race, veteran status, working status, number of household residents, self-
reported health status, insurance status, life insurance status, long term care insurance, education 
(less than high school, high school/GED, some college, college or above), assets,  mental health 
(CESD score), functional limitations, previous diagnosis of cancer, heart disease, lung disease, 
stroke, diabetes, arthritis, high blood pressure, residence in one of 10 census divisions and year 
when age 65. Heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote 
statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent, and 10-percent level, respectively.     
 For those respondents who have a diagnosis of the chronic conditions described in 
table 4.33 (57% of the sample), the picture is somewhat different. Normal weight status, flu 
shot, cholesterol screening, and prostate cancer screening are associated with increased but 
not significant post-65, 5 year Medicare expenditures. On the other hand, physical activity, 
non smoker status, mammogram and Pap smear test are associated with diminished 
expenditures. However, only the association of non-smoker status is significant. Hence, 
among that sub sample with chronic disease diagnosis, the associations of prevention with 
expenditures are more sizable than among those without such diagnoses. 
Table 4.33. Results of OLS regression on Medicare expenditures among those with a chronic conditions 
diagnosis. 
Diagnoses 
Preventive 
activity 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Prevention on 
all Medicare 
expenditures 
age 65 to 69 
Prevention 
on 
Inpatient 
expenditure
s age 65 to 
69 
Prevention 
on 
Physician 
expenditur
es age 65 
to 69 
Prevention on 
Outpatient 
expenditures 
age 65 to 69 
At least 
one 
diagnosis 
of heart 
Physical 
Activity 
-2,882.94 -2,853.556** 262.09 -59.53 
(1903.865) (1290.148) (821.836) (329.395) 
Non-smoker 
status 
-5,779.690* -6,453.986** 1,005.44 -415.36 
(3450.285) (2665.894) (831.114) (631.782) 
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disease, 
diabetes, 
stroke, 
high blood 
pressure or 
lung 
disease 
Normal 
weight status 
1,455.35 1,916.44 -139.11 193.90 
(2202.096) (1486.238) (738.272) (387.518) 
Flu shot 
688.73 381.72 -264.45 1,142.697*** 
(2269.482) (1435.783) (930.078) (348.824) 
Cholesterol 
screening 
1,841.82 436.18 601.29 550.47 
(2488.544) (1665.775) (808.710) (527.483) 
With a 
cancer 
diagnosis  
Mammogram 
-10,077.63 -10,960.18 396.75 301.14 
(14828.405) (11567.645) (4695.845) (1155.154) 
Pap smear 
test 
-8,278.19 -9,331.61 754.18 356.58 
(9313.953) (7423.996) (2959.954) (1134.835) 
Prostate 
cancer 
screening 
6,555.96 2,964.68 -1,542.45 5,152.34 
(10826.915) (5763.275) (2076.503) (6767.311) 
All columns show the marginal effect of the preventive behavior at age 65 (or close) in separate 
models predicting Medicare expenditures at age 65-69 with all preventive activities included at 
the same time among men. All regressions were controlled for respondent's variables at age 65: 
inverse mills ratio (for selection bias), propensity weights, insurance status, risk aversion, time 
preference, gender, race, veteran status, working status, number of household residents, self-
reported health status, insurance status, life insurance status, long term care insurance, 
education (less than high school, high school/GED, some college, college or above), assets,  
mental health (CESD score), functional limitations, previous diagnosis of cancer, heart disease, 
lung disease, stroke, diabetes, arthritis, high blood pressure, residence in one of 10 census 
divisions and year when age 65. Heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors are in parentheses. 
***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent, and 10-percent level, 
respectively.     
 
Another attempt to distinguish the differences between primary and tertiary 
prevention and the association with expenditures was performed by looking at the 
expenditure trends for each of the activities when a previous diagnosis of chronic conditions 
or cancer was present. Figure 17 presents the expenditure trends of physical activity, non-
smoker status, normal weight status, flu shot, and cholesterol screening with and without a 
diagnosis of chronic conditions prior to age 65 (heart disease, diabetes, stroke, high blood 
pressure, lung disease). Figure 18 presents the trends for mammography, Pap smears test, 
and prostate cancer screening when a cancer diagnosis prior to age 65 existed. 
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In all of the trends, it is evident that respondents with chronic conditions or cancer 
had more expenditures that those who do not. Respondents who did not exercise, those 
who smoked or those who were obese or overweight, had a tendency for higher 
expenditures than those who do not, regardless of the presence of chronic conditions. 
Conversely, respondents with cholesterol screening and flu shot had more expenditures than 
those without these services notwithstanding the presence of chronic conditions. For the 
cancer related activities, it is more difficult to elucidate much about the trends since the 
samples or people with cancer are get small very fast. As such, the trends seem to be 
susceptible to the effect of some observations with unusually high expenditures in a given 
year probably linked to the cancer diagnosis itself. Interestingly, though, the trends of the 
respondents with and without these services tend to converge to each other at the end of the 
five year period. In none of the graphs in figures 17 or 18 there is evidence of a plateau or 
decline in expenditures that could be attributed to the preventive services. 
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Figure 17. Five year expenditure trends by preventive activity and presence of chronic conditions at age 65. 
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Figure 18. Five year expenditure trends by preventive activity and presence of cancer at age 65 
 
5.2.7. Taste for medical care 
 An increased preference for medical system might pose an additional bias. On the 
one hand, might engage in preventive behavior upon a physician advice to do so. 
Alternatively, increased preventive behavior might simply be a proxy for better access to 
medical care or simply a preference for increased services and possibly to higher 
expenditures in the long run.  In this section I analyzed the effect of different medical access 
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measures (insurance in previous wave, at least one doctor visit, number of doctor visits, 
outpatient surgery in the last 2 years, dental visits in previous 2 years) on the decision to 
engage in the usual set of preventive activities by access. It is believed that the bias induced 
by omission of these variables could most likely lead to an underestimation of the 
explanatory variable: │β1│<│βtrue│. 
 The descriptive statistics in table 4.34 show that respondents with a positive 
response for the lifestyle preventive services are in general not significantly more likely to 
have sought medical services in the previous wave than people who do not engage in that 
kind of activities.  Respondents with a positive medical related preventive activity were 
typically significantly more likely to have health insurance, at least on doctor visit, more 
doctor visit during the last two years before the interview, and more dental visits. People 
engaging in medical related preventive activities have more need or a preference for more 
medical care in the previous wave.  
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Table 4.34. Medical utilization measures in t-1 by preventive activity participation. 
Preventive Activity 
Insuran
ce at t-1 
P 
Value 
in T-
test 
At least one 
doctor visit 
in last 2 
years, pre 
age 65 
P 
Value 
in T-
test 
Number of 
doctor 
visits in 
last 2 
years, at t-
1 
P 
Value 
in T-
test 
Outpatien
t surgery 
in last 2 
years, at 
t-1 
P 
Value 
in T-
test 
Dental 
Visit in 
previous 2 
yrs, at t-1 
P Value in 
T-test 
No vigorous activity 76.36% 
0.598 
94.91% 
0.586 
9.74 
<0.001 
18.14% 
0.975 
62.14% 
<0.001 
With vigorous activity 75.23% 94.30% 6.96 18.08% 72.22% 
Smoker 74.21% 
0.538 
89.24% 
0.110 
9.03 
0.433 
14.73% 
0.159 
47.11% 
<0.001 
Non-smoker 76.12% 95.51% 8.29 18.64% 70.15% 
Overweight/Obese 72.17% 
0.430 
95.19% 
0.538 
8.93 
0.035 
18.36% 
0.674 
65.17% 
0.038 
Normal Weight 78.04% 93.19% 7.40 17.47% 70.53% 
No flu shot 72.17% 
0.008 
91.87% 
<0.001 
7.14 
0.003 
16.99% 
0.360 
60.36% 
<0.001 
With flu shot 78.04% 96.30% 9.14 18.79% 71.10% 
No cholesterol screening 64.18% <0.00
1 
84.32% 
<0.001 
6.09 
0.001 
16.26% 
0.396 
53.63% 
<0.001 
With cholesterol screening 78.31% 96.82% 8.87 18.38% 69.84% 
No mammogram 59.68% <0.00
1 
88.30% 
<0.001 
7.08 
0.023 
11.05% 
0.006 
45.79% 
<0.001 
With mammogram 75.65% 97.04% 9.33 19.49% 71.41% 
No Pap Smear test 68.20% 
0.043 
92.53% 
0.005 
8.92 
0.963 
14.42% 
0.053 
55.59% 
<0.001 
With Pap smear test 74.49% 96.64% 8.88 19.52% 71.45% 
No prostate cancer screening 71.67% 
0.006 
78.51% 
<0.001 
6.43 
0.137 
17.07% 
0.632 
56.10% 
0.002 With Prostate Cancer 
screening 82.72% 96.95% 7.84 18.94% 70.70% 
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 In table 4.35, adding the controls for access to medical care made the association of 
prevention less positive in the cases of normal weight status, flu shot, cholesterol screening, 
prostate cancer screening. Adding the controls for access to medical care made the estimates 
for the associations of physical activity, non smoking status, mammogram, and Pap smear 
test more positive. Thus, there is no conclusive evidence regarding the effect that access to 
medical care might have on the regression models. 
Table 4.35. Results of OLS regression for all Medicare expenditures with and without controls for taste for 
medical care. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Preventive 
activity 
No controls 
Controlled only 
for taste for 
medical care 
All controls 
except for taste 
for medical 
care 
All controls 
including 
taste for 
medical 
care 
Physical Activity 
-5,690.445*** -4,299.346** -1,628.87 -580.63 
(1,371.878) (1,731.869) (1,337.890) (1,602.591) 
Non-smoker 
status 
-3,494.233* -1,551.607 -3,990.709* -3,514.756 
(2,115.511) (2,477.245) (2,294.134) (2,436.336) 
Normal weight 
status 
-2,502.271* -1,174.515 626.863 993.812 
(1,453.442) (1,735.337) (1,379.188) (1,737.982) 
Flu shot 
2,556.424* -210.034 -366.442 -1,916.311 
(1,531.809) (2,001.846) (1,551.017) (2,115.649) 
Cholesterol 
screening 
5,346.954*** 3,528.673* 734.631 490.935 
(1,435.728) (1,946.489) (1,474.531) (1,927.918) 
Mammogram 
1,344.445 3,061.585 694.323 2,301.86 
(2,240.249) (2,838.736) (2,219.894) (2,791.082) 
Pap smear test 
-2698.552 -2,100.948 380.495 1,369.609 
(2,438.321) (2,855.999) (2,033.092) (2,434.402) 
Prostate cancer 
screening 
4,394.425** 1,880.948 3,120.506 2,280.56 
(2,091.318) (2,887.857) (2,436.888) (3,118.083) 
Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1-percent, 
5-percent, and 10-percent level, respectively.     
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5.2.8. Conditional prevention 
 As it has become evident in the analysis of the data in this chapter, lifestyle 
preventive activities vary widely from medical related preventive activities in its associations 
with Medicare expenditures. As shown in section 5.2.7., some preventive services are 
positively correlated with a taste for medical care such as flu shot and cholesterol screening; 
others such as exercising or normal weight status are negatively correlated. In order to 
explore these opposite characteristics in the demand for prevention, I repeat the analysis of 
OLS regressions of the association of each of the clinical preventive services on 5 years 
overall Medicare expenditures but (1) controlling and (2) interacting for the demand for all 
of the lifestyle preventive activities. Thirteen percent of the sample reported demanding all 3 
of the lifestyle preventive activities (physical activity, non smoker status, normal weight). 
Table 4.36 presents the regression coefficients and standard errors of the baseline regression 
for each of the clinical preventive activity with the usual controls (column 1), the marginal 
effect when a control for all lifestyle prevention is added (column 2), and finally when the 
preventive activity is interacted with a dummy variable indicating if the person engaged in all 
lifestyle prevention activities. 
Table 4.36. Results of OLS regression of clinical prevention on all Medicare expenditures conditional on 
lifestyle prevention. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Preventive Activity 
Association of preventive activity on Medicare expenditures from 
ages 65-69 
All controls except 
for any lifestyle 
prevention 
Controlling for any 
lifestyle prevention 
Interacting with 
lifestyle prevention 
Flu shot 
-366.442 -319.463 -429.977 
(1551.017) (1,572.385) (1,721.759) 
All lifestyle prevention  
-1,481.872 -1,929.752 
 
(1,833.864) (3,130.549) 
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Flu shot*All lifestyle 
prevention 
  
771.36 
    (3,872.429) 
Cholesterol screening 
734.631 1,039.766 698.252 
(1474.531) (1,473.722) (1,657.647) 
All lifestyle prevention  
-1,955.341 -3,953.697* 
 
(1,860.416) (2,261.836) 
Cholesterol 
screening*All lifestyle 
prevention 
  
2,450.733 
    (3,266.976) 
Mammogram 
694.323 820.319 787.595 
(2219.894) (2,246.374) (2,430.005) 
All lifestyle prevention  
80.957 -223.72 
 
(2,951.069) (4,944.076) 
Mammogram*All 
lifestyle prevention 
  
348.315 
    (5,666.993) 
Pap smear test 
380.495 345.17 -265.405 
(2033.092) (2,009.077) (2,206.610) 
All lifestyle prevention  
292.968 -3837.609 
 
(3,017.029) (3,238.231) 
Pap smear test*All 
lifestyle prevention 
  
5,300.625 
    (4,360.945) 
Prostate cancer 
screening 
3120.506 3,999.215 5,471.837** 
(2436.888) (2,443.568) (2,677.043) 
All lifestyle prevention  
-6,224.892*** 3,381.256 
 
(2,304.090) (4,991.876) 
Prostate cancer 
screening*All lifestyle 
prevention 
  
-11,559.430** 
    (5,661.249) 
Any clinical 
prevention 
2594.275 2,597.613 3,231.552 
(2008.717) (2,030.556) (2,262.337) 
All lifestyle prevention  
-1,956.964 2,580.954 
 
(1,788.842) (4,274.068) 
Any clinical 
prevention*All 
lifestyle prevention 
  
-4,798.837 
    (4,754.545) 
All clinical prevention 
-276.58 -70.345 -328.817 
(1,463.594) (1,484.808) (1,566.326) 
All lifestyle prevention  
-1,009.622 -1,809.125 
 
(2,049.608) (2,862.274) 
All clinical 
prevention*All 
lifestyle prevention 
  
1,742.01 
    (3,959.881) 
All columns show the marginal effect of the preventive behavior at age 65 (or close) in separate 
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models predicting Medicare expenditures at age 65-69. All regressions were controlled for 
respondent's variables at age 65: inverse mills ratio (for selection bias), propensity weights, 
insurance status, risk aversion, time preference, gender, race, veteran status, working status, 
number of household residents, self-reported health status, insurance status, life insurance status, 
long term care insurance, education (less than high school, high school/GED, some college, 
college or above), assets,  mental health (CESD score), functional limitations, previous diagnosis 
of cancer, heart disease, lung disease, stroke, diabetes, arthritis, high blood pressure, residence in 
one of 10 census divisions and year when age 65. Heteroskedasticity adjusted standard errors are 
in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent, and 10-percent 
level, respectively.     
  
 Adding a control for demand of all lifestyle preventive activities hardly changes the 
magnitude of the coefficient of the medical preventive activities. The coefficient for the 
control dummy variable for ―all lifestyle preventive activities‖ tended to be negative and not 
significant, except in the regression for prostate cancer screening. When the interaction of 
the preventive activity in question and the dummy for all lifestyle preventive activities was 
added, it is found that demanding all lifestyle preventive services  and at the same time flu 
shot, cholesterol screening, or prostate cancer screening results in  negative expenditures. 
 Table 4.37 repeats the analysis shifting the roles of medical prevention from 
independent variables to controls and lifestyle prevention from controls to independent 
variables. Forty percent of the sample reports having all medical preventive activities (flu 
shot, cholesterol screening, Pap smear test and mammogram for women; flu shot, 
cholesterol screening, prostate cancer screening) in the wave closest to age 65. 
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Table 4.37. Results of OLS regression of lifestyle prevention on all Medicare expenditures conditional on 
receiving all clinical prevention 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Preventive Activity 
Association of preventive activity on all Medicare 
expenditures from ages 65-69 
All controls 
except for any 
clinical 
prevention 
Controlling for 
any clinical 
prevention 
Interacting with 
clinical prevention 
Physical activity 
-1,628.87 -1,638.636 -1,112.671 
(1,337.890) (1,336.866) (1,778.001) 
All clinical prevention  
-188.622 467.9 
 
(1,430.953) (2,140.501) 
Physical prevention*All 
clinical prevention 
  
-1,232.801 
    (2,688.402) 
Non-smoker 
-3,990.709* -3,942.198* -3,857.264 
(2,294.134) (2,292.418) (2,801.486) 
All clinical prevention  
-362.678 -135.974 
 
(1,440.553) (4,312.675) 
Non-smoker status*All 
clinical prevention 
  
-257.155 
    (4,578.583) 
Normal weight 
626.863 635.068 1,392.144 
(1,379.188) (1,385.951) (1,928.181) 
All clinical prevention  
79.849 684.052 
 
(1,382.143) (1,660.129) 
Normal weight*All clinical 
prevention 
  
-1,808.618 
    (2,758.944) 
Any lifestyle prevention 
-7142.529 -7108.304 -6,587.744 
(4,403.854) (4,405.130) (5,196.029) 
All clinical prevention  
-453.375 1,057.194 
 
(1,435.431) (9,338.634) 
Any lifestyle prevention*All 
clinical prevention 
  
-1,577.121 
    (9,487.378) 
All lifestyle prevention 
-1,517.809 -1,479.595 -1,741.84 
(1,987.934) (1,999.551) (2,869.372) 
All clinical prevention  
527.421 431.211 
 
(1,399.347) (1,460.807) 
All lifestyle prevention*All 
clinical prevention 
  
579.195 
    (3,771.388) 
All columns show the marginal effect of the preventive behavior at age 65 (or close) in separate 
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models predicting Medicare expenditures at age 65-69. All regressions were controlled for 
respondent's variables at age 65: inverse mills ratio (for selection bias), propensity weights, 
insurance status, risk aversion, time preference, gender, race, veteran status, working status, 
number of household residents, self-reported health status, insurance status, life insurance 
status, long term care insurance, education (less than high school, high school/GED, some 
college, college or above), assets,  mental health (CESD score), functional limitations, previous 
diagnosis of cancer, heart disease, lung disease, stroke, diabetes, arthritis, high blood pressure, 
residence in one of 10 census divisions and year when age 65. Heteroskedasticity adjusted 
standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5-
percent, and 10-percent level, respectively.     
 
 When added as a control a dummy indicating whether a respondent demands all 
clinical prevention services, the coefficient for the association of each of the single lifestyle 
preventive activities hardly changes. The dummy variable for all medical prevention is 
negative yet not significant. When the interaction term was added, the sum of the 
coefficients shows that engaging in physical activity while demanding all of the medical 
preventive services has a negative association with Medicare expenditures. The same can be 
said about being a non-smoker and demanding medical prevention. Yet, none of these are 
significant. When normal weight status is combined with demand for all the medical 
prevention services, there is a non significant positive association with expenditures. 
5.3. Average Treatment Effect  
Following Rosenbaum (1998) and Hirano, Imbens and Ridder (2003), the difference in 
weighted average of the outcomes between treatment and untreated group gives a consistent 
estimate of the average treatment effect (ATE) using nearest neighbor matching where the 
weights are proportional to the inverse of the estimated propensity scores. Propensity scores 
were calculated using logistic regression with the following regressors: race, age, education, 
financial planning horizon, life insurance policy, risk aversion to changing jobs, wealth, 
marital status, and long term care health insurance. 
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 Table 4.38 summarizes the ATE for the different preventive activities in separate 
models using inverse propensity scores as weights. The results confirm what was found in 
section 5.1. Lifestyle preventive activities tend to be correlated with lower the average 
expenditures during the first periods of Medicare of $2634 in the case normal weight status, 
$1,840 for non smoker status, and $1,143 for physical activity. These results are less negative 
that the OLS results yet not significant. The propensity scores seem to have ameliorated 
some of the selection biased that was evidenced in the examination of the alternative 
hypotheses in section 5.2. 
 The average treatment effect for all clinical preventive activities on the first 5 years of 
Medicare data is positive. However, only cholesterol screening has a positive and significant 
ATE. 
Table 4.38. Average treatment effect of each preventive activity on all Medicare expenditures 
Preventive 
activity 
Average Treatment 
Effect on all Medicare 
expenditures 
Physical Activity 
-1,143.75 
(3,296.38) 
Non-smoker 
status 
-1,840.91 
(3,482.204) 
Normal weight 
status 
-2,633.89 
(14,485.45) 
Flu shot 
1,696.72 
(4,312.23) 
Cholesterol 
screening 
6,401.31* 
(3,355.31) 
Mammogram 
5,072.48 
(2,895.51) 
Pap smear test 
204.40 
(3,101.16) 
Prostate cancer 
screening 
5,229.17 
(5,034.87) 
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Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, *  
denote statistical significance at the 1-percent,  
5-percent, and 10-percent level, respectively.     
5.4. Instruments 
  I try 8 plausible instruments that were thought in the theoretical model to be strong 
predictors of the demand for preventive care. I use each of these instruments in instrumental 
variable two stage least square models controlling for all the covariates used before (see table 
4.4). The results are disappointing as the estimates of the coefficients are extremely imprecise 
and not reliable. I attribute such results to the fact that in most cases, the instruments are too 
weak and show a Kleibergen-Paap statistic that is lower than the minimum standard of 10 to 
be considered sufficiently good instruments. 
 It is well recognized in the literature that using weak instruments will produce second 
stage marginal estimates with large standard errors. Also, if the instruments are not strongly 
correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable, then even a weak correlation between 
the instruments and the error in the original equation can lead to a large inconsistency in IV 
estimates (Bound, Jaeger & Baker, 1995). Both of these situations are evident in the use of 
my instrumental variables. The estimates for the marginal effects presented in table 4.39 are 
clearly unreasonable since some of them surpass the maximum actual observations of 
Medicare expenditures by many orders of magnitude. As such, I can only conclude that in 
this case, the use of instrumental variables does not help to alleviate the endogeneity 
problem in my estimation. 
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Table 4.39. Instrumental variable analysis of the effect of prevention on 5 year overall Medicare expenditures. 
    (1) (1a) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel A. Non risk averse instruments 
Preventive 
Activity 
Statistic 
Spouse's 
preventive activity 
(mammogram for 
prostate cancer 
screening) 
Spouse's 
preventive 
activity 
(pap smear 
for prostate 
cancer 
screening) 
Education 
years 
Long term 
financial 
planning 
Deterioration 
of health 
stock 
Household 
assets 
Physical 
Activity 
Coefficient -14,831.34 . -3,482,884.89 -19,945.85 105,806.99 -111,191.76 
Robust Std. Error 
                
(12,656.87) . 
  
(59,166,332.77) 
  
(57,438.06) 
    (99,168.97) 
      
(203,104.37) 
Kleibergen-Paap 
rk Wald F statistic 
for weak 
instruments 22.3 . 0.0 1.1 1.7 0.4 
Non-smoker 
status 
Coefficient -10,454.39 . 90,732.703** -92,275.29 388,846.14 -93,624.99 
Robust Std. Error 
                
(16,302.98) . 
        
(45,609.17) 
 
(191,179.30)    (812,817.36) 
       
(82,095.60) 
Kleibergen-Paap 
rk Wald F statistic 
for weak 
instruments 29.3 . 11.6 0.4 0.2 2.0 
Normal weight 
status 
Coefficient 83,625.55 . 106252.156 61,074.70 -311,476.46 -50,292.54 
Robust Std. Error 
                
(72,482.11) . 
      
(107,205.02) 
 
(130,694.41)    (806,968.05) 
       
(37,938.63) 
Kleibergen-Paap 
rk Wald F statistic 
for weak 2.8 . 1.6 0.4 0.2 2.9 
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instruments 
Flu shot 
Coefficient 3,758.32 . 42,527.131* -30,893.39 209,442.14 -135,178.31 
Robust Std. Error 
                  
(3,992.40) . 
        
(21,915.27) 
  
(42,332.91)    (362,298.37) 
      
(268,402.36) 
Kleibergen-Paap 
rk Wald F statistic 
for weak 
instruments 300.5 . 19.0 2.6 0.4 0.3 
Cholesterol 
screening 
Coefficient 19,617.27 . 53,023.985* -30,387.29 671,033.06 -60,425.28 
Robust Std. Error 
                
(17,165.98) . 
        
(27,230.82) 
  
(53,726.05) ######## 
       
(46,820.57) 
Kleibergen-Paap 
rk Wald F statistic 
for weak 
instruments 16.7 . 21.0 2.5 0.1 3.6 
Mammography 
Coefficient -13,474.83 . 40707.778 -19,403.02 -213,936.84 -5,552.43 
Robust Std. Error 
                
(68,243.37) . 
        
(30,965.28) 
  
(29,862.75)    (600,181.42) 
       
(23,733.15) 
Kleibergen-Paap 
rk Wald F statistic 
for weak 
instruments 1.6 . 12.2 5.9 0.2 4.3 
Pap smear test 
Coefficient -4,310.79 . 45244.646 -17,114.75 178,921.42 -4,386.49 
Robust Std. Error 
                
(32,888.99) . 
        
(34,599.23) 
  
(32,934.94)    (407,020.98) 
       
(33,839.26) 
Kleibergen-Paap 
rk Wald F statistic 
for weak 
instruments 4.7 . 8.1 3.7 0.2 1.9 
Prostate Coefficient 62,619.87 42040.927 55,889.081* -26,474.51 -175,815.22 -100,966.08 
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screening 
Robust Std. Error 
                
(39,580.18) -66389.684 
        
(29,056.04) 
  
(64,023.78)    (281,403.49) 
       
(94,775.42) 
Kleibergen-Paap 
rk Wald F statistic 
for weak 
instruments 4.9 2.4 17.6 1.7 0.5 1.9 
 
 
Panel B. Risk averse instruments 
       (6) (7) (8) 
   
Preventive 
Activity 
Statistic 
Risk aversion to 
job change 
Life 
insurance 
Long term 
care 
insurance 
   
Physical 
Activity 
Coefficient 46,008.88 13,749.12 -117,571.34 
   
Robust Std. Error 
                
(55,395.79) 
      
(32,818.31) 
      
(360,943.06) 
   Kleibergen-Paap 
rk Wald F statistic 
for weak 
instruments 1.9 2.9 0.1 
   
Non-smoker 
status 
Coefficient 100,928.82 -128,275.14 71,517.85 
   
Robust Std. Error 
              
(131,653.17) 
     
(331,695.71) 
        
(96,034.33) 
   Kleibergen-Paap 
rk Wald F statistic 
for weak 
instruments 1.1 0.2 1.7 
   
Normal weight 
status 
Coefficient -25,450.99 188,120.41 214,680.12 
   
Robust Std. Error 
                
(37,511.92) 
     
(689,920.73) 
      
(681,636.59) 
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Kleibergen-Paap 
rk Wald F statistic 
for weak 
instruments 3.3 0.1 0.1 
   
Flu shot 
Coefficient -393,502.55 -43,933.12 44,368.39 
   
Robust Std. Error 
            
(2,203,931.46) 
      
(84,720.62) 
        
(57,476.52) 
   Kleibergen-Paap 
rk Wald F statistic 
for weak 
instruments 0.0 0.7 1.7 
   
Cholesterol 
screening 
Coefficient 141,473.27 -139,537.18 694,928.06 
   
Robust Std. Error 
              
(266,902.14) 
     
(359,348.29) 
    
(6,343,066.07) 
   Kleibergen-Paap 
rk Wald F statistic 
for weak 
instruments 0.4 0.2 0.0 
   
Mammography 
Coefficient 227,540.36 -274,487.20 259,770.97 
   
Robust Std. Error 
              
(460,117.15) 
     
(859,952.79) 
      
(748,781.73) 
   Kleibergen-Paap 
rk Wald F statistic 
for weak 
instruments 0.3 0.1 0.1 
   
Pap smear test 
Coefficient 178,474.32 -202,052.76 -33,707.50 
   
Robust Std. Error 
              
(333,283.71) 
     
(554,458.39) 
        
(36,197.86) 
   Kleibergen-Paap 
rk Wald F statistic 
for weak 
instruments 0.3 0.1 4.4 
   Prostate Coefficient -133,808.02 7,817.25 11,076.20 
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screening 
Robust Std. Error 
              
(620,830.29) 
      
(21,495.01) 
        
(60,983.53) 
   Kleibergen-Paap 
rk Wald F statistic 
for weak 
instruments 0.1 10.4 1.4 
   All columns show the marginal effect of the preventive behavior at age 65 (or close) in separate models predicting Medicare expenditures at age 65-69. All regressions 
were controlled for respondent's variables at age 65: inverse mills ratio (for selection bias), propensity weights, insurance status, risk aversion, time preference, gender, race, 
veteran status, working status, number of household residents, self-reported health status, insurance status, life insurance status, long term care insurance, education (less 
than high school, high school/GED, some college, college or above), assets,  mental health (CESD score), functional limitations, previous diagnosis of cancer, heart 
disease, lung disease, stroke, diabetes, arthritis, high blood pressure, residence in one of 10 census divisions and year when age 65. Heteroskedasticity adjusted standard 
errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent, and 10-percent level, respectively.     
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5.5. Life expectancy 
 As evidenced in the last section, the differences in spending seem small even when 
significant. However, it has been pointed out that aside from financial gains some 
researchers have emphasized the potential health benefits of prevention as a way to justify 
increased funding for preventive activities and programs. Some European countries have 
reported that effective investment can be instrumental in securing longer life expectancy and, 
crucially, healthier life expectancy, by preventing and/or treating premature or avoidable 
morbidity (Raitano, 2006). To explore the possibility that prevention might affect life 
expectancy, in this section I turn to survival analysis. 
 
I used Cox proportional-hazard modeling to compute the hazard ratios, such that: 
 
                     ,         is the baseline hazard  
 
Confounders included the same covariates used when estimating the effect for health 
expenditures (table 4.2). Table 4.40 summarizes the hazard ratios estimated in individual 
models for each of the preventive activities. The only significantly differences in the hazard 
ratios were found in non smokers and normal weights. Non smokers had a 55.3% lower risk 
of death than smokers. Surprisingly, normal weight people had a 39.7% higher risk of death 
than overweight and obese respondents. 
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Table 4.40. Hazard ratios in Cox proportional hazard models. 
Preventive activity 
Effect of preventive activity on screening on 
survival models (respondents with at least 
five years of claim data) 
Physical Activity 
1.095 
(0.183) 
Non-smoker status 
0.447*** 
(0.083) 
Normal weight status 
1.397** 
-0.237 
Flu shot 
1.269 
(0.208) 
Cholesterol screening 
0.765 
(0.138) 
Mammogram 
1.007 
(0.297) 
Pap smear test 
0.743 
(0.183) 
Prostate cancer screening 
1.357 
(0.393) 
All columns show the marginal effect of the preventive behavior at age 65 (or close) in separate models 
predicting Medicare expenditures at age 65-69. All regressions were controlled for respondent's variables 
at age 65: inverse mills ratio (for selection bias), propensity weights, insurance status, risk aversion, time 
preference, gender, race, veteran status, working status, number of household residents, self-reported 
health status, insurance status, life insurance status, long term care insurance, education (less than high 
school, high school/GED, some college, college or above), assets,  mental health (CESD score), 
functional limitations, previous diagnosis of cancer, heart disease, lung disease, stroke, diabetes, arthritis, 
high blood pressure, residence in one of 10 census divisions and year when age 65. Heteroskedasticity 
adjusted standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5-
percent, and 10-percent level, respectively. 
226 
 
 Figure 19 shows the shape of the Kaplan-Meier failure functions by each of the 
different preventive activities separately. As expected from the Cox proportional hazards 
models‘ estimates presented above, there seems to be very little difference in the graphs. 
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Figure 19. Failure functions by preventive activity. 
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6. Discussion 
In this nationally representative study, the association between Medicare 
expenditures and preventive behavior at age 65 was analyzed. The results show that the kind 
of activities that are often catalogued as preventive activities have very different correlations 
with expenditures.  As such, widely different conclusions can be derived from each of them. 
None of these are without caveats as the study struggles to overcome the endogeneity 
concerns that are common in the topic of prevention 
In terms of the association of preventive activities with expenditures, I find three 
groups: the ones that have a negative association (physical activity, non-smoking and normal 
weight status, although the correlation of the last one is much more pronounced and 
significant in the long term), the ones with a positive association with expenditures (flu shot 
and cholesterol screening), and those that are largely ineffectual (mammograms, prostate 
cancer screening, and Pap smear test).  
Respondents who perform physical activity 3 or more times a week end up spending 
$4,852 less than respondents who exercise less frequently when analyzing 5 years of 
Medicare expenditures. When adjusting for confounding variables, the association reduces to 
$1,629 less dollars. Yet the magnitude of the association is insignificant. However, it does 
seem that physical activity is negatively and significantly associated with inpatient 
expenditures. The reason why adding controls substantially decrease the magnitude of the 
association of physical activity and expenditures is that respondents who engage in physical 
activity report having less chronic conditions and, importantly better health status. Hence, 
there is a powerful selection bias in the uptake of physical activity which is potentially driving 
the differences in expenditures as well. Even if the difference in expenditures could be 
229 
 
attributable to the effect of physical activity, it is worth considering that rather that true 
savings, these could be considered transfers as respondents invested considerable amounts 
of time and even perhaps foregone wages and leisure time exercising. 
Non- smoking is found to be associated with savings of $1,823 over 5 years, most of 
them coming from less inpatient expenditures. Similarly to the case of physical activity, non-
smokers tended to be also in better underlying health, more educated, and less prone to 
chronic conditions at baseline. Yet, when confounding effects were added, the negative 
association of non smoking on expenditures is exacerbated in adjusted multivariate analysis.  
Respondents with cholesterol screening and flu shots have higher 5 year Medicare 
expenditures: $4,586.85 for the former, and $1,244 for the latter. The associations are not 
significant when controlling for covariates. The differences seen in the descriptive analysis 
come probably as a result of worse underlying health at baseline. The evidence examined 
here indicate that respondents who engage in this activity have worse health status, more 
chronic conditions, and higher contact with the medical profession prior to Medicare. 
Cancer screenings, often grouped as forms of secondary prevention, did not seem to 
make any difference in the expenditure trends of respondents. Interestingly, women with 
mammograms and Pap smear test tended to have less inpatient expenditures (although these 
were mostly insignificant), but more outpatient and physician expenditures. The differences 
cancel each other. On the other hand, prostate cancer screening seems to be unequivocally 
correlated with insignificantly higher expenditures. 
Selection bias might be in play since and examination of alternative hypothesis 
showed that people in better underlying health were more prone to exercise and to be non-
smokers. Similarly, sicker people and people with more chronic conditions were more likely 
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to have cholesterol screenings and flu shots, and a history of more access to the health care 
system in the past. Propensity score methods were tried to ameliorate these biases. The 
average treatment effect derived from such methods confirm the general trends of the OLS 
regressions but the standard errors of such effects are too big to render the estimates 
significant. 
To address the question of whether the effect of health expenditures is obscured by 
effects on life expectancy, I used survival analysis. Survival graphs were shown to vary very 
little by preventive activity, where only non-smoking appearing to have an effect on the 
survival graphs. And in proportional hazard models with multiple covariates, non-smoking is 
also the only preventive activity that seems to significantly affect the survival rates. 
To try to address endogeneity concerns, instrumental variable analysis was attempted 
with several variables that were thought, using the theoretical background, to have good 
predictive power but that were ineffectual in affecting by themselves the expenditure trends. 
However, the analysis of these instrumental variables reveal a very weak first stage 
correlation with preventive behaviors leading to inflated second stage coefficients and large 
standard errors. Therefore, the instrumental variable analysis was deemed irrelevant. 
The study has numerous limitations. Firstly, although many attempts were performed 
to include and interpret a comprehensive set of observed variables that are present in HRS 
but seldom available in Medicare data analysis, it is still possible that unobserved variables 
may be driving the variation in expenditures. Secondly, the analysis is prone to a problem of 
counterfactuals. In this study, I observe the expenditure trends of people conditional on 
their decision to undertake prevention. However, I do not know how their expenditure 
profile would have looked had they chose the alternative route. Also, there is considerable 
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measurement error in my variables as the survey questions contain self reported information. 
Finally, the study does not take into account the lifetime history of prevention. It only looks 
at the preventive behavior at one point in time, namely at age 65. 
7. Conclusion and implications 
This study lends to the argument that prevention is less likely to result in cost savings 
among the older adults than often hoped. It is important to stress this, since politically 
prevention is still sometimes seen as a means to reduce health-care spending. From this 
analysis, it is clear that it is impossible to generalize about preventive interventions as though 
they were all alike. Some, like smoking cessation programs, may be good investments almost 
regardless of how they are applied as this study shows that non smokers spend less money 
and live longer. Some other might be associated with the advent of disease in such a way that 
it is impossible to understand its effect on expenditures absent randomized trials.  
It is important to clarify that this study does not answer the question of whether it is 
worth to invest in prevention or not. It just analyzes whether expenditure trends among 
Medicare beneficiaries are likely to be different or not without establishing any causal 
relationships, for which only carefully designed long term randomized experiments could 
definitive provide answers.  There might be many reasons why prevention are be a 
worthwhile investment. For once, some of these preventive activities might actually prove to 
be cost-effective if not cost-saving. They might also provide with better health outcomes. 
These questions were beyond the scope of this analysis.  
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8. Appendix 
8.1. Alternative expenditure measurements 
8.1.1. 10 years of data 
 In this additional section I look at all those expenditures and claims during the first 
10 years of a respondent‘s tenure in Medicare for the population that have at least 5 years of 
data in Medicare. 
Table A.4.1. Expenditures and claims during the first 10 years in Medicare by preventive activity. 
Preventi
ve 
activity 
Type of 
expenditure/cl
aims 
No prevention Prevention 
P-value 
(T-test) Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Vigorous 
Physical 
activity 
Overall 
expenditures 
$ 47,235.90 ($61,215.67) $  35,346.58 ($45,792.79) <0.001 
Inpatient 
expenditures 
$ 22,057.07 ($38,799.77) $  14,202.48 ($28,060.32) <0.001 
Physician 
expenditures 
$  15,981.73 ($16,912.09) $  14,299.26 ($19,637.89) 0.007 
Outpatient 
expenditures 
$   7,409.28 ($13,252.87) $    6,159.99 ($10,147.65) 0.003 
Overall claims 124.60 (95.34) 107.37 (74.24 <0.001 
Inpatient claims 1.93 (3.16) 1.22 (1.97 <0.001 
Physician claims 95.49 (75.04) 83.37 (57.54 <0.001 
Outpatient 
claims 
26.37 (30.63) 22.46 (26.86 <0.001 
Non- 
smoker 
status 
Overall 
expenditures 
$  48,559.16 ($52,219.33) $  41,642.27 ($56,540.20) 0.05 
Inpatient 
expenditures 
$ 23,535.77 ($34,730.02) $  18,248.37 ($35,463.06) 0.02 
Physician 
expenditures 
$  16,257.37 ($17,841.87) $  15,163.59 ($18,235.85) 0.330 
Outpatient 
expenditures 
$    7,376.30 ($10,501.11) $    6,811.38 ($12,081.41) 0.390 
Overall claims 111.96 (83.93) 117.89 (87.15) <0.001 
Inpatient claims 1.96 (3.05) 1.60 (2.72) 0.04 
Physician claims 82.80 (62.52) 91.07 (68.29) 0.06 
Outpatient 
claims 
26.51 (29.87) 24.58 (29.18) 0.19 
Normal 
weight 
Overall 
expenditures 
$ 44,349.94 ($58,299.11) $  37,219.15 ($47,355.93) 0.00 
Inpatient 
expenditures 
$  19,696.90 ($36,202.07) $  16,503.92 ($32,261.22) 0.02 
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Physician 
expenditures 
$  15,808.91 ($17,319.69) $  14,031.48 ($17,077.56) 0.032 
Outpatient 
expenditures 
$    7,179.44 ($12,084.46) $    5,869.26 ($8,684.81) 0.007 
Overall claims 122.14 (90.87) 107.49 (78.23) <0.001 
Inpatient claims 1.77 (2.98) 1.34 (2.20) <0.001 
Physician claims 94.02 (70.51) 82.83 (62.26) <0.001 
Outpatient 
claims 
25.64 (30.50) 22.91 (26.95) 0.02 
Flu shot 
Overall 
expenditures 
$  40,275.35 ($53,711.15) $ 44,789.96 ($58,038.58) 0.09 
Inpatient 
expenditures 
$  17,615.98 ($31,906.85) $  20,296.05 ($38,529.15) 0.14 
Physician 
expenditures 
$  14,937.66 ($20,330.67) $  15,797.97 ($16,649.72) 0.361 
Outpatient 
expenditures 
$    6,063.70 ($9,933.67) $   7,409.97 ($12,380.95) 0.006 
Overall claims 107.95 (80.24) 124.82 (91.28) <0.001 
Inpatient claims 1.49 (2.47) 1.77 (2.99) 0.04 
Physician claims 83.33 (62.32) 95.69 (71.49) 0.00 
Outpatient 
claims 
22.46 (26.83) 26.71 (31.01) <0.001 
Cholester
ol 
Screening 
Overall 
expenditures 
$  39,863.86 ($48,400.64) $  43,438.36 ($57,893.67) 0.22 
Inpatient 
expenditures 
$  19,171.36 ($33,361.81) $  18,994.46 ($35,922.37) 0.97 
Physician 
expenditures 
$  13,769.71 ($14,285.25) $  15,797.64 ($19,217.13) 0.033 
Outpatient 
expenditures 
$    5,705.89 ($8,868.24) $    7,154.28 ($12,217.04) 0.023 
Overall claims 99.19 (75.61) 121.97 (89.14) <0.001 
Inpatient claims 1.56 (2.4 ) 1.67 (2.83) 0.49 
Physician claims 77.27 (59.34) 93.55 (69.56) <0.001 
Outpatient 
claims 
19.80 (23.89) 26.08 (30.30) <0.001 
Mammog
ram 
Overall 
expenditures 
$  42,325.17 ($61,698.97) $  39,687.11 ($53,931.31) 0.51 
Inpatient 
expenditures 
$  21,325.61 ($39,875.77) $  15,884.24 ($31,525.64) 0.27 
Physician 
expenditures 
$  12,881.12 ($13,986.85) $  15,273.78 ($18,660.74) 0.060 
Outpatient 
expenditures 
$    6,098.58 ($12,633.75) $    6,910.68 ($10,055.24) 0.308 
Overall claims 105.30 (85.98) 127.75 (90.66) <0.001 
Inpatient claims 1.84 (3.12) 1.53 (2.76) 0.15 
Physician claims 79.17 (66.34) 97.84 (71.46) <0.001 
Outpatient 
claims 
23.20 (27.36) 27.75 (30.26) 0.01 
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Pap 
smear 
test 
Overall 
expenditures 
$ 47,799.94 ($72,049.93) $  36,433.75 ($45,667.42) 0.00 
Inpatient 
expenditures 
$  22,718.47 ($41,876.52) $  14,214.39 ($28,275.17) <0.001 
Physician 
expenditures 
$  14,652.42 ($17,129.36) $  14,776.90 ($18,460.44) 0.920 
Outpatient 
expenditures 
$    7,441.95 ($14,094.50) $    6,385.02 ($8,737.71) 0.118 
Overall claims 122.38 (101.61) 122.71 (83.71) 0.80 
Inpatient claims 1.99 ( 3.46) 1.39 ( 2.44) <0.001 
Physician claims 91.79 (77.27) 94.51 (67.26) 0.46 
Outpatient 
claims 
27.39 (31.40) 26.32 (28.68) 0.76 
Prostate 
cancer 
screening 
Overall 
expenditures 
$  42,956.33 ($46,817.76) $   45,119.12 ($56,545.41) 0.67 
Inpatient 
expenditures 
$  20,328.66 ($28,594.94) $  20,694.65 ($37,075.23) 0.98 
Physician 
expenditures 
$  13,837.79 ($13,831.62) $  16,485.17 ($19,712.25) 0.081 
Outpatient 
expenditures 
$    7,610.86 ($14,139.39) $    6,959.41 ($13,188.99) 0.657 
Overall claims 96.43 (80.36) 112.75 ( 81.12) 0.01 
Inpatient claims 1.75 (2.44 ) 1.65 ( 2.57) 0.58 
Physician claims 70.96 (56.52 ) 88.45 (63.62) 0.00 
Outpatient 
claims 
23.18 (34.86 ) 22.18 (26.86) 0.83 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
235 
 
Table A.4.2. OLS regression coefficients for expenditures during the first 10 years in Medicare  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Preventive 
activity/Type of 
expenditure 
Preventive 
activity on 
screening on all 
Medicare 
expenditures age 
65 to 74 
Preventive 
activity on 
screening on 
inpatient 
expenditures 
age 65 to 74 
Preventive 
activity on 
screening on 
physician 
expenditures 
age 65 to 74 
Preventive 
activity on 
screening on 
outpatient 
expenditures 
age 65 to 74 
Vigorous Activity 
-25,944.719** -15,617.937** -9,620.998** -22.023 
(11818.767) (7347.050) (4081.034) (2209.505) 
Non smoker status 
-26,241.665 -26,723.983* 1,305.995 -251.694 
(17784.402) (14454.907) (4026.941) (1960.019) 
Normal weight 
-24,055.661*** -13,823.418** -5,812.305* -4,166.765* 
(9118.511) (5760.033) (3143.177) (2232.342) 
Flu shot 
6,371.769 5,808.199 733.226 116.829 
(7791.875) (5384.040) (2683.153) (1695.166) 
Cholesterol 
Screening 
-2,902.725 -5,903.329 -525.647 3,945.397* 
(13136.321) (9071.591) (3861.587) (2208.077) 
Pap smear test 
-15,193.972 -10,079.477 -2,052.012 -2,459.255 
(13513.576) (9769.720) (3072.486) (3093.311) 
Mammogram 
-9,583.652 -11184.06 2,908.023 -864.687 
(13365.322) (8889.879) (3329.916) (3107.139) 
Prostate cancer 
screening 
25,478.441 11,821.023 12,108.223 1,088.711 
(22547.980) (14455.423) (7596.269) (2898.598) 
N 229 
N-female 122 
N-male 107 
All columns show the marginal effect of the preventive behavior at age 65 (or close) in separate models 
predicting Medicare expenditures at age 65-69. All regressions were controlled for respondent's variables 
at age 65: inverse mills ratio (for selection bias), propensity weights, insurance status, risk aversion, time 
preference, gender, race, veteran status, working status, number of household residents, self-reported 
health status, insurance status, life insurance status, long term care insurance, education (less than high 
school, high school/GED, some college, college or above), assets,  mental health (CESD score), 
functional limitations, previous diagnosis of cancer, heart disease, lung disease, stroke, diabetes, arthritis, 
high blood pressure, residence in one of 10 census divisions and year when age 65. Heteroskedasticity 
adjusted standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5-
percent, and 10-percent level, respectively.     
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8.1.2. Average Annual Expenditures 
 In this section, I calculate average yearly expenditures for the population that has at 
least one year of Medicare claims data. 
Table A.4.3. Average expenditures and claims during the first 10 years in Medicare by preventive 
activity 
Preventiv
e activity 
Type of 
expenditure/c
laims 
No prevention Prevention 
P-value 
(T-test) Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Vigorous 
Physical 
activity 
Overall 
expenditures 
$ 6,348.25 ($10,315.89) $4,641.66 ($7,393.67) <0.001 
Inpatient 
expenditures 
$16,604.58 ($16,336.54) $15,568.74 ($15,463.09) 0.20 
Physician 
expenditures 
$2,180.57 ($3,058.60) $1,867.50 ($3,191.81) 0.002 
Outpatient 
expenditures 
$1,508.88 ($3,168.86) $1,088.47 ($1,555.95) <0.001 
Overall claims 15.55 (13.00) 13.52 (9.90) <0.001 
Inpatient 
claims 
1.38 (0.65) 1.32 (0.54) 0.03 
Physician 
claims 
12.15 (10.26) 10.72 (8.01) <0.001 
Outpatient 
claims 
4.34 (4.26) 3.68 (3.17) <0.001 
Non- 
smoker 
status 
Overall 
expenditures 
$6,607.53 ($10,901.69) $5,452.06 ($8,906.39) 0.005 
Inpatient 
expenditures 
$19,896.91 ($20,405.34) $15,477.09 ($14,984.10) <0.001 
Physician 
expenditures 
$2,100.90 ($3,567.27) $2,036.45 ($3,036.11) 0.645 
Outpatient 
expenditures 
$1,385.87 ($3,044.65) $1,326.45 ($2,559.22) 0.646 
Overall claims 13.65 (12.04) 14.87 (11.79) 0.02 
Inpatient 
claims 
1.43 (0.67) 1.34 (0.59) 0.02 
Physician 
claims 
11.74 (9.36) 13.44 (9.40) 0.001 
Outpatient 
claims 
4.22 (3.85) 4.02 (3.85) 0.29 
Normal 
weight 
Overall 
expenditures 
$5,891.05 ($5,891.05) $4,921.18 ($8,265.58) 0.003 
Inpatient 
expenditures 
$15,979.33 ($15,387.64) $16,606.47 ($17,799.77) 0.50 
Physician 
expenditures 
$2,103.28 ($3,065.02) $1,917.73 ($3,294.97) 0.096 
Outpatient 
expenditures 
$1,365.51 ($2,632.47) $2,632.47 ($2,052.59) 0.044 
Overall claims 15.24 (12.31) 13.40 (10.59) <0.001 
Inpatient 
claims 
1.36 (0.62) 1.33 (0.56) 0.41 
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Physician 
claims 
11.97 (9.78) 10.58 (8.54) <0.001 
Outpatient 
claims 
4.17 (4.01) 3.71 (3.35) 0.00 
Flu shot 
Overall 
expenditures 
$5,494.48 ($9,208.84) $5,725.02 ($9,244.85) 0.44 
Inpatient 
expenditures 
$16,176.59 ($15,438.61) $16,199.69 ($16,365.75) 0.977 
Physician 
expenditures 
$2,004.25 ($3,843.79) $2,078.68 ($2,518.40) 0.465 
Outpatient 
expenditures 
$1,250.92 ($2,461.30) $1,385.73 ($2,726.47) 0.148 
Overall claims 13.15 (10.90) 15.74 (12.33) <0.001 
Inpatient 
claims 
1.33 (0.58) 1.37 (0.62) 0.16 
Physician 
claims 
10.34 (8.76) 12.35 (9.76) <0.001 
Outpatient 
claims 
3.76 (3.55) 4.25 (4.03) <0.001 
Cholestero
l Screening 
Overall 
expenditures 
$5,679.15 ($9,222.13) $5,630.42 ($9,251.95) 0.90 
Inpatient 
expenditures 
$18,016.91 ($19,173.89) $15,795.33 ($15,131.86) 0.03 
Physician 
expenditures 
$1,860.97 ($3,273.33) $2,092.82 ($3,080.35) 0.07 
Outpatient 
expenditures 
$1,326.73 ($2,804.36) $1,335.00 ($2,591.47) 0.94 
Overall claims 11.89 (9.82) 15.35 (12.15) <0.001 
Inpatient 
claims 
1.36 (0.57) 1.35 (0.62) 0.86 
Physician 
claims 
9.26 (7.84) 12.08 (9.66) <0.001 
Outpatient 
claims 
3.69 (3.44) 4.13 (3.92) 0.01 
Mammogr
am 
Overall 
expenditures 
$6,365.41 ($11,973.45) $5,125.15 ($8,151.97) 0.01 
Inpatient 
expenditures 
$18,605.22 ($20,604.12) $13,768.54 ($13,407.46) <0.001 
Physician 
expenditures 
$1,997.83 ($3,742.59) $2,102.60 ($3,197.06) 0.54 
Outpatient 
expenditures 
$1,326.30 ($2,887.50) $1,198.25 ($2,288.43) 0.35 
Overall claims 13.95 (13.76) 16.18 (12.06) <0.001 
Inpatient 
claims 
1.49 (0.75) 1.31 (0.58) <0.001 
Physician 
claims 
10.62 (10.74) 12.73 (9.58) <0.001 
Outpatient 
claims 
4.30 (4.05) 4.20 (3.89) 0.64 
Pap smear 
test 
Overall 
expenditures 
$6,222.54 ($10,955.23) $4,940.27 ($7,961.86) 0.002 
Inpatient $17,127.09 ($19,122.60) $13,628.91 ($12,934.23) 0.00 
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expenditures 
Physician 
expenditures 
$2,030.68 ($3,261.29) $2,082.40 ($3,320.12) 0.73 
Outpatient 
expenditures 
$1,308.14 ($2,606.17) $1,179.22 ($2,326.03) 0.28 
Overall claims 15.54 (13.61) 15.69 (11.84) 0.78 
Inpatient 
claims 
1.47 (0.74) 1.29 (0.54) <0.001 
Physician 
claims 
11.88 (10.43) 12.39 (9.57) 0.26 
Outpatient 
claims 
4.45 (4.24) 4.09 (3.72) 0.06 
Prostate 
cancer 
screening 
Overall 
expenditures 
$6,247.52 ($9,593.56) $5,822.38 ($9,207.62) 0.42 
Inpatient 
expenditures 
$19,070.49 ($17,687.73) $17,334.54 ($15,298.39) 0.22 
Physician 
expenditures 
$1,844.58 ($2,444.78) $2,058.23 ($2,929.53) 0.18 
Outpatient 
expenditures 
$1,528.58 ($2,737.83) $1,448.00 ($2,871.57) 0.66 
Overall claims 11.71 (10.09) 13.98 (10.92) <0.001 
Inpatient 
claims 
1.43 (0.64) 1.33 (0.56) 0.06 
Physician 
claims 
9.05 (7.95) 11.13 (8.76) <0.001 
Outpatient 
claims 
3.92 (4.39) 3.82 (3.55) 0.66 
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Table A.4.4. OLS regression coefficients for average yearly expenditure 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Preventive 
activity 
Preventive 
activity on 
screening on all 
Medicare 
expenditures age 
65 to 74 
Preventive 
activity on 
screening on 
inpatient 
expenditures 
age 65 to 74 
Preventive 
activity on 
screening on 
physician 
expenditures 
age 65 to 74 
Preventive activity 
on screening on 
outpatient 
expenditures age 
65 to 74 
Vigorous 
Activity 
-409.633 62.661 40.214 -179.265* 
(291.099) (815.681) (115.128) (100.660) 
Non smoker 
status 
-697.022 -4,695.346*** 7.794 -19.237 
(480.458) (1402.879) (156.608) (161.122) 
Normal 
weight 
-208.371 830.282 -25.255 -120.075 
(304.485) (954.932) (120.782) (85.918) 
Flu shot 
-309.822 -803.572 -178.328 67.413 
(307.401) (844.951) (140.559) (92.820) 
Cholesterol 
Screening 
-973.589** -4,305.168*** -62.367 -165.246 
(408.864) (1243.372) (142.729) (147.248) 
Pap smear test 
-240.908 -2,794.045** 225.395 -25.255 
(439.526) (1337.001) (156.053) (137.359) 
Mammogram 
-754.478 -5,427.344*** 129.693 -0.82 
(513.393) (1564.793) (199.272) (130.711) 
Prostate 
cancer 
screening 
-479.75 -953.478 178.299 -105.459 
(557.512) (1483.696) (142.545) (215.101) 
N 3647 
N-female 2102 
N-male 1545 
All columns show the marginal effect of the preventive behavior at age 65 (or close) in separate models 
predicting Medicare expenditures at age 65-69. All regressions were controlled for respondent's variables 
at age 65: inverse mills ratio (for selection bias), propensity weights, insurance status, risk aversion, time 
preference, gender, race, veteran status, working status, number of household residents, self-reported 
health status, insurance status, life insurance status, long term care insurance, education (less than high 
school, high school/GED, some college, college or above), assets,  mental health (CESD score), 
functional limitations, previous diagnosis of cancer, heart disease, lung disease, stroke, diabetes, arthritis, 
high blood pressure, residence in one of 10 census divisions and year when age 65. Heteroskedasticity 
adjusted standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1-percent, 5-
percent, and 10-percent level, respectively.     
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CONCLUSION 
 
The main objective of this dissertation is to investigate the demand and the 
association of prevention with Medicare expenditures among older adults. In order to do so, 
I have adapted some of the most existent theoretical frameworks in the literature to the 
better predict the factors influence the uptake of prevention among an older population. In 
addition, I have made use of a unique combination of data resources in the form of eight 
rounds of the longitudinal data set Health and Retirement Study linked to Medicare claims 
data. To my knowledge, this is one of the first studies to try to attack such a thorny area of a 
study in such a comprehensive manner. The combination of the theoretical and empirical 
work renders a thorough analysis of the area of study. 
In the first part of the dissertation, I find that empirically higher levels of education 
translate in a higher demand for prevention. A higher discount rate of time is negatively 
correlated with prevention. Risk aversion and wealth were also found empirically to be 
highly correlated with preventive investments. These results were predicted in the conceptual 
theoretical model of prevention. 
In the analysis of preventive behavior in the household, I outline theoretical reasons 
that might explain the large correlation between spouses demand for prevention. I find that 
the correlation between physical activity among elderly and near elderly spouses seems to be 
consistent with positive matching in marriage, while the correlation between all other 
preventive behaviors appears to be connected to decision-making within the household. 
Spouse‘s health shocks are not significant predictors of initiation or termination of any of 
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the preventive activities studied, therefore reducing the likelihood that social learning about 
risks and healthy lifestyle benefits might be driving the correlation. 
This chapter provides at least two important contributions for the field. The first is 
purely descriptive or positive: if we are able to identify the source of similarity in couples‘ 
behaviors, we will build better and more accurate economic models of the household. The 
second is normative: optimal policy is bound to depend on the nature of household 
interactions. Given the interest in the American health care system to increase preventive 
behavior, is useful to know whether is more efficient to target one person per household in 
term of a given health intervention, or to target all members. The evidence in this chapter 
shows that for most preventive activities, the demand is jointly driven by bargaining within 
the household, perhaps targeting only one household member, for example women, could 
have the spillover effect of shifting the behavior in men too. 
Using a panel data set from the Health and Retirement study linked to Medicare 
claims data, I find evidence that while lifestyle prevention such as physical activity, non-
smoking and normal weight status maintenance are negatively associated with Medicare 
expenditures at ages 65-69, clinical preventive activities such flu shot, cholesterol 
screening, mammography, Pap smears test and prostate cancer screening have at best no 
effect on expenditures, at worst they are positively associated, yet these findings are 
biased by uncontrolled unobservables.  
As stated at the beginning of this dissertation, prevention is still sometimes seen as a 
means to reduce health-care spending particularly in certain political and policy making 
circles. From this analysis, it is clear that it is impossible to generalize about preventive 
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interventions as though they were all alike. As I have thoroughly examined in this 
dissertation, lifestyle preventive activities and clinical ones are very different from each other 
and their corresponding associations with Medicare expenditures vary widely. Still, the 
question of why preventive services might or might not save money remains.  
After reviewing the evidence in the literature and using the analysis in this 
dissertation, I believe that smoking cessation programs may indeed be considered a good 
investment almost regardless of how they are applied as this study shows that non smokers 
spend less money and live longer. The results in chapter 4 seem to be robust under different 
specifications controlling for a wide variety of factors.  
Physical activity and maintaining a normal weight proved to be negatively associated 
with 5- year Medicare expenditures yet not significantly so. However, they seem to make 
much more of a difference over the 10th year period. It is problematic to attribute causal 
relationship between these two activities and expenditures since there is strong evidence of 
self-selection even when controlling for a comprehensive list of variables as I did. 
Furthermore, even if exercising had a direct effect on less expenditures, one would have to 
consider the possibility that it can be considered a transfer from personal income/leisure 
time to whoever pays the medical bills (Medicare plus the respondent herself who might 
cover co-payments). Exercising at least 3 times a week, as posed in the question asked in the 
HRS survey, takes a considerable amount of time that could be spent otherwise. Following 
the traditional Grossman model or any other human capital model, the time spent exercising 
comes either from foregone income or leisure time. In other words, a person investing time 
and money to engage in physical activity could be essentially transferring money to Medicare. 
From the point of view of the Medicare program this could be seen, of course, as a net gain. 
243 
 
Thus, there is no reason to discourage people from maintaining a healthy weight or 
exercising. However, one has to keep in mind that the magnitudes for the savings that could 
be associated with exercising (i.e. $1,000-$5,000 per person over 5 years of expenditures), 
even if one could indeed make a causal connection, are timid when compared to the 
financial troubles confronted by the Medicare program. Hence, when policy makers talk 
about the savings that could be gained by these interventions, they should realize the 
limitations and magnitudes of such policies. 
Clinical preventive services might not save money for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
these preventive services are not always used exactly in the Grossman sense of a means for 
creating health stock. Rather, as it was found in chapter 3, they are often used in response to 
a health shock or illness episode.  It is conceivable that oftentimes, preventive services such 
as flu shot or a cholesterol screening not only follow a doctor visit or a hospitalization, but 
are prescribed as a consequence of them. This would be in agreement with the evidence that 
respondents who report having either of these services were demonstrably sicker of had 
more ailments on average that people who do not undergo these services. This translates in a 
larger expenditure stream in the following years. 
Another possibility is that preventive activities do not save money per se, rather they 
change the mix of services in which the money is spent. For instance, in the cases of Pap 
smears and mammography it was found that respondents with either of these preventive 
services had less inpatient expenditures but more outpatient and physician expenditures. In 
the end, these expenditures balance off. 
Another reason that might contribute to explain why investment services do not 
translate in saving in medical expenditures lies in the fact that the people that demand 
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medical services have more appetite or a higher preference for medical care. In this study, 
people that were more prone to exercise, being non smoker, have flu shots, cholesterol 
screening, Pap smear test, mammography, prostate cancer screening were also more likely to 
demand medical services (such as dental care, outpatient services, and doctor visits) prior to 
turning 65. These people might be unlikely to cut their use of services while on Medicare 
thus diluting any potential effect that prevention is having in shifting their need for medical 
care. 
Prostate cancer screening, at this particular age seems to be highly ineffectual as a 
cost containment strategy. Respondents who report this service do not appear to be 
demonstrably sicker than people without the test, yet, as noted above, they do have a 
preference for more medical care. In the end, they end up spending more in all measures: 5 
year Medicare spending, 10 year Medicare spending, and average annual spending. It might 
well be that this is the wrong timing to measure the effectiveness or desirability of prostate 
cancer screening since this disease tend to presents itself later in life. Yet, given the 
controversy regarding the treatment for prostate cancer to begin with and given its poor 
cost-effectiveness demonstrated in clinical trials, one should really question if there is much 
use to prostate cancer screening to begin with, at least at that age. 
As corollary of this, one could say that perhaps the reason why prevention is not 
effective a significant cost containment tool is because the people for which those services 
could be more effective either do not get or are not the only ones to get it. One has to be 
aware that the results presented in this chapter represent an average effect on the difference 
on expenditure between those who get those services and those who do not. It might well be 
the case that the value of the interventions is diluted by the fact that people for whom they 
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are not truly effective are thrown into the pool. This has been a consistent finding of well 
designed cost-effectiveness and has been one of the arguments towards emphasizing the 
design of preventive interventions that target more narrow populations for which a given 
intervention might be more useful, e.g. more frequent mammograms only for women with a 
family history of breast cancer. 
Finally, this study corroborates many of the arguments that have been purported by 
Louise Russell throughout the years: there is hardly in any evidence that prevention saves 
moneys. In light of my findings and the literature that precedes them, it would be wise to 
stop touting prevention as a panacea by which any health care system might save costs. This 
does not necessarily mean that prevention is futile. In fact, in many cases it is perfectly 
legitimate to decide that the better health gained from preventive services is worth the 
expense. But it does mean that we need to realize that prevention is not going to help reduce 
the growth of medical spending. It is the opinion of this author that advocates of prevention 
will do their field much good by acknowledging that the alleged cost-savings of prevention 
are infrequent yet much wasteful curative treatments. 
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